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* ''Born: Tenmon 11/12/26 (31 Jan [[1543]])''
 
* ''Born: Tenmon 11/12/26 (31 Jan [[1543]])''
* ''Died: [[1616]]''
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* ''Died: [[1616]]/4/17''
 
* ''Titles: Shôgun (1603-1605), Udaijin, Ôgosho, Mikawa no Kami, Daifu''<ref>This last, ''Daifu'' 内府, being his title at the time of Sekigahara, short for 内大臣、''Naidaijin''.</ref>
 
* ''Titles: Shôgun (1603-1605), Udaijin, Ôgosho, Mikawa no Kami, Daifu''<ref>This last, ''Daifu'' 内府, being his title at the time of Sekigahara, short for 内大臣、''Naidaijin''.</ref>
 
* ''Japanese'': [[徳川]]家康 ''(Tokugawa Ieyasu)''
 
* ''Japanese'': [[徳川]]家康 ''(Tokugawa Ieyasu)''
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==Sekigahara==
 
==Sekigahara==
in 1598 Ieyasu was named one of the five regents responsible for ruling while young [[Toyotomi Hideyori]] came of age (Hideyoshi had intended there to be six, but one of the chosen, [[Kobayakawa Takakage]], predeceased him). Ieyasu was probably the most powerful of these men, but Hideyoshi had chosen the others carefully. Ieyasu's four colleagues ([[Maeda Toshiie]], [[Uesugi Kagekatsu]], [[Mori Terumoto]], and [[Ukita Hideie]]) were men whose loyalty to the Toyotomi name could be counted on after Hideyoshi died. Yet after Hideyoshi died in September [[1598]], Tokugawa almost immediately began making provocative alliances with families such as the Date and proceeded to alienate the other regents. Additionally, Ieyasu occupied first Fushimi, then [[Osaka Castle]] (following the death of Maeda Toshiie in [[1599]]), actions that prompted suspicion on the part of the of the regents. Resistance to Ieyasu's moves was centered around [[Ishida Mitsunari]], who unsuccessfully attempted to have Ieyasu assassinated in 1599. When that plan failed, Ishida himself was marked for death by a number of Tokugawa generals, and found refuge, oddly enough, with Ieyasu himself. Whatever Ieyasu's motives may have been in saving his rivals' life, by [[1600]] two camps had formed, one (the 'eastern') around Ieyasu, and the other (the 'western') around Ishida. The latter was determined to make the first move, and depended on Uesugi Kagekatsu, who held a vast fief northeast of Ieyasu. Ishida counted on Uesugi tying down Ieyasu long enough for the capital region to be firmly brought under Western control, at which point any move by Ieyasu could be countered from a footing of at least equal power. The Uesugi and Tokugawa began feuding in June and actual war came in August 1600. Ishida's grand strategy (such as it was) began to come apart almost immediately. Ieyasu left Uesugi to be contained by the Date and Mogami, and led an army westward in October. At the same time, Ishida did manage to take Fushimi and a number of other important points in the [[Kinai Province|Kinai]], but not with the timeliness required. Fate seemed to de dealing cards to both sides in equal measure, for on the eve of the final confrontation, both sides were without their full complements. Ieyasu's heir Hidetada (with 36,000 men) had unwisely chosen to dally about in Shinano attempting bring down Ueda while around the same number of 'western' samurai were too far away to aid in the fight. Ieyasu's ace in the hole, however, was knowledge that [[Kobayakawa Hideaki]] intended to betray Ishida during the battle, and the knowledge (provided by [[Kikkawa Tsunie]]) that the Mori (who had been insulted by Ishida) were none too eager to fight.  
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in 1598 Ieyasu was named one of the five regents responsible for ruling while young [[Toyotomi Hideyori]] came of age (Hideyoshi had intended there to be six, but one of the chosen, [[Kobayakawa Takakage]], predeceased him). Ieyasu was probably the most powerful of these men, but Hideyoshi had chosen the others carefully. Ieyasu's four colleagues ([[Maeda Toshiie]], [[Uesugi Kagekatsu]], [[Mori Terumoto]], and [[Ukita Hideie]]) were men whose loyalty to the Toyotomi name could be counted on after Hideyoshi died. Yet after Hideyoshi died in September [[1598]], Tokugawa almost immediately began making provocative alliances with families such as the Date and proceeded to alienate the other regents. Historian [[Morgan Pitelka]] suggests there is little indication that Ieyasu had planned to betray Hideyoshi's plans from the beginning, but rather that, though initially loyal to these plans, he began to chafe under the restrictions included in the oaths the regents had sworn, e.g. that none of them could arrange marriages without committee discussion and agreement among all five of them. Indeed, Ieyasu was hardly the only one who began mustering troops and otherwise preparing for war following Hideyoshi's death - most warlords across the realm were doing the same.<ref>Pitelka, 120.</ref>
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Ieyasu occupied first Fushimi, then [[Osaka Castle]] (following the death of Maeda Toshiie in [[1599]]), actions that prompted suspicion on the part of the of the regents. Resistance to Ieyasu's moves was centered around [[Ishida Mitsunari]], who unsuccessfully attempted to have Ieyasu assassinated in 1599. When that plan failed, Ishida himself was marked for death by a number of Tokugawa generals, and found refuge, oddly enough, with Ieyasu himself. Whatever Ieyasu's motives may have been in saving his rivals' life, by [[1600]] two camps had formed, one (the 'eastern') around Ieyasu, and the other (the 'western') around Ishida. The latter was determined to make the first move, and depended on Uesugi Kagekatsu, who held a vast fief northeast of Ieyasu. Ishida counted on Uesugi tying down Ieyasu long enough for the capital region to be firmly brought under Western control, at which point any move by Ieyasu could be countered from a footing of at least equal power. The Uesugi and Tokugawa began feuding in June and actual war came in August 1600. Ishida's grand strategy (such as it was) began to come apart almost immediately. Ieyasu left Uesugi to be contained by the Date and Mogami, and led an army westward in October. At the same time, Ishida did manage to take Fushimi and a number of other important points in the [[Kinai Province|Kinai]], but not with the timeliness required. Fate seemed to de dealing cards to both sides in equal measure, for on the eve of the final confrontation, both sides were without their full complements. Ieyasu's heir Hidetada (with 36,000 men) had unwisely chosen to dally about in Shinano attempting bring down Ueda while around the same number of 'western' samurai were too far away to aid in the fight. Ieyasu's ace in the hole, however, was knowledge that [[Kobayakawa Hideaki]] intended to betray Ishida during the battle, and the knowledge (provided by [[Kikkawa Tsunie]]) that the Mori (who had been insulted by Ishida) were none too eager to fight.  
    
The [[Battle of Sekigahara]] opened on the misty morning of 21 October1600 with as many as 160,000 warriors prepared to fight the greatest battle in Japanese history. The irony was that there had been no rhyme or reason to the choice of this particular battlefield. While [[Saito Dosan]] had once said that he who controls Sekigahara controls Japan, this was simply where the two sides had the most room to maneuver. At the same time, the terrain favored Ishida. Tokugawa was largely staggered out in a valley, with his forward units dangerously exposed to encirclement. The key was Kobayakawa Hideaki. His 16,000 men, positioned on Mt. Matsuo and looking down at the forward Ishida and Tokugawa lines, would likely decide the issue one way or the other.  
 
The [[Battle of Sekigahara]] opened on the misty morning of 21 October1600 with as many as 160,000 warriors prepared to fight the greatest battle in Japanese history. The irony was that there had been no rhyme or reason to the choice of this particular battlefield. While [[Saito Dosan]] had once said that he who controls Sekigahara controls Japan, this was simply where the two sides had the most room to maneuver. At the same time, the terrain favored Ishida. Tokugawa was largely staggered out in a valley, with his forward units dangerously exposed to encirclement. The key was Kobayakawa Hideaki. His 16,000 men, positioned on Mt. Matsuo and looking down at the forward Ishida and Tokugawa lines, would likely decide the issue one way or the other.  
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In [[1603]] the emperor granted Ieyasu the title of shôgun, an honor helped along by his 'Minamoto' genealogy. He held this post for only two years before officially retiring in favor of his third son, Hidetada.<ref>Ieyasu's two older sons were [[Matsudaira Nobuyasu]] and [[Yuki Hideyasu|Yûki Hideyasu]].</ref> This was done chiefly in order to further cement the pattern of succession, as well as to increase Tokugawa power by doubling the number of ruling figures in similar fashion to the ''[[insei]]'' (Retired Emperor) system of centuries earlier. Further, Ieyasu was at this time already older than Imagawa Yoshimoto, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, [[Maeda Toshiie]] or half a dozen other similarly prominent Sengoku warlords had been at the times of their respective deaths. At age 63, there were no guarantees he would last much longer, and so it was logical to put his successor in place.<ref>Pitelka, 92.</ref>
 
In [[1603]] the emperor granted Ieyasu the title of shôgun, an honor helped along by his 'Minamoto' genealogy. He held this post for only two years before officially retiring in favor of his third son, Hidetada.<ref>Ieyasu's two older sons were [[Matsudaira Nobuyasu]] and [[Yuki Hideyasu|Yûki Hideyasu]].</ref> This was done chiefly in order to further cement the pattern of succession, as well as to increase Tokugawa power by doubling the number of ruling figures in similar fashion to the ''[[insei]]'' (Retired Emperor) system of centuries earlier. Further, Ieyasu was at this time already older than Imagawa Yoshimoto, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, [[Maeda Toshiie]] or half a dozen other similarly prominent Sengoku warlords had been at the times of their respective deaths. At age 63, there were no guarantees he would last much longer, and so it was logical to put his successor in place.<ref>Pitelka, 92.</ref>
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He then spent the next several years in Kyoto and Edo, supervising the expansion of Chiyoda (Edo) Castle and of the surrounding city, and conducting diplomatic business with the Dutch ([[1609]]) and Spanish, from whom he distanced Japan. Ieyasu also sent diplomatic communications to a number of Southeast Asian polities; forty-eight letters from Ieyasu and 28 from the ''[[roju|rôjû]]'' in [[1601]]-[[1614]] alone constituted a greater diplomatic engagement with the world beyond Japan's closest neighbors (i.e. China, Korea, Ryûkyû) than ever before in history. Forty-one of Ieyasu's 48 letters were directed to Southeast Asian polities, including [[Tonkin]], [[Quang Nam]], [[Ayutthaya]], Cambodia, Patani, and the Philippines, while the few remaining letters including missives to China, Korea, Ryûkyû, England, and the Dutch Republic.<ref>Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” ''Journal of World History'' 24:2 (2013), 339.</ref>
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In [[1605]]/4, Hidetada processed to [[Fushimi castle]] with an entourage of some 100,000 men, where he was formally received by Ieyasu. The two enjoyed an audience with [[Emperor Go-Yozei|Emperor Go-Yôzei]] and then received numerous samurai, court, and religious leaders before Ieyasu formally submitted his resignation to the emperor; Hidetada was formally named shogun immediately afterwards.<ref>Morgan Pitelka, "Name and Fame: Material Objects as Authority, Security, and Legacy," Mary Elizabeth Berry, Marcia Yonemoto (eds.), ''What Is a Family?: Answers from Early Modern Japan'', University of California Press (2019), 110.</ref>
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Ieyasu then spent the next several years alternating between Kyoto and Edo, supervising the expansion of Chiyoda (Edo) Castle and of the surrounding city, and conducting diplomatic business with the Dutch ([[1609]]) and Spanish, from whom he distanced Japan. Ieyasu also sent diplomatic communications to a number of Southeast Asian polities; forty-eight letters from Ieyasu and 28 from the ''[[roju|rôjû]]'' in [[1601]]-[[1614]] alone constituted a greater diplomatic engagement with the world beyond Japan's closest neighbors (i.e. China, Korea, Ryûkyû) than ever before in history. Forty-one of Ieyasu's 48 letters were directed to Southeast Asian polities, including [[Tonkin]], [[Quang Nam]], [[Ayutthaya]], Cambodia, Patani, and the Philippines, while the few remaining letters including missives to China, Korea, Ryûkyû, England, and the Dutch Republic.<ref>Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” ''Journal of World History'' 24:2 (2013), 339.</ref>
    
Before long, however, Ieyasu retired to Sunpu, which would remain his chief residence and base of operations for the remainder of his life.
 
Before long, however, Ieyasu retired to Sunpu, which would remain his chief residence and base of operations for the remainder of his life.
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The final threat to Tokugawa hegemony was Hideyori. Ironically, Hideyori does not appear to have harbored any particular desire to face Ieyasu. Ieyasu, though, was unwilling to take any chances, especially given his own advanced age. He engineered a pretext for war in [[1614]] over a convoluted and supposed slight that involved the casting of a great bell. At this point Hideyori had felt compelled to open the gates of Osaka to thousands of ronin for self-defense, and now found himself under attack. The initial Tokugawa assault (called the Osaka Winter Campaign) was repulsed bloodily, and despite the protests of Hidetada Ieyasu sought an indirect resolution of the situation. Guessing that the matron of the castle, Hideyori's mother Yodo-gimi, was a weak link that could be exploited, Ieyasu ordered that her location be determined and cannon fire directed in that area. This had the desired effect and to the shock of the defending generals, Yodo-gimi convinced Hideyori to negotiate. Ieyasu was seemingly magnanimous. He promised the defenders that he would honor a peaceful solution to the crisis, and that Hideyori would be allowed to retain his holdings in the Settsu-Kwatchi area. Moreover, no action would be taken against any member of the defending army. Hideyori, who had probably never wanted a war with a man he had grown up considering an uncle in the first place, agreed and ordered his followers to stand down. Ieyasu made a show of arranging for his army to withdraw, then promptly arranged for Osaka's outer moat to be filled in, the actual deed being done by [[Honda Masazumi]]. Hideyori protested, and Ieyasu ultimately revoked his peace offer. The Osaka Summer Campaign essentially revolved around the climactic Battle of Tennoji in June [[1615]], the last great samurai battle and a Tokugawa victory. With the defeat of his army and the Tokugawa pouring through Osaka's gates, Hideyori and his mother committed suicide. In the aftermath Ieyasu personally ordered that Hideyori's infant son be executed and Osaka Castle largely dismantled.
 
The final threat to Tokugawa hegemony was Hideyori. Ironically, Hideyori does not appear to have harbored any particular desire to face Ieyasu. Ieyasu, though, was unwilling to take any chances, especially given his own advanced age. He engineered a pretext for war in [[1614]] over a convoluted and supposed slight that involved the casting of a great bell. At this point Hideyori had felt compelled to open the gates of Osaka to thousands of ronin for self-defense, and now found himself under attack. The initial Tokugawa assault (called the Osaka Winter Campaign) was repulsed bloodily, and despite the protests of Hidetada Ieyasu sought an indirect resolution of the situation. Guessing that the matron of the castle, Hideyori's mother Yodo-gimi, was a weak link that could be exploited, Ieyasu ordered that her location be determined and cannon fire directed in that area. This had the desired effect and to the shock of the defending generals, Yodo-gimi convinced Hideyori to negotiate. Ieyasu was seemingly magnanimous. He promised the defenders that he would honor a peaceful solution to the crisis, and that Hideyori would be allowed to retain his holdings in the Settsu-Kwatchi area. Moreover, no action would be taken against any member of the defending army. Hideyori, who had probably never wanted a war with a man he had grown up considering an uncle in the first place, agreed and ordered his followers to stand down. Ieyasu made a show of arranging for his army to withdraw, then promptly arranged for Osaka's outer moat to be filled in, the actual deed being done by [[Honda Masazumi]]. Hideyori protested, and Ieyasu ultimately revoked his peace offer. The Osaka Summer Campaign essentially revolved around the climactic Battle of Tennoji in June [[1615]], the last great samurai battle and a Tokugawa victory. With the defeat of his army and the Tokugawa pouring through Osaka's gates, Hideyori and his mother committed suicide. In the aftermath Ieyasu personally ordered that Hideyori's infant son be executed and Osaka Castle largely dismantled.
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Following the fall of Osaka, Ieyasu ordered his retainers to comb through the wreckage and salvage, as much as possible, famous tea utensils, swords, or other heirloom treasures. These objects, many of which had previously been owned by Ashikaga shoguns, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and/or other similarly notable leaders of the past, were now the property of the Tokugawa, a symbol of Ieyasu's power and hegemony. In total, over the course of his life, Ieyasu amassed a collection of over one thousand heirloom swords, perhaps the greatest such collection in Japanese history,<ref name=sophia>Morgan Pitelka, “Famous Objects: Agency and Materiality in the Collection of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616),” talk given at Sophia University, Tokyo, 25 May 2017.</ref> as well as a similarly impressive and significant collection of ceramics, tea utensils, and so forth. Though he seems to have had less of an interest in [[tea ceremony]] than almost any of the most prominent of his contemporaries, Ieyasu is known to have had a great passion for [[falconry]], and over the course of his life had some one thousand falcons obtained from all over East Asia.<ref name=sophia/>
    
==Death==
 
==Death==
The following year, Ieyasu fell ill and died in bed. Unlike Hideyoshi, he could pass away secure in the future of his house. Over the course of his life, he had had 11 sons and four daughters.<ref name=arai110/>
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[[File:Yomeimon.jpg|right|thumb|400px|The famous Yômeimon gate at [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]]]]
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In [[1616]], the year after his final victory over the Toyotomi, Ieyasu fell ill and died in bed. Unlike Hideyoshi, he could pass away secure in the future of his house. Over the course of his life, he had had 11 sons and four daughters.<ref name=arai110/>
    
The dynasty Ieyasu had created was exceedingly solid, with three sub-branches (the [[Kishu Tokugawa clan|Kii]], [[Owari Tokugawa clan|Owari]], and [[Mito Tokugawa clan|Mito]]) maintained for the sole purpose of providing an heir should the main branch fail to produce one. The daimyo were weary of war, and more or less content to enjoy the fruits of their labors. There would be disputes and grievances, but with the exception of the short and bloody [[Shimabara Rebellion]], Japan would enjoy peace for over two hundred years. At the same time, Tokugawa Ieyasu had another legacy - never before had Japan been as socially rigid, nor had the common man and woman had so little control over their own lives. The daimyo - especially those tagged as [[tozama]] - would also suffer the brunt of the fledgling Tokugawa's heavy-handedness, with relief coming only after the death of the third shogun Iemitsu in [[1651]].  
 
The dynasty Ieyasu had created was exceedingly solid, with three sub-branches (the [[Kishu Tokugawa clan|Kii]], [[Owari Tokugawa clan|Owari]], and [[Mito Tokugawa clan|Mito]]) maintained for the sole purpose of providing an heir should the main branch fail to produce one. The daimyo were weary of war, and more or less content to enjoy the fruits of their labors. There would be disputes and grievances, but with the exception of the short and bloody [[Shimabara Rebellion]], Japan would enjoy peace for over two hundred years. At the same time, Tokugawa Ieyasu had another legacy - never before had Japan been as socially rigid, nor had the common man and woman had so little control over their own lives. The daimyo - especially those tagged as [[tozama]] - would also suffer the brunt of the fledgling Tokugawa's heavy-handedness, with relief coming only after the death of the third shogun Iemitsu in [[1651]].  
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Upon his death, Ieyasu left a massive collection of heirlooms, including more than 1,000 swords, and numerous ceramics, paintings, works of calligraphy, and tea instruments. The collection was divided between the Kii, Mito, Owari, and shogunal houses, with some objects being interned with Ieyasu in his grave.<ref>Morgan Pitelka. "Art, Agency, and Networks in the Career of Tokugawa Ieyasu." in ''A Companion to Asian Art and Architecture''. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 460-461.</ref>
 
Upon his death, Ieyasu left a massive collection of heirlooms, including more than 1,000 swords, and numerous ceramics, paintings, works of calligraphy, and tea instruments. The collection was divided between the Kii, Mito, Owari, and shogunal houses, with some objects being interned with Ieyasu in his grave.<ref>Morgan Pitelka. "Art, Agency, and Networks in the Career of Tokugawa Ieyasu." in ''A Companion to Asian Art and Architecture''. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 460-461.</ref>
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Ieyasu was originally buried at [[Sunpu Castle]], and enshrined as a [[Shinto]] deity, Tôshô Daigongen, at a shrine established nearby and called [[Kunozan Toshogu|Kunôzan Tôshôgû]]. [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]], Ieyasu's grandson, later established in [[1636]] a shrine in [[Nikko|Nikkô]] (to the north of Edo). Ieyasu's remains were transferred to this new [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]], which then became the chief shrine dedicated to the deified Ieyasu.
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In accordance with his own instructions, Ieyasu was originally buried at [[Sunpu Castle]], and enshrined as a [[Shinto]] deity, Tôshô Daigongen, at a [[Yoshida Shinto]] shrine established nearby and called [[Kunozan Toshogu|Kunôzan Tôshôgû]]. His image was installed there as well, facing west, so as to pacify and protect the western provinces. He also ordered that a small hall be built at [[Nikko|Nikkô]] (in the mountains near Edo) a year later, so that he could act as protector deity of the eight [[provinces]] of [[Kanto|Kantô]].<ref name=nakai177>Kate Wildman Nakai, ''Shogunal Politics'', Harvard University Press (1988), 177.</ref>
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However, within the same year of his death, the Buddhist priest and shogunal advisor [[Tenkai]] managed to push [[Bonshun]] (head Buddhist priest associated with Kunôzan Tôshôgû) and [[Ishin Suden|Ishin Sûden]] (another prominent Buddhist monk & shogunal advisor) aside as he arranged for himself to oversee mourning ceremonies at the Tokugawa clan temple of [[Zojo-ji|Zôjô-ji]] in Edo. Tenkai then also arranged for Ieyasu to be deified not as a ''myôjin'' ("bright deity") in the Yoshida Shinto tradition as Ishin Sûden had supported, but rather as a ''daigongen'' ("great avatar") in the [[Tendai]] Buddhism-associated [[Sanno Ichijitsu|Sannô Ichijitsu]] school of Shinto. An envoy from the Imperial court visited Kunôzan and formally bestowed the title of ''daigongen'' upon Ieyasu in [[1617]], in conjunction with the first anniversary of his death.<ref name=nakai177/>
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Ieyasu's body was then moved to Nikkô, and his spirit was then installed as the chief deity at a new shrine there on [[1617]]/4/17, the anniversary of his death.<ref name=pitelka147>Pitelka, ''Spectacular Accumulation'', 147.</ref><ref name=nakai177/> This deification of Ieyasu followed a pattern, or precedent, set by Toyotomi Hideyoshi before him, and emulated, or repeated, by both [[Tokugawa Hidetada]] and [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]] after him. The shogunate then began in the 1630s-1660s to take efforts to discourage, prevent, or even outlaw others from being deified similarly, something the shogunate perceived as a threat to Tokugawa power and supremacy. At least fifteen ''daimyô'' nevertheless received Shinto burials and ''[[kami]]'' names/titles from priests of the [[Yoshida Shinto]] sect, despite the shogunate's efforts to maintain Tokugawa deification as unique.<ref>Evelyn Rawski, ''Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives'', Cambridge University Press (2015), 121.</ref>
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Construction continued at Nikkô, and shoguns paid formal visits in [[1619]] and [[1622]],<ref name=pitelka147/> but it was under [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]], Ieyasu's grandson, that [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]] is said to have been formally established in [[1636]]. This then became the chief shrine dedicated to the deified Ieyasu. The shrine was officially elevated from a ''jinja'' to a ''jingû'' (a higher level of shrine) in [[1645]].<ref>Nakai, 178.</ref>
    
==Legacy==
 
==Legacy==
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