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[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] helped further weaken the ''wakô'' with a [[1588]] edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial ''daimyô'' to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the ''wakô''.<ref name=arano190>Arano. p190.</ref>
 
[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] helped further weaken the ''wakô'' with a [[1588]] edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial ''daimyô'' to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the ''wakô''.<ref name=arano190>Arano. p190.</ref>
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Though the actual ''wakô'' were somewhat weakened by these and other steps taken by Hideyoshi, his invasions of Korea in the 1590s were viewed by China and Korea as part and parcel of the ''wakô'' phenomenon. His samurai forces, who raided, plundered, and pillaged, destroying and stealing much financial and cultural property, and kidnapping many craftsmen (especially potters) and others, were seen as no different from the ''wakô'' pirates.<ref>Arano. p197.</ref> This is somewhat ironic, as, according to some sources, Hideyoshi's goal in invading Korea was to press China for access to the so-called "tally trade" (''[[kango boeki|kangô bôeki]]'')<ref>Arano. pp206-207. Arano asserts that Hideyoshi believed that by demonstrating Japan's military supremacy, Japan could thus rightfully claim "civilized" non-barbarian status within the [[Sinocentric world order]], and a right to access to trade.</ref>, the very same formal trade relations which China which were cut off by the Ming court in response to Japanese refusal or inability to curb ''wakô'' raids.
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Though the actual ''wakô'' were somewhat weakened by these and other steps taken by Hideyoshi, his invasions of Korea in the 1590s were viewed by China and Korea as part and parcel of the ''wakô'' phenomenon. His samurai forces, who raided, plundered, and pillaged, destroying and stealing much financial and cultural property, and kidnapping many craftsmen (especially potters) and others, were seen as no different from the ''wakô'' pirates.<ref>Arano. p197.</ref> This is somewhat ironic, as, according to some sources, Hideyoshi's goal in invading Korea was to press China for access to the so-called "tally trade" (''[[kango boeki|kangô bôeki]]'')<ref>Arano. pp206-207. Arano asserts that Hideyoshi believed that by demonstrating Japan's military supremacy, Japan could thus rightfully claim "civilized" non-barbarian status within the [[Sinocentric world order]], and a right to access to trade.</ref>, the very same formal trade relations which were cut off by the Ming court in response to Japanese refusal or inability to curb ''wakô'' raids.
    
In the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate, various efforts were made to gain access to formal Chinese trade, thus curbing the ''wakô'' phenomenon by diminishing the situations under which traders between China and Japan would be considered "pirates."
 
In the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate, various efforts were made to gain access to formal Chinese trade, thus curbing the ''wakô'' phenomenon by diminishing the situations under which traders between China and Japan would be considered "pirates."
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