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| Following Hideyoshi's death in 1598, and [[Tokugawa Ieyasu]]'s subsequent rise to power, Shô Nei was asked by Satsuma to formally submit to the new shogunate, a request which was also ignored. The Shimazu then requested to launch a punitive mission against Ryûkyû and, in 1606, were granted permission by the shogunate. | | Following Hideyoshi's death in 1598, and [[Tokugawa Ieyasu]]'s subsequent rise to power, Shô Nei was asked by Satsuma to formally submit to the new shogunate, a request which was also ignored. The Shimazu then requested to launch a punitive mission against Ryûkyû and, in 1606, were granted permission by the shogunate. |
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| + | ==Planning== |
| + | The final planning stages for the invasion took place in the second lunar month of Keichô 14 (1609). On the sixth day of that month, the senior Shimazu retainers met and named [[Kabayama Hisataka]] to lead the invasion as ''sôtaishô''; [[Hirata Masamune]] would serve as his second in command. This marked the beginning of the gathering of forces for the invasion. |
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| + | The Satsuma forces were instructed to withdraw from the islands as soon as their military objectives were accomplished, and to return to Satsuma no later than the fifth or sixth month. To that end, in order to help ensure the efficiency of the mission, instructions were given to avoid excessive antagonism of the common people, by desecrating palaces, shrines or temples, or by scattering Confucian materials. In the end, the invasion would successfully adhere to its planned timeframe, securing the submission of even the outlying [[Sakishima Islands]] and departing from the Ryukyus before the end of the fifth month. |
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| ==Invasion== | | ==Invasion== |
− | The final planning stages for the invasion took place in the second lunar month of Keichô 14 (1609). On the sixth day of that month, the senior Shimazu retainers met and named [[Kabayama Hisataka]] to lead the invasion as ''sôtaishô''; [[Hirata Masamune]] would serve as his second in command. This marked the beginning of the gathering of forces for the invasion.
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| On the fourth day of the third month, the Satsuma force, consisting of over 100 ships carrying roughly 3000 warriors and 5000 sailors and laborers,<ref>Smits, Gregory. "[http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gregory-Smits/3409 Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism]." ''The Asia-Pacific Journal'' 37-3-10 (September 13, 2010).</ref> left [[Yamakawa]] Harbor for the Ryukyus. The samurai landed at the friendly [[Kuchinoerabujima]] the following day, staying there several nights before departing for [[Amami Oshima|Amami Ôshima]], where the invasion began in earnest on 3/7. The island would not fall to the invaders until 3/16. After an initial landing at Kasari Bay, the invaders moved on to Yamatohama on 3/12, and then to Nishi Yoshimi, securing the island by 3/16. | | On the fourth day of the third month, the Satsuma force, consisting of over 100 ships carrying roughly 3000 warriors and 5000 sailors and laborers,<ref>Smits, Gregory. "[http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gregory-Smits/3409 Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism]." ''The Asia-Pacific Journal'' 37-3-10 (September 13, 2010).</ref> left [[Yamakawa]] Harbor for the Ryukyus. The samurai landed at the friendly [[Kuchinoerabujima]] the following day, staying there several nights before departing for [[Amami Oshima|Amami Ôshima]], where the invasion began in earnest on 3/7. The island would not fall to the invaders until 3/16. After an initial landing at Kasari Bay, the invaders moved on to Yamatohama on 3/12, and then to Nishi Yoshimi, securing the island by 3/16. |
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| The samurai advance next made its way across [[Tairabashi|Tairakyô]] (today called Tairabashi), an important bridge on the road from Urasoe to Shuri, defeating 100 men who sought to defend it, led by [[Goeku ueekata]]. Ryukyuan records of the skirmish indicate that they were felled "in a hail of bullets" and that "[they] did not know about guns like these"<ref>Turnbull. p40.</ref>. Contrary to some myths about the pacifistic nature of the Okinawan people, or their lack of arms, the Ryukyuan defenders were in fact armed with [[Firearms in Ryukyu|firearms]], and their ships and fortresses with cannon, as well, albeit ones based upon Chinese firearms, while the samurai used arquebuses based on European designs. | | The samurai advance next made its way across [[Tairabashi|Tairakyô]] (today called Tairabashi), an important bridge on the road from Urasoe to Shuri, defeating 100 men who sought to defend it, led by [[Goeku ueekata]]. Ryukyuan records of the skirmish indicate that they were felled "in a hail of bullets" and that "[they] did not know about guns like these"<ref>Turnbull. p40.</ref>. Contrary to some myths about the pacifistic nature of the Okinawan people, or their lack of arms, the Ryukyuan defenders were in fact armed with [[Firearms in Ryukyu|firearms]], and their ships and fortresses with cannon, as well, albeit ones based upon Chinese firearms, while the samurai used arquebuses based on European designs. |
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− | Meanwhile, the other half of the invading force, which progressed to Naha by sea, were repulsed by the port's defenses, in one of the only Ryukyuan victories of the campaign, though it would prove short-lived. [[Jana Ueekata|Tei Dô]] (Jana ''[[ueekata]]'') and [[Tomigusuku Seizoku]] commanded a force of 3000 soldiers in defending the harbor. [[Mie gusuku|Mie]] and [[Yarazamori gusuku]], located on opposite sides of the harbor, were both armed with cannon. A net or chain of iron was stretched between them, blocking the enemy ships from entering the harbor. The Japanese ships then turned back, making port somewhere nearby to the north, possibly at Makiminato. | + | Meanwhile, the other half of the invading force, which progressed to Naha by sea, were repulsed by the port's defenses, in one of the only Ryukyuan victories of the campaign, though it would prove short-lived. Tei Dô (Jana ''[[ueekata]]'') and [[Tomigusuku Seizoku]] commanded a force of 3000 soldiers in defending the harbor. [[Mie gusuku|Mie]] and [[Yarazamori gusuku]], located on opposite sides of the harbor, were both armed with cannon. A net or chain of iron was stretched between them, blocking the enemy ships from entering the harbor. The Japanese ships then turned back, making port somewhere nearby to the north, possibly at Makiminato. |
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| Turnbull points out that the maritime attack may have been a feint, to distract from the land-based attack and to draw defenders away from the capital. As Kabayama's diary and other sources do not directly indicate the generals' intentions, it is impossible to know whether the maritime attack on Naha was authentic, or merely a feint. Nevertheless, in the end, the land-based force would succeed in seizing [[Shuri castle]] and claiming victory over the kingdom. | | Turnbull points out that the maritime attack may have been a feint, to distract from the land-based attack and to draw defenders away from the capital. As Kabayama's diary and other sources do not directly indicate the generals' intentions, it is impossible to know whether the maritime attack on Naha was authentic, or merely a feint. Nevertheless, in the end, the land-based force would succeed in seizing [[Shuri castle]] and claiming victory over the kingdom. |
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| ==Aftermath== | | ==Aftermath== |
− | Shô Nei and the other hostages were taken to [[Sunpu]] to meet with the retired [[Shogun]] Tokugawa Ieyasu, then to [[Edo]] for a formal audience with Shogun [[Tokugawa Hidetada]], and then to Kagoshima, where the king was forced to more formally surrender and to declare a number of oaths to the Shimazu clan. | + | Shô Nei and the other hostages were taken to Kagoshima, and then, in the summer of [[1610]], to [[Sunpu]] to meet with the retired [[Shogun]] Tokugawa Ieyasu, then to [[Edo]] for a formal audience with Shogun [[Tokugawa Hidetada]], and finally to Kagoshima, where on [[1611]]/9/19, the king was forced to more formally surrender and to declare a number of oaths to the Shimazu clan. For two years, Shô Nei and the other hostages were treated, in some ways at least, as "guests," and were treated to numerous banquets and entertainments.<ref name=sakai>[[Robert Sakai]], "The Ryukyu Islands as a Fief of Satsuma," in [[John K. Fairbank]], ''The Chinese World Order'', Harvard University Press (1968), 112-134.</ref> |
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| In 1611, two years after the invasion, the king returned to his castle at Shuri. | | In 1611, two years after the invasion, the king returned to his castle at Shuri. |
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| ==Consequences and effects== | | ==Consequences and effects== |
− | The surrender documents signed at Kagoshima in 1611 were accompanied by a series of oaths<ref>These can be found in translation in Kerr. pp160-163.</ref>. The king and his councilors were made to swear that "the islands of Riu Kiu have from ancient times been a feudal dependency of Satsuma"<ref>Smits. ''Visions of Ryukyu''. p16.</ref>, and that there was a long-standing tradition of sending tribute and congratulatory missions on the succession of the Satsuma lords, those these were all falsehoods. The oaths also included stipulations that the kingdom admit its wrongdoing in ignoring and rejecting numerous requests for materials and for manpower, that the invasion was justified and deserved, and that the lord of Satsuma was merciful and kind in allowing the king and his officers to return home and to remain in power. Finally, the councilors were forced to swear their allegiance to the Shimazu over their king. Tei Dô refused to sign the oaths and was beheaded. | + | The surrender documents signed at Kagoshima in 1611 were accompanied by a series of oaths<ref>These can be found in translation in Kerr. pp160-163.</ref>. The king and his councilors were made to swear that "the islands of Riu Kiu have from ancient times been a feudal dependency of Satsuma"<ref>Smits. ''Visions of Ryukyu''. p16.</ref>, and that there was a long-standing tradition of sending tribute and congratulatory missions on the succession of the Satsuma lords, though these were all falsehoods. The oaths also included stipulations that the kingdom admit its wrongdoing in ignoring and rejecting numerous requests for materials and for manpower, that the invasion was justified and deserved, and that the lord of Satsuma was merciful and kind in allowing the king and his officers to return home and to remain in power. Finally, the councilors were forced to swear their allegiance to the Shimazu over their king. Tei Dô refused to sign the oaths and was beheaded. |
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| + | The agreements also included, however, assurances on Satsuma’s part that the independence of the kingdom and the dignity of the royal family would be maintained, and that Satsuma recognized the social and cultural autonomy of the kingdom and guaranteed the rights of islanders against abuse by Satsuma representatives.<ref name=sakai/> |
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− | The kingdom's royal governmental structures remained intact, along with its royal lineage. The Ryukyus remained nominally independent, a "foreign country" (異国, ''ikoku'')<ref>Toby. pp46-7.</ref> to the Japanese, and efforts were made to obscure Satsuma's domination of Ryûkyû from the Chinese Court, in order to ensure the continuation of trade and diplomacy, since China refused to conduct formal relations or trade with Japan at the time. However, though the king retained considerable powers, he was only permitted to operate within a framework of strict guidelines set down by Satsuma, and was required to pay considerable amounts in tribute to Satsuma on a regular basis. | + | The kingdom's royal governmental structures thus remained intact, along with its royal lineage. The Ryukyus remained nominally independent, a "foreign country" (異国, ''ikoku'')<ref>Toby. pp46-7.</ref> to the Japanese, and efforts were made to obscure Satsuma's domination of Ryûkyû from the Chinese Court, in order to ensure the continuation of trade and diplomacy, since China refused to conduct formal relations or trade with Japan at the time. However, though the king retained considerable powers, he was only permitted to operate within a framework of strict guidelines set down by Satsuma, and was required to pay considerable amounts in tribute to Satsuma on a regular basis. |
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| This framework of guidelines was largely set down by a document sometimes called the [[Fifteen Injunctions]] (掟十五ヶ条, ''Okite jûgo-ka-jô''), which accompanied the oaths signed in Kagoshima in 1611, and which detailed political and economic restrictions placed upon the kingdom. Prohibitions on foreign trade, diplomacy, and travel outside of that officially permitted by Satsuma were among the chief elements of these injunctions. Ryûkyû's extensive trade relations with China, Southeast Asia, and Korea were turned to Satsuma's interests, and various laws were put into place forbidding interactions between Japanese and Ryûkyûans, travel between the two island nations. Likewise, travel abroad from Ryûkyû in general, and the reception of ships at Ryûkyû's harbors, were heavily restricted with exceptions made only for official trade and diplomatic journeys authorized by Satsuma. | | This framework of guidelines was largely set down by a document sometimes called the [[Fifteen Injunctions]] (掟十五ヶ条, ''Okite jûgo-ka-jô''), which accompanied the oaths signed in Kagoshima in 1611, and which detailed political and economic restrictions placed upon the kingdom. Prohibitions on foreign trade, diplomacy, and travel outside of that officially permitted by Satsuma were among the chief elements of these injunctions. Ryûkyû's extensive trade relations with China, Southeast Asia, and Korea were turned to Satsuma's interests, and various laws were put into place forbidding interactions between Japanese and Ryûkyûans, travel between the two island nations. Likewise, travel abroad from Ryûkyû in general, and the reception of ships at Ryûkyû's harbors, were heavily restricted with exceptions made only for official trade and diplomatic journeys authorized by Satsuma. |