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Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved.

Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved.

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th century, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th-21st centuries, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

==Early Wakô==

==Early Wakô==

As Chinese demand for, and Japanese supply of, silver rose in the 1530s-40s, a number of Chinese merchants established themselves at bases in Kyushu, selling expensive Chinese silks for Japanese silver, in violation of the Chinese bans. These merchants, including [[Wang Zhi]] (d. 1559), Chan Hai (d. 1556), Chen Dong (d. 1556), and Ye Ming (d. 1556), along with their mixed Chinese and Japanese crews, were considered '''wakô'' by the Chinese authorities as well, despite not being Japanese, and not being involved in any true piratical or raiding activities.<ref name=arano188>Arano. p188.</ref> One Chinese primary source indicates that the proportion of ethnic Chinese among the so-called "Japanese pirates" may have been as high as ninety percent.<ref>So. p205.</ref>

As Chinese demand for, and Japanese supply of, silver rose in the 1530s-40s, a number of Chinese merchants established themselves at bases in Kyushu, selling expensive Chinese silks for Japanese silver, in violation of the Chinese bans. These merchants, including [[Wang Zhi]] (d. 1559), Chan Hai (d. 1556), Chen Dong (d. 1556), and Ye Ming (d. 1556), along with their mixed Chinese and Japanese crews, were considered '''wakô'' by the Chinese authorities as well, despite not being Japanese, and not being involved in any true piratical or raiding activities.<ref name=arano188>Arano. p188.</ref> One Chinese primary source indicates that the proportion of ethnic Chinese among the so-called "Japanese pirates" may have been as high as ninety percent.<ref>So. p205.</ref>

Over time, the raids spread to encompass much of the South China coast. Though the pirates who emerged in the aftermath of the 1523 bans were largely traders, now regarded as smugglers under the ban, their crews gradually came to include people with little or no interest in trade, and more interest in violence and thievery. Huangyan, in Zhejiang province, fell in [[1552]] to a party of ''wakô'' said to number as many as 10,000.<ref name=so6>So. p6.</ref> Raiders traveled up the Yangtze and attacked cities along its shores the same year, and attacked Nanjing and Chaozhou in [[1555]]. By this time, many of the raiding parties made use of arquebuses (''[[teppo|teppô]]'').<ref name=so1516/> Over the course of the early 1550s, the ''wakô'' seized or simply defeated nearly every defense post along the coast, transforming many into their own bases of operations. The situation became particularly severe for the Chinese authorities when the pirate threat spread to Nanjing.<ref name=so6/>

Over time, the raids spread to encompass much of the South China coast. Though the pirates who emerged in the aftermath of the 1523 bans were largely traders, now regarded as smugglers under the ban, their crews gradually came to include people with little or no interest in trade, and more interest in violence and thievery. Huangyan, in Zhejiang province, fell in [[1552]] to a party of ''wakô'' said to number as many as 10,000.<ref name=so6>So. p6.</ref> Raiders traveled up the Yangtze and attacked cities along its shores the same year, and attacked Nanjing and Chaozhou in [[1555]]. By this time, many of the raiding parties made use of arquebuses (''[[teppo|teppô]]'');<ref name=so1516/> Meanwhile, the Ming armies were equipped with rather inferior firearms, as there were no centrally-coordinated factories or distribution depots, and generals were left to supply their armies on their own; as a result, Western-style firearms made by individual armies based on models had high failure rates, often failing to ignite, or even exploding in the soldier's hands.<ref>Huang, 170-171.</ref>

 

These coastal raids, in which ''wakô'' came onto land - sometimes fairly deeply inland - and attacked villages and outposts on land, constituted the majority of their activity, not seaborne combat. In fact, some Chinese sources from the time suggest that the raiders were far more effective at land battle than on the seas, and advocated trying to defeat them at sea, and to prevent them from coming on land.<ref>Huang, 169.</ref> Over the course of the early 1550s, the ''wakô'' seized or simply defeated nearly every defense post along the coast, transforming many into their own bases of operations. The situation became particularly severe for the Chinese authorities when the pirate threat spread to Nanjing.<ref name=so6/>

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>