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The population of China is believed to have been around 60-90 million at the beginning of the Ming, growing to around 125-150 million by the end of the period,<ref>Craig, 100.; Benjamin Elman, ''A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China'', University of California Press (2000), 130.; This figure exceeded the population of all European nations at that time, combined. Jonathan Spence, ''The Search for Modern China'', Second Edition, W.W. Norton & Co. (1999), 7.</ref> and comprising perhaps 1/3 of the total human population of the planet. Though roughly 90% of Chinese lived in rural areas, the period saw considerable urban growth as well, with Beijing reaching perhaps one million inhabitants, and Nanjing only somewhat fewer.<ref name=elman470>Robert Tignor, [[Benjamin Elman]], et al, ''Worlds Together, Worlds Apart'', vol B, Fourth Edition, W.W. Norton & Co (2014), 470.</ref>
The population of China is believed to have been around 60-90 million at the beginning of the Ming, growing to around 125-150 million by the end of the period,<ref>Craig, 100.; Benjamin Elman, ''A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China'', University of California Press (2000), 130.; This figure exceeded the population of all European nations at that time, combined. Jonathan Spence, ''The Search for Modern China'', Second Edition, W.W. Norton & Co. (1999), 7.</ref> and comprising perhaps 1/3 of the total human population of the planet. Though roughly 90% of Chinese lived in rural areas, the period saw considerable urban growth as well, with Beijing reaching perhaps one million inhabitants, and Nanjing only somewhat fewer.<ref name=elman470>Robert Tignor, [[Benjamin Elman]], et al, ''Worlds Together, Worlds Apart'', vol B, Fourth Edition, W.W. Norton & Co (2014), 470.</ref>
==Administration==
===The Role of the Court Bureaucracy===
In the 1580s, the civil service (not including military officers) boasted around 20,000 members, of whom roughly 2,000 served in the imperial capital.<ref>Huang, 53.</ref>
The [[provinces of China|provinces]] of the empire were divided into roughly 1,100 counties, each of which was administered by a magistrate appointed by the center. Even in the most populous counties, a magistrate was aided by no more than six assistants with [[Chinese imperial examinations|civil service credentials]], and a staff of maybe a dozen clerks. Due to the law of avoidance, which sought to prevent officials from gaining too much local connections or local power-bases, magistrates were rotated to a new post every three years. This meant that most magistrates did not speak the local dialect, did not understand certain local customs, and had to rely on the local gentry - retired scholars, exam certificate holders who never rose to official posts, and some who simply bought status - to get things done. The gentry were the ones with local influence, and they helped the magistrates enforce policy and ensure tax collection. This short time span in each post also meant that a magistrate generally could not implement great policy programs, but could at best hope to simply keep things running as smoothly as possible.<ref name=huang50>Huang, 50.</ref>
Since the Imperial Court lacked the power to effectively manage affairs on the ground throughout the empire, the business of the court consisted largely of personnel matters - carefully selecting the best men for each post, and reviewing them from time to time, such that those appointed to these posts could be trusted to make the right decisions and administer their jurisdiction competently. Official reports from the most distant provinces could take up to a month to arrive in the capital, and due to the great distances involved and the sparse number of officials, among other reasons, local and regional records held in the capital were often grossly out of date. For example, a given county might go as long as one hundred years between thorough-going demographic and land surveys conducted by the Court; not dissimilar with [[Edo period|Tokugawa Japan]], tax quotas were set at the beginning of the dynasty, and were extremely rarely, if ever, reassessed. In many districts with historically absurdly low tax rates, the local economy had grown so dependent on low tax rates that any effort to re-assess and raise the tax rate would bankrupt significant swaths of the population. Conversely, in areas where taxes were exceptionally high on paper, collection was strongly resisted by entrenched interests, and was rarely successful; in many areas, as many as 60% of the people managed to avoid paying any tax at all. When Grand Secretary [[Zhang Juzheng]] worked in the 1570s to see all taxes properly collected, this brought much-needed increases in government revenues, but at the cost of arresting and harshly punishing a great many peasants, which severely damaged the regime's reputation of legitimacy as a benevolent government supported by the [[Mandate of Heaven]].<ref>Huang, 62-63.</ref>
Unable to effectively remain informed about goings-on throughout the empire, or to render decisions on every local matter (or even very many at all), the Court thus left much local administration completely up to local officials, able to do little more than simply commending them for good work from time to time, and punishing them (often quite harshly) for failures and mistakes. And, since the Court lacked the time and manpower to be informed of, or to properly consider, more complex considerations in any given situation of local matters, it was standard practice to blame and punish local officials for anything that might go wrong. For example, when a local official was struggling with a bandit uprising, the Court typically blamed the official for either failing to suppress the bandits, or for suppressing them too harshly, and thus inspiring further resistance. As a local official, the best one could hope to do was to simply keep one's affairs in order, such that no news of any difficulties or problems reached the capital.<ref>Huang, 50, 57-58.</ref>
Reviews were conducted once every three years for local officials, and once every six years for those serving in the capital. Members of the censorate and of the Ministry of Personnel carefully examined each official's record, and either reassigned him to a new post (with or without a promotion or demotion), or in cases of the official being judged "cruel," "unstable," "indiscreet," or the like, he might be dismissed from service, thus making room in officialdom for other degree-holders vying for official posts. Many junior officials, as a result, fearing losing their position within officialdom, garnered connections with more senior officials, who might look out for them, or exercise influence on their behalf.<ref>Huang, 58.</ref>
===The Role of the Emperor===
The mid-to-late 16th century saw a significant shift in the role of the Emperor within the Court. Whereas the Emperor had previously had considerable power as a leader, initiating and guiding policy - and the Hongwu Emperor, the founder of the dynasty, would certainly seem to fit that mold - by the time of the [[Wanli Emperor]] (r. [[1573]]-[[1620]]), the person of the Emperor had grown to be a far more symbolic role, restrained by the obligations and expectations of his role, and largely lacking in power to determine policy.<ref name=huang103>Huang, 93-103.</ref>
This shift came gradually, and due to shifts in the functioning of government, and attitudes about how it had to be handled. An avenue of thought emerged and became dominant in which it was essential that the emperor be impartial and aloof from petty politicking, factionalism, and favoritism, in order to cultivate and safeguard the image of the emperor as the Son of Heaven, as imbued with the [[Mandate of Heaven]], being eminently just and wise, and thus bearing the authority to make the final decision on matters brought before him - a final decision that would disallow any further quibbling or debate on the issue. Thus, a system emerged in which the scholar-bureaucrats, after carefully considering the merits of a matter, based on precedents and especially as based on the teachings of the [[Confucian classics|Four Books]] of [[Neo-Confucianism]], could reach, if not quite a conclusion, then at least a strong recommendation for the emperor. Ultimately, there remained numerous areas in which the emperor's approval or decision was required, but for the most part, it was ideal within this system that the emperor show favoritism, involve himself in factional politics, initiate policy, or otherwise employ his own creativity or political acumen. An Emperor who was merely human lost the mystic authority of the more removed, aloof, character of the Son of Heaven, which would only invite discord.<ref name=huang103/>
This came about gradually, for the most part, but the process was sped along by the actions of the [[Zhengde Emperor]] (r. [[1505]]-[[1521]]), who made repeated and extensive efforts to not only skirt regulation and neglect his duties, but went so far as to make a mockery of the bureaucratic process, and of court ritual, in various ways, boldly asserting his individual authority as monarch even as efforts were made to restrain him within this increasingly codified system. Zhengde lived just outside of the Forbidden City proper, in a residence within the Imperial City he dubbed the Leopard Palace. There, he cavorted in various ways, watching military maneuvers, hosting banquets and parties, and so forth. He granted himself a variety of titles, some of them newly invented by him, and led military expeditions against the [[Mongols]], and to the south, on several occasions, working his way past bureaucratic efforts to stop him, either by forcing the resignation or re-assignment of those officials who aimed to block him, or in other ways. During these expeditions, he sent few orders or imperial rescripts (responses to petitions or memorials) back from the front, leaving governance in the hands of the bureaucracy, albeit with the knowledge that there were a variety of final decisions which could not be carried out without his explicit approval. On a number of occasions, including his triumphant return from his first military excursion, Zhengde commanded the performance of entirely new ritual forms, turning the established hierarchies topsy-turvy and requiring the officials to, figuratively, bend over backwards to accede to his arbitrary demands (e.g. constructing a new style of court costume overnight; flying banners welcoming him back but without providing for what the respectful, appropriate forms of address for his newly invented titles and hierarchies should be); on at least the one occasion of this triumphal return, if not on others, Zhengde made a further mockery of officials' efforts to strictly adhere to complex systems of imperial ritual by requiring them to assemble this entire complex welcome ceremony, and then simply blowing past all of the officials on his horse, leaving them to trudge back into the palace in snow and mud.<ref name=huang103/>
The Zhengde Emperor's military expeditions, his branding of himself as the General of the Army of Greater Valor, and his taking a military leader as one of his closest companions and advisors, presented a threat to the system of the court bureaucracy in another way. Civil officials' dominance over the military had been the rule for roughly one hundred years, following the end of the Hongwu reign; as the civil bureaucracy and its functioning grew more established, its authority over the military allowed it to function as it desired, giving civil officials time and space to consider and debate any given matter based on Confucian teachings, reason & rationality, and precedent. By augmenting the power or prominence of the military, Zhengde's actions could have led to greater potential for military rebellions or even a coup (Hongwu, after all, had been a rebel to begin with, and violently overthrew the previous dynasty); further, military officials were seen as demanding swifter decisions based more closely on practicality, not on virtue, and civil officials feared a demeaning or debasement of the virtuous basis for decision-making should the military gain more power.<ref name=huang103/> When the Wanli Emperor later began to increase the size of the palace guard, and to have them train more frequently within the palace grounds, it raised figurative alarm bells for many concerned officials, given the precedents of the Zhengde reign; this was diffused quickly and quietly, however, as Grand Secretary [[Shen Shixing]] spoke with the leaders of the guard, and convinced them by way of reason and Confucian rhetoric to diminish their presence.<ref>Huang, 121-123.</ref>
While Western Orientalist commentators historically saw much of Chinese court ritual as frivolous and meaningless at best, and as a blind adherence to superstition at worst, holding China back, frozen in an un-progressing traditional / pre-modern state, scholars of ritual and performance studies today recognize, as the Chinese scholar-bureaucrats of that time did, the importance of these rituals in cultivating very real impressions of hierarchy, authority, and propriety. Zhengde's precise thoughts or intentions in this matter are unclear, but the end result was that by the time of the Wanli Emperor, roughly sixty years later, the bureaucracy worked all the more devotedly to restrict the emperor from exercising his will in individual or creative ways, let alone to depart from the palace in order to engage in whatever other pursuits. Rather, they sought to restrict him to performing to the utmost the role of the symbolic leader, the just, wise, and Heavenly ruler, whose voice bore Heavenly authority and was untainted by personal, individual, whims or desires.<ref name=huang103/> From the time of Zhengde forward, the successive monarchs were permitted to leave the palace only on very rare occasions. Following a visit to his birthplace in [[1539]], the [[Jiajing Emperor]] did not leave Beijing again for the remaining 27 years of his reign; the [[Longqing Emperor]], similarly, visited the imperial mausolea on the outskirts of Beijing only once during his entire reign, being absent from the palace on that occasion for a span of four days. The Wanli Emperor visited the mausolea four times between [[1583]] to [[1585]], and in the latter year traveled from the palace to the [[Altar of Heaven]] on one occasion to pray for rain; this alone was already seen as excessive, given the precedents set by his immediate predecessors.<ref>Huang, 121.</ref>
Wanli reacted, famously, to these restrictions on his personal freedom and monarchical power by simply removing himself from the political process almost entirely in the last decades of his reign. In essence, he went on "strike," refusing to respond to memorials and petitions, refusing to authorize the appointment or promotion of officials, refusing to accept officials' resignations, and refusing to participate in imperial rituals. In some respects, the latter was perhaps the most frightening for many officials. Many of these rituals were essential to enacting the hierarchical order within the court - with no emperor to bow to, who stood at the head of the imperial state? Whose Heavenly will were the officials serving? Further, many of these rituals were seen as essential for maintaining the cosmic order; the Emperor was seen since ancient times in China as a fulcrum between Heaven and Earth, and it was his profound responsibility to set the weights & measures, the musical tones, and language in order, all of which were simply metaphors or microcosms of the greater Imperial task of keeping the cosmos itself from falling into disorder. These were serious concerns, with real political impacts, not limited to superstition. On a more practical level, too, though officials executed a number of work-arounds, finding ways, for example, to appoint new officials even without the emperor's approval, Wanli's refusal to approve decisions created chaos for the administration, and ultimately weakened it enough that many historians cite this as among the factors which contributed to the fall of the Ming in [[1644]].<ref name=huang103/>
===Military===
The Ming military was run in a largely quasi-independent manner. Generals received orders from provincial governors and governors-general, but to a large extent were left to their own devices in terms of training, organizing, and commanding their men, and the Court provided no centrally-administered military academies, supply depots, regulation handbooks or field manuals. If the Court maintained records of budgets, organizational charts, and so forth, they went out of use early in the dynasty. Generals were, however, held responsible for their failures, with strict punishments being doled out when a military effort went awry, regardless of the reasons. Members of the censorate were appointed to each army to act as military circuit intendants, and reported back on misdeeds and failings.<ref>Huang, 159, 162.</ref>
The Ming military was huge, nevertheless, with nearly two million hereditary military households being under legal obligation, due to their status, to provide at least one soldier per household to active military service at all times. Even with a great many military households relocating, falling out of the registers, and the system falling apart otherwise, the Ming still likely had the largest standing army in the world. That said, most of the time, many of these soldiers were used by their commanders as domestic servants, construction workers, and porters, when there was not immediate military work to be done.<ref>Huang, 160.</ref>
The Court did direct the distribution of supplies in a centralized fashion, but the actual execution of those directives was performed on a very local level, by local officials who would not have been able to coordinate well with one another in large numbers or across great distances; intermediate levels of direction or implementation, such as on the provincial level, were minimal.<ref>Huang, 161.</ref>
Military ranks were filled almost entirely from hereditary households, even though the [[Chinese imperial exams|military service exams]], like the civil service exams, were in theory open to all qualified candidates. Those from junior military houses inherited their ranks intact, while those from more senior households suffered a diminution, inheriting a rank somewhat lower than that of their father.<ref>Huang, 162.</ref>
Confucian ideals of moderation and restraint caused the Court to expect military officers to execute only brief, focused, and deadly strikes, not lengthy campaigns, and on the defensive to guard only the most vital points. Emphasis was Emphasis was placed on maintaining the peace in the provinces, including the suppression of peasant uprisings and of banditry, and not on defending against large-scale invasion, let alone venturing to invade other lands themselves. Meanwhile, the coast, previously considered a safe barrier, in the mid-to-late Ming Dynasty became ravaged by so-called "[[wako|pirates]]," leading to a variety of policies, some quite extreme (see ''[[hai jin]]'').<ref>Huang, 157, 162.</ref>
==Policies==
==Policies==
The founder of the Ming, the Hongwu Emperor, is often described as an autocrat and despot. He abolished the [[Grand Secretariat]] which in previous periods had handled important matters of state, insisting instead on handling such matters himself. He had three prime ministers killed, and no one was reappointed to that post for the duration of the dynasty. Further, unlike in earlier dynasties, regents were not appointed for young emperors, and in fact close male relatives of the emperor - essentially anyone who could contest his claim to the throne, or contest the succession - were removed from the palace, given lavish villas in the provinces, and were forbidden from traveling without the emperor's authorization.
The founder of the Ming, the Hongwu Emperor, is often described as an autocrat and despot. He abolished the [[Grand Secretariat]] which in previous periods had handled important matters of state, insisting instead on handling such matters himself. He had three prime ministers killed, and no one was reappointed to that post for the duration of the dynasty. Further, unlike in earlier dynasties, regents were not appointed for young emperors, and in fact close male relatives of the emperor - essentially anyone who could contest his claim to the throne, or contest the succession - were removed from the palace, given lavish villas in the provinces, and were forbidden from traveling without the emperor's authorization.
With no prime minister (chancellor, ''chengxiang'') to help handle the daily administrative business of governance, Ming emperors, even those not yet in their majority, thus bore more of the brunt of day-to-day administration than their predecessors.<ref>Ray Huang, ''1587: A Year of No Significance'', Yale University Press (1981), 18.</ref> The Hongwu Emperor himself is reported to have handled 1,660 memorials on 3,391 different matters in one particular 10-day period.<ref name=schiro>Conrad Schirokauer, et al, ''A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations'', Fourth Edition, Cengage Learning (2012), 242-267.</ref> Some later emperors were not as able, or as willing, to handle such a load, and during certain reigns, government processes slowed down and backed up dramatically. In the late Ming period, a succession of emperors showed little interest in governance; one even remained illiterate throughout his reign. As a result, the re-established Grand Secretariat and palace [[eunuchs]] gained considerable power at over policy and administration.
With no prime minister (chancellor, ''chengxiang'') to help handle the daily administrative business of governance, Ming emperors, even those not yet in their majority, thus bore more of the brunt of day-to-day administration than their predecessors.<ref>Huang, 18.</ref> The Hongwu Emperor himself is reported to have handled 1,660 memorials on 3,391 different matters in one particular 10-day period.<ref name=schiro>Conrad Schirokauer, et al, ''A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations'', Fourth Edition, Cengage Learning (2012), 242-267.</ref> Some later emperors were not as able, or as willing, to handle such a load, and during certain reigns, government processes slowed down and backed up dramatically. In the late Ming period, a succession of emperors showed little interest in governance; one even remained illiterate throughout his reign. As a result, the re-established Grand Secretariat and palace [[eunuchs]] gained considerable power at over policy and administration.
Hongwu also implemented a "Great Ming Code," attempting to transform and regulate society in accordance with a legal framework informed by ancient precedents. This included numerous structures which did have lasting impact; however, the Hongwu Emperor also frequently contradicted his own Great Code to suit needs of the immediate moment, or purely on a whim. One of his lasting changes was the establishment of a system known as ''li-jia'', in which every ten families in a neighborhood or village constituted a ''jia'', and each ten ''jia'' a ''li''; each ''li'' and ''jia'' was then mutually responsible for ensuring the good conduct of its members, a system not entirely unlike the [[Edo period]] Japanese system of ''[[goningumi]]'' (five person groups).<ref name=schiro/>
Hongwu also implemented a "Great Ming Code," attempting to transform and regulate society in accordance with a legal framework informed by ancient precedents. This included numerous structures which did have lasting impact; however, the Hongwu Emperor also frequently contradicted his own Great Code to suit needs of the immediate moment, or purely on a whim. One of his lasting changes was the establishment of a system known as ''li-jia'', in which every ten families in a neighborhood or village constituted a ''jia'', and each ten ''jia'' a ''li''; each ''li'' and ''jia'' was then mutually responsible for ensuring the good conduct of its members, a system not entirely unlike the [[Edo period]] Japanese system of ''[[goningumi]]'' (five person groups).<ref name=schiro/>
Having overthrown the Mongols, the first foreign (barbarian) group to conquer all of China, and who ruled for nearly a hundred years, the Ming have been described as perpetually paranoid about the Mongols. The Ming Court rebuilt and expanded the Great Wall of China, and in the 1410s-20s launched five military expeditions deep into Mongolia. The Dynasty remained at war with various Mongol groups on and off for two hundred years, with one Emperor being captured by the Mongols in [[1449]], and a Mongol army at one point in the mid-16th century making its way to the very walls of Beijing. It was not until [[1571]] that the Ming managed to establish an official peace with the Mongols; and, only a few decades later, a separate group, the Manchus, came knocking on China's door.
Having overthrown the Mongols, the first foreign (barbarian) group to conquer all of China, and who ruled for nearly a hundred years, the Ming have been described as perpetually paranoid about the Mongols. The Ming Court rebuilt and expanded the Great Wall of China, and in the 1410s-20s launched five military expeditions deep into Mongolia. The Dynasty remained at war with various Mongol groups on and off for two hundred years, with one Emperor being captured by the Mongols in [[1449]], and a Mongol army at one point in the mid-16th century making its way to the very walls of Beijing. It was not until [[1571]] that the Ming managed to establish an official peace with the Mongols; and, only a few decades later, a separate group, the Manchus, came knocking on China's door.
Almost immediately after founding the dynasty, the Hongwu Emperor sent missions to every major polity in the region, seeking a reaffirmation, or beginning, of [[tribute]] trade relations. Submission to Ming authority by [[Koryo Dynasty]] Korea, among others, would do much to symbolize foreign recognition of the legitimacy of Zhu Yuangzhang's new dynasty. Rebuffed initially by Korea, the Ming reduced Korean missions in [[1374]] to taking place only once every three years, and later, when [[King Taejo|Yi Sŏng-gye]] established a new dynasty in Korea, the [[Joseon Dynasty]], the Ming initially refused to provide [[investiture]]. In light of concerns about Mongols and Jurchens on the border, the Ming Court needed to know it had Korea's loyalty. Meanwhile, beginning in [[1372]], all [[Sanzan Period|three kingdoms]] active on [[Okinawa Island]] entered into tributary relations with the Ming. [[Chuzan|Chûzan]], which conquered its neighbors in the 1420s, would continue these relations into the 1870s.
Formal tribute/[[kango boeki|tally]] trade relations were established with Japan for the first time in [[1401]]-[[1402]], under the [[Jianwen Emperor]], and then continued briefly under the Yongle Emperor before being severed by Shogun [[Ashikaga Yoshimochi]]. Relations were later restored, then severed again in the 1550s, due in part to [[wako|pirate/raider]] activity (see below), which was blamed on the Japanese. Official Sino-Japanese relations would not be restored again until the late 19th century, but unofficially (and thus, for the most part, illegally in the eyes of the Chinese Court) a vibrant trade continued between China and Japan throughout the Ming and Qing periods. Up until the very last years of the Ming Dynasty, Chinese and Japanese merchants both traveled in great numbers between the two countries, trading Chinese silk for Japanese silver, among many other goods; though the Chinese had opened new mines in the southwest, many of their other silver mines were already beginning to run dry at the very beginning of the Ming period, and so the influx of silver from Japan and the New World (carried by European trade) was much welcome. From the 1540s onward, Europeans were also prominent intermediaries in transporting and selling Chinese goods to Japan, and vice versa.<ref>Eastman, 125.</ref>
Formal tribute/[[kango boeki|tally]] trade relations were established with Japan for the first time in [[1401]]-[[1402]], under the [[Jianwen Emperor]], and then continued briefly under the Yongle Emperor before being severed by Shogun [[Ashikaga Yoshimochi]]. Relations were later restored, then severed again in the 1550s, due in part to [[wako|pirate/raider]] activity (see below), which was blamed on the Japanese. Official Sino-Japanese relations would not be restored again until the late 19th century, but unofficially (and thus, for the most part, illegally in the eyes of the Chinese Court) a vibrant trade continued between China and Japan throughout the Ming and Qing periods. Up until the very last years of the Ming Dynasty, Chinese and Japanese merchants both traveled in great numbers between the two countries, trading Chinese silk for Japanese silver, among many other goods; though the Chinese had opened new mines in the southwest, many of their other silver mines were already beginning to run dry at the very beginning of the Ming period, and so the influx of silver from Japan and the New World (carried by European trade) was much welcome. From the 1540s onward, Europeans were also prominent intermediaries in transporting and selling Chinese goods to Japan, and vice versa.<ref>Eastman, 125.</ref>
The Yongle Emperor also launched military expeditions into [[Annam]], but withdrew after twenty years of fighting, with no significant gains.
The famous voyages of [[Zheng He]] were undertaken in the early Ming, as well. Zheng journeyed across the Indian Ocean on a series of trips from [[1405]]-[[1433]], ostensibly spreading awareness of the power and virtue of the Chinese Emperor, seeking nominal pledges of submission and tribute, and bringing back numerous luxuries, including exotic animals. However, such voyages were terminated as expensive and unnecessary, a luxury that the Court could not afford while focusing efforts on the more vital concerns of domestic matters, and border defense against the Mongols.
The famous voyages of [[Zheng He]] were undertaken in the early Ming, as well. Zheng journeyed across the Indian Ocean on a series of trips from [[1405]]-[[1433]], ostensibly spreading awareness of the power and virtue of the Chinese Emperor, seeking nominal pledges of submission and tribute, and bringing back numerous luxuries, including exotic animals. However, such voyages were terminated as expensive and unnecessary, a luxury that the Court could not afford while focusing efforts on the more vital concerns of domestic matters, and border defense against the Mongols.
By sometime early in the dynasty, Chinese luxury goods were already widely traded and treasured in distant parts of the world. Silks and porcelains in particular were prized by wealthy elites from India to Iberia. Ming traders operating chiefly out of the ports of [[Hangzhou]], [[Quanzhou]], and [[Guangzhou]] sailed to the [[Pescadores]], [[Taiwan]], [[Kyushu]], the [[Ryukyu Islands|Ryukyus]], [[Luzon]], and other parts of maritime Southeast Asia, while Chinese ports and coastal towns grew and flourished as sites of import and transshipment of goods from all around the world, as well.<ref>Tignor, Elman, et al, 430.</ref> Every year, as many as one hundred Chinese ships, with 20,000 tons of cargo space between them, sailed for Southeast Asian ports, bringing back thousands of pieces of silver, plus a myriad of tropical products. Chinese activity at [[Batavia]] (Jakarta) alone exceeded the entirety of the [[VOC|Dutch East India Company's]] operations throughout the region.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 24.</ref>
By sometime early in the dynasty, Chinese luxury goods were already widely traded and treasured in distant parts of the world. Silks and porcelains in particular were prized by wealthy elites from India to Iberia. Ming traders operating chiefly out of the ports of [[Hangzhou]], [[Quanzhou]], and [[Guangzhou]] sailed to the [[Pescadores]], [[Taiwan]], [[Kyushu]], the [[Ryukyu Islands|Ryukyus]], [[Luzon]], and other parts of maritime Southeast Asia, while Chinese ports and coastal towns grew and flourished as sites of import and transshipment of goods from all around the world, as well.<ref>Tignor, Elman, et al, 430.</ref> Every year, as many as one hundred Chinese ships, with 20,000 tons of cargo space between them, sailed for Southeast Asian ports, bringing back thousands of pieces of silver, plus a myriad of tropical products. Chinese activity at [[Batavia]] (Jakarta) alone exceeded the entirety of the [[VOC|Dutch East India Company's]] operations throughout the region.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 24.</ref>
While this was a period of lively maritime activity, the vast majority of such activity was illicit, or at least private trade; the Ming Court severely limited both the size and frequency of tribute missions which each polity could send, and did not officially recognize or condone most other maritime activity. Official disinterest in maritime trade was aided by the completion in [[1417]] of a series of locks along the [[Grand Canal]] that allowed the Canal to be used effectively year-round, thus obviating the need to rely entirely on sea trade for any part of the year.<ref name=schiro/> At times, for lengthy periods, the Court outlawed much maritime activity, rendering the many Chinese and non-Chinese traders on the high seas as smugglers. No longer able to rely on the authorities for protection, many of these smugglers armed themselves, in order to defend themselves against attack, or against unfair dealings; likewise, many also armed themselves in order to force upon others unfair dealings, turning to extortion, piracy, coastal raiding and so forth. Thus was born the ''wakô'' (lit. "Japanese pirates/raiders"). Though many ''wakô'' were Japanese, many were also Chinese, Korean, Malay, or from other Southeast Asian origins; nevertheless, they continue to be remembered today in China and Korea as "Japanese," and as examples of the violent and predatory nature of the Japanese people; though the Ming government demanded on numerous occasions that the Ashikaga shogunate (and, later, figures such as [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]]) take steps to end the pirate threat, the pirates were not encouraged or commanded by Japanese central authorities, and such authorities had no effective power to move against them.
While this was a period of lively maritime activity, the vast majority of such activity was illicit, or at least private trade; the Ming Court severely limited both the size and frequency of tribute missions which each polity could send, and did not officially recognize or condone most other maritime activity. Official disinterest in maritime trade was aided by the completion in [[1417]] of a series of locks along the [[Grand Canal]] that allowed the Canal to be used effectively year-round, thus obviating the need to rely entirely on sea trade for any part of the year.<ref name=schiro/> For nearly a century, from the 1470s until [[1567]], the Court outlawed much maritime activity, rendering the many Chinese and non-Chinese traders on the high seas as smugglers. These bans were not well enforced, and the vast mercantile community of southern Chinese and overseas (diaspora) Chinese in Southeast Asia largely ignored the prohibitions.<ref>Craig Lockard, “‘The Sea Common to All’: Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders in the Southeast Asian Age of Commerce, Ca. 1400–1750.” ''Journal of World History'' 21, no. 2 (2010): 225.</ref> However, they remained outlaws nevertheless. No longer able to rely on the authorities for protection, many of these smugglers armed themselves, in order to defend themselves against attack, or against unfair dealings; likewise, many also armed themselves in order to force upon others unfair dealings, turning to extortion, piracy, coastal raiding and so forth. Thus was born the ''wakô'' (lit. "Japanese pirates/raiders"). Though many ''wakô'' were Japanese, many were also Chinese, Korean, Malay, or from other Southeast Asian origins; nevertheless, they continue to be remembered today in China and Korea as "Japanese," and as examples of the violent and predatory nature of the Japanese people; though the Ming government demanded on numerous occasions that the Ashikaga shogunate (and, later, figures such as [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]]) take steps to end the pirate threat, the pirates were not encouraged or commanded by Japanese central authorities, and such authorities had no effective power to move against them.
In addition to its various conflicts with nomadic groups such as the Mongols, and later the Manchus, as well as in Vietnam to the south, the Ming faced a significant conflict in [[Joseon Dynasty|Korea]], as samurai forces under Toyotomi Hideyoshi [[Korean Invasions|invaded]] the peninsula twice in the 1590s. Though the allied Ming-Joseon forces were ultimately successful in repelling the Japanese invasion, this was a particularly significant series of events, both militarily, and in terms of later implications for Chinese-Japanese and especially Korean-Japanese relations.
In addition to its various conflicts with nomadic groups such as the Mongols, and later the Manchus, as well as in Vietnam to the south, the Ming faced a significant conflict in [[Joseon Dynasty|Korea]], as samurai forces under Toyotomi Hideyoshi [[Korean Invasions|invaded]] the peninsula twice in the 1590s. Though the allied Ming-Joseon forces were ultimately successful in repelling the Japanese invasion, this was a particularly significant series of events, both militarily, and in terms of later implications for Chinese-Japanese and especially Korean-Japanese relations.
*[[Albert M. Craig]], ''The Heritage of Chinese Civilization'', Third Edition, Prentice Hall (2011), 98-113.
*[[Albert M. Craig]], ''The Heritage of Chinese Civilization'', Third Edition, Prentice Hall (2011), 98-113.
*Valerie Hansen, ''The Open Empire'', New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2000), 369-407.
*Valerie Hansen, ''The Open Empire'', New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2000), 369-407.
*Ray Huang, ''1587: A Year of No Significance'', Yale University Press (1981).
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[[Category:Historical Periods]]
[[Category:Historical Periods]]
