Changes

* ''Born: Tenmon 11/12/26 (31 Jan [[1543]])''

* ''Born: Tenmon 11/12/26 (31 Jan [[1543]])''

* ''Died: [[1616]]''

* ''Died: [[1616]]/4/17''

* ''Titles: Shôgun, Udaijin, Ôgosho, Mikawa no Kami, Daifu'' (内府, his title at the time of Sekigahara, short for 内大臣、''Naidaijin'')

* ''Titles: Shôgun (1603-1605), Udaijin, Ôgosho, Mikawa no Kami, Daifu''<ref>This last, ''Daifu'' 内府, being his title at the time of Sekigahara, short for 内大臣、''Naidaijin''.</ref>

* ''Japanese'': [[徳川]]家康 ''(Tokugawa Ieyasu)''

* ''Japanese'': [[徳川]]家康 ''(Tokugawa Ieyasu)''

==Sekigahara==

==Sekigahara==

in 1598 Ieyasu was named one of the five regents responsible for ruling while young [[Toyotomi Hideyori]] came of age (Hideyoshi had intended there to be six, but one of the chosen, [[Kobayakawa Takakage]], predeceased him). Ieyasu was probably the most powerful of these men, but Hideyoshi had chosen the others carefully. Ieyasu's four colleagues ([[Maeda Toshiie]], [[Uesugi Kagekatsu]], [[Mori Terumoto]], and [[Ukita Hideie]]) were men whose loyalty to the Toyotomi name could be counted on after Hideyoshi died. Yet after Hideyoshi died in September [[1598]], Tokugawa almost immediately began making provocative alliances with families such as the Date and proceeded to alienate the other regents. Additionally, Ieyasu occupied first Fushimi, then [[Osaka Castle]] (following the death of Maeda Toshiie in [[1599]]), actions that prompted suspicion on the part of the of the regents. Resistance to Ieyasu's moves was centered around [[Ishida Mitsunari]], who unsuccessfully attempted to have Ieyasu assassinated in 1599. When that plan failed, Ishida himself was marked for death by a number of Tokugawa generals, and found refuge, oddly enough, with Ieyasu himself. Whatever Ieyasu's motives may have been in saving his rivals' life, by [[1600]] two camps had formed, one (the 'eastern') around Ieyasu, and the other (the 'western') around Ishida. The latter was determined to make the first move, and depended on Uesugi Kagekatsu, who held a vast fief northeast of Ieyasu. Ishida counted on Uesugi tying down Ieyasu long enough for the capital region to be firmly brought under Western control, at which point any move by Ieyasu could be countered from a footing of at least equal power. The Uesugi and Tokugawa began feuding in June and actual war came in August 1600. Ishida's grand strategy (such as it was) began to come apart almost immediately. Ieyasu left Uesugi to be contained by the Date and Mogami, and led an army westward in October. At the same time, Ishida did manage to take Fushimi and a number of other important points in the [[Kinai Province|Kinai]], but not with the timeliness required. Fate seemed to de dealing cards to both sides in equal measure, for on the eve of the final confrontation, both sides were without their full complements. Ieyasu's heir Hidetada (with 36,000 men) had unwisely chosen to dally about in Shinano attempting bring down Ueda while around the same number of 'western' samurai were too far away to aid in the fight. Ieyasu's ace in the hole, however, was knowledge that [[Kobayakawa Hideaki]] intended to betray Ishida during the battle, and the knowledge (provided by [[Kikkawa Tsunie]]) that the Mori (who had been insulted by Ishida) were none too eager to fight.  

in 1598 Ieyasu was named one of the five regents responsible for ruling while young [[Toyotomi Hideyori]] came of age (Hideyoshi had intended there to be six, but one of the chosen, [[Kobayakawa Takakage]], predeceased him). Ieyasu was probably the most powerful of these men, but Hideyoshi had chosen the others carefully. Ieyasu's four colleagues ([[Maeda Toshiie]], [[Uesugi Kagekatsu]], [[Mori Terumoto]], and [[Ukita Hideie]]) were men whose loyalty to the Toyotomi name could be counted on after Hideyoshi died. Yet after Hideyoshi died in September [[1598]], Tokugawa almost immediately began making provocative alliances with families such as the Date and proceeded to alienate the other regents. Historian [[Morgan Pitelka]] suggests there is little indication that Ieyasu had planned to betray Hideyoshi's plans from the beginning, but rather that, though initially loyal to these plans, he began to chafe under the restrictions included in the oaths the regents had sworn, e.g. that none of them could arrange marriages without committee discussion and agreement among all five of them. Indeed, Ieyasu was hardly the only one who began mustering troops and otherwise preparing for war following Hideyoshi's death - most warlords across the realm were doing the same.<ref>Pitelka, 120.</ref>

 

Ieyasu occupied first Fushimi, then [[Osaka Castle]] (following the death of Maeda Toshiie in [[1599]]), actions that prompted suspicion on the part of the of the regents. Resistance to Ieyasu's moves was centered around [[Ishida Mitsunari]], who unsuccessfully attempted to have Ieyasu assassinated in 1599. When that plan failed, Ishida himself was marked for death by a number of Tokugawa generals, and found refuge, oddly enough, with Ieyasu himself. Whatever Ieyasu's motives may have been in saving his rivals' life, by [[1600]] two camps had formed, one (the 'eastern') around Ieyasu, and the other (the 'western') around Ishida. The latter was determined to make the first move, and depended on Uesugi Kagekatsu, who held a vast fief northeast of Ieyasu. Ishida counted on Uesugi tying down Ieyasu long enough for the capital region to be firmly brought under Western control, at which point any move by Ieyasu could be countered from a footing of at least equal power. The Uesugi and Tokugawa began feuding in June and actual war came in August 1600. Ishida's grand strategy (such as it was) began to come apart almost immediately. Ieyasu left Uesugi to be contained by the Date and Mogami, and led an army westward in October. At the same time, Ishida did manage to take Fushimi and a number of other important points in the [[Kinai Province|Kinai]], but not with the timeliness required. Fate seemed to de dealing cards to both sides in equal measure, for on the eve of the final confrontation, both sides were without their full complements. Ieyasu's heir Hidetada (with 36,000 men) had unwisely chosen to dally about in Shinano attempting bring down Ueda while around the same number of 'western' samurai were too far away to aid in the fight. Ieyasu's ace in the hole, however, was knowledge that [[Kobayakawa Hideaki]] intended to betray Ishida during the battle, and the knowledge (provided by [[Kikkawa Tsunie]]) that the Mori (who had been insulted by Ishida) were none too eager to fight.  

The [[Battle of Sekigahara]] opened on the misty morning of 21 October1600 with as many as 160,000 warriors prepared to fight the greatest battle in Japanese history. The irony was that there had been no rhyme or reason to the choice of this particular battlefield. While [[Saito Dosan]] had once said that he who controls Sekigahara controls Japan, this was simply where the two sides had the most room to maneuver. At the same time, the terrain favored Ishida. Tokugawa was largely staggered out in a valley, with his forward units dangerously exposed to encirclement. The key was Kobayakawa Hideaki. His 16,000 men, positioned on Mt. Matsuo and looking down at the forward Ishida and Tokugawa lines, would likely decide the issue one way or the other.  

The [[Battle of Sekigahara]] opened on the misty morning of 21 October1600 with as many as 160,000 warriors prepared to fight the greatest battle in Japanese history. The irony was that there had been no rhyme or reason to the choice of this particular battlefield. While [[Saito Dosan]] had once said that he who controls Sekigahara controls Japan, this was simply where the two sides had the most room to maneuver. At the same time, the terrain favored Ishida. Tokugawa was largely staggered out in a valley, with his forward units dangerously exposed to encirclement. The key was Kobayakawa Hideaki. His 16,000 men, positioned on Mt. Matsuo and looking down at the forward Ishida and Tokugawa lines, would likely decide the issue one way or the other.  

The battle at 0800 began with a spirited Tokugawa attack and developed into a general melee conducted under a driving rain. Ieyasu moved his headquarters forward at 1000 and anxiously eyed Kobayakawa, whose ranks had not moved since the start of the action. No real advantage was being enjoyed by either side, and Hidetada was still mnay hours away. The bright spot was that just as [[Kikawa Tsunie]] had promised, the Mori, largely positioned on the eastern slopes of Mt. Nangu, had yet to make any moves. Finally, at noon, Ieyasu ordered rifle fire directed at Kobayakawa's position and this did the trick - Hideaki ordered a general advance against Ishida's forces, and the battle turned in Ieyasu's favor. By that late afternoon, the Battle of Sekigahara was decided and Ieyasu was able to view the many heads taken and also to greet his son Hidetada very icily when he finally arrived. Over the next few days Ishida Mitsunari and a number of other chief 'western' commanders were caught and executed in Kyoto.  

The battle at 0800 began with a spirited Tokugawa attack and developed into a general melee conducted under a driving rain. Ieyasu moved his headquarters forward at 1000 and anxiously eyed Kobayakawa, whose ranks had not moved since the start of the action. No real advantage was being enjoyed by either side, and Hidetada was still mnay hours away. The bright spot was that just as [[Kikawa Tsunie]] had promised, the Mori, largely positioned on the eastern slopes of Mt. Nangu, had yet to make any moves. Finally, at noon, Ieyasu ordered rifle fire directed at Kobayakawa's position and this did the trick - Hideaki ordered a general advance against Ishida's forces, and the battle turned in Ieyasu's favor. By that late afternoon, the Battle of Sekigahara was decided and Ieyasu was able to view the many heads taken and also to greet his son Hidetada very icily when he finally arrived. Over the next few days Ishida Mitsunari and a number of other chief 'western' commanders were caught and executed in Kyoto.  

With the defeat of the Western cause, Ieyasu was the undisputed master of Japan. While he had never declared his intention to rule the country, this was the abiding effect of Sekigahara. He used his power to redistribute lands to those who had supported him, and reduced the lands of those who had not. For instance, he reduced the Mori holdings from 1,200,000 koku to just under 370,000 while granting [[Maeda Toshinaga]] an additional 360,000 koku, making the Maeda the wealthiest daimyo in Japan behind Ieyasu himself). Some of the 'western' daimyo he left untouched (such as the Shimazu), while others he stripped of all lands (Ukita, Chosokabe, and Miyabe, for instance). To an extent, he made his decisions in these matters with the understanding that Toyotomi Hideyori was still alive and well in the mighty Osaka Castle.

With the defeat of the Western cause, Ieyasu was the undisputed master of Japan. While he had never declared his intention to rule the country, this was the abiding effect of Sekigahara. In the aftermath of the battle, he used his power to redistribute lands to those who had supported him, and reduced the lands of those who had not. For instance, he reduced the [[Mori clan|Môri clan's]] holdings from 1,200,000 ''koku'' to just under 370,000 while granting [[Maeda Toshinaga]] an additional 360,000 ''koku'', making the [[Maeda clan]] the wealthiest ''daimyô'' in Japan behind Ieyasu himself. Some of the 'western' ''daimyô'' he left untouched (such as the [[Shimazu clan|Shimazu]]), while others he stripped of all lands ([[Ukita clan|Ukita]], [[Chosokabe clan|Chôsokabe]], and [[Miyabe clan|Miyabe]], for instance). Meanwhile, those ''daimyô'' who were killed in battle, or who committed suicide shortly after their defeat, such as [[Otani Yoshitsugu|Ôtani Yoshitsugu]] and [[Uda Yoritada]], had their lands confiscated entirely (rather than being left in the hands of their heirs).<ref name=pitelka80>Pitelka, 80.</ref>

 

Meanwhile, [[Kato Kiyomasa|Katô Kiyomasa]] and [[Date Masamune]], among others, led Tokugawa-loyal forces in wiping out the last vestiges of opposition, in various corners of the archipelago.<ref name=pitelka80/>

 

Though Toyotomi Hideyori and his supporters remained alive, and would a decade later become (or, remain) the chief remaining threat to Tokugawa hegemony, at this early stage, Ieyasu was still in a position to operate out of [[Osaka castle]], and to claim some degree of authority as one of Hideyoshi's named and sworn regents for the young Hideyori. Residing not at Edo but at Osaka for some five months in late 1600 until 1601/3/23, Ieyasu employed this source of authority as he ordered various ''daimyô'' to accede to having their fiefs reduced or confiscated. His presence in Osaka also gave him proximity to the Imperial Court.<ref name=pitelka80/>

 

Ieyasu then relocated from Osaka to [[Fushimi castle]] at the end of the third month of 1601. Though for obvious reasons strongly associated with Edo, Ieyasu in fact spent four out of the first five years of his hegemony, this crucial time of securing his control, organizing fief transfers, and so forth, in Osaka and Kyoto. He only spent one year in Edo before naming his son Shogun in 1605 and retiring to Sunpu.<ref>Pitelka, 83.</ref> This is perhaps an interesting but ultimately trivial aspect of Ieyasu's biography, but taken in consideration of the nature or character of the shogunate, it has some profound meaning; even if Edo was already destined at this point to later become the seat of the Tokugawa shogunate, in these early years power remained seated in Kyoto and Osaka, where connections to Imperial and Oda/Toyotomi claims of legitimacy remained strong.

==Shogun==

==Shogun & Retirement==

In [[1603]] the emperor granted Ieyasu the title of shôgun, an honor helped along by his 'Minamoto' genealogy. He held this post for only two years before officially retiring in favor of his third son, Hidetada. His two older sons were [[Matsudaira Nobuyasu]] and [[Yuki Hideyasu|Yûki Hideyasu]]. Retreating to Sumpu in Suruga province, he supervised the expansion of Chiyoda (Edo) Castle and the expansion of the surrounding town over the next few years, and conducted diplomatic business with the Dutch ([[1609]]) and Spanish, from whom he distanced Japan. Ieyasu also sent diplomatic communications to a number of Southeast Asian polities; forty-eight letters from Ieyasu and 28 from the ''[[roju|rôjû]]'' in [[1601]]-[[1614]] alone constituted a greater diplomatic engagement with the world beyond Japan's closest neighbors (i.e. China, Korea, Ryûkyû) than ever before in history. Forty-one of Ieyasu's 48 letters were directed to Southeast Asian polities, including [[Tonkin]], [[Quang Nam]], [[Ayutthaya]], Cambodia, Patani, and the Philippines, while the few remaining letters including missives to China, Korea, Ryûkyû, England, and the Dutch Republic.<ref>Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” ''Journal of World History'' 24:2 (2013), 339.</ref>

In [[1603]] the emperor granted Ieyasu the title of shôgun, an honor helped along by his 'Minamoto' genealogy. He held this post for only two years before officially retiring in favor of his third son, Hidetada.<ref>Ieyasu's two older sons were [[Matsudaira Nobuyasu]] and [[Yuki Hideyasu|Yûki Hideyasu]].</ref> This was done chiefly in order to further cement the pattern of succession, as well as to increase Tokugawa power by doubling the number of ruling figures in similar fashion to the ''[[insei]]'' (Retired Emperor) system of centuries earlier. Further, Ieyasu was at this time already older than Imagawa Yoshimoto, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, [[Maeda Toshiie]] or half a dozen other similarly prominent Sengoku warlords had been at the times of their respective deaths. At age 63, there were no guarantees he would last much longer, and so it was logical to put his successor in place.<ref>Pitelka, 92.</ref>

In May [[1611]] Ieyasu returned to Kyoto at the head of 50,000 men, his trip ostensibly to attend the retirement of Emperor Goyozei and the succession of Go-Mizonoo. During his stay in the Capital, Ieyasu ordered the expansion of the Imperial Court's buildings and grounds and asked the western daimyo to sign a three-part document vowing their fealty.<ref>This document was as follows:<br>''1. We will respect the laws and formularies established by the bakufu for generations since the time of the General of the Right (Yoritomo); out of concern for our own interest, we will strictly obey any regulations which may be issed by Edo hereafter.<br>2. If there will be someone who violates the laws and regulations or goes contrary to the instructions given from above (Edo), we will not harbor any such person in our respective domains.<br>3. If any samurai or subordinate officer in oour employ is found guilty of rebellion or homicide, and that fact is reported to us, we pledge to each other that we will not take the offender into our employ.<br>In case any of the foregoing articles is violated, upon investigation conducted by Edo, we shall be immediatly liable to be severely dealt in accordance with the laws and regulations.<br>Sixteenth Year of Keichô [1611] fourth month, 16th day.''<br>Ieyasu would impose a similar document on the daimyô of northern Japan the following year.</ref> Perhaps based on his experiences on this trip, he composed the Kuge shohatto in [[1613]], a document that placed restrictions on the activities of the nobility, essentially limiting that class to ceremonial and aesthetic pursuits. In [[1615]] he would order the preparation of the Buke Shohatto, a document which contained the injunctions contained within the 1611 order and was initially a 13-article code (amended in [[1635]]). Drawing on previous house codes and earlier ideas, Ieyasu, possibly concerned for the future of his house, formalized what was essentially a 'house code' for the nation's daimyo. In a further move to secure the stability of the Tokugawa regime, he issued the final and most sweeping Christian Expulsion Edict in 1614.  

 

 

 

In May [[1611]] Ieyasu returned to Kyoto at the head of 50,000 men, his trip ostensibly to attend the retirement of Emperor Go-Yôzei and the succession of Go-Mizunoo. During his stay in the Capital, Ieyasu ordered the expansion of the Imperial Court's buildings and grounds and asked the western daimyo to sign a three-part document vowing their fealty.<ref>This document was as follows:<br>''1. We will respect the laws and formularies established by the bakufu for generations since the time of the General of the Right (Yoritomo); out of concern for our own interest, we will strictly obey any regulations which may be issed by Edo hereafter.<br>2. If there will be someone who violates the laws and regulations or goes contrary to the instructions given from above (Edo), we will not harbor any such person in our respective domains.<br>3. If any samurai or subordinate officer in oour employ is found guilty of rebellion or homicide, and that fact is reported to us, we pledge to each other that we will not take the offender into our employ.<br>In case any of the foregoing articles is violated, upon investigation conducted by Edo, we shall be immediatly liable to be severely dealt in accordance with the laws and regulations.<br>Sixteenth Year of Keichô [1611] fourth month, 16th day.''<br>Ieyasu would impose a similar document on the daimyô of northern Japan the following year.</ref> Perhaps based on his experiences on this trip, he composed the Kuge shohatto in [[1613]], a document that placed restrictions on the activities of the nobility, essentially limiting that class to ceremonial and aesthetic pursuits. In [[1615]] he would order the preparation of the Buke Shohatto, a document which contained the injunctions contained within the 1611 order and was initially a 13-article code (amended in [[1635]]). Drawing on previous house codes and earlier ideas, Ieyasu, possibly concerned for the future of his house, formalized what was essentially a 'house code' for the nation's daimyo. In a further move to secure the stability of the Tokugawa regime, he issued the final and most sweeping Christian Expulsion Edict in 1614.  

The final threat to Tokugawa hegemony was Hideyori. Ironically, Hideyori does not appear to have harbored any particular desire to face Ieyasu. Ieyasu, though, was unwilling to take any chances, especially given his own advanced age. He engineered a pretext for war in [[1614]] over a convoluted and supposed slight that involved the casting of a great bell. At this point Hideyori had felt compelled to open the gates of Osaka to thousands of ronin for self-defense, and now found himself under attack. The initial Tokugawa assault (called the Osaka Winter Campaign) was repulsed bloodily, and despite the protests of Hidetada Ieyasu sought an indirect resolution of the situation. Guessing that the matron of the castle, Hideyori's mother Yodo-gimi, was a weak link that could be exploited, Ieyasu ordered that her location be determined and cannon fire directed in that area. This had the desired effect and to the shock of the defending generals, Yodo-gimi convinced Hideyori to negotiate. Ieyasu was seemingly magnanimous. He promised the defenders that he would honor a peaceful solution to the crisis, and that Hideyori would be allowed to retain his holdings in the Settsu-Kwatchi area. Moreover, no action would be taken against any member of the defending army. Hideyori, who had probably never wanted a war with a man he had grown up considering an uncle in the first place, agreed and ordered his followers to stand down. Ieyasu made a show of arranging for his army to withdraw, then promptly arranged for Osaka's outer moat to be filled in, the actual deed being done by [[Honda Masazumi]]. Hideyori protested, and Ieyasu ultimately revoked his peace offer. The Osaka Summer Campaign essentially revolved around the climactic Battle of Tennoji in June [[1615]], the last great samurai battle and a Tokugawa victory. With the defeat of his army and the Tokugawa pouring through Osaka's gates, Hideyori and his mother committed suicide. In the aftermath Ieyasu personally ordered that Hideyori's infant son be executed and Osaka Castle largely dismantled.

The final threat to Tokugawa hegemony was Hideyori. Ironically, Hideyori does not appear to have harbored any particular desire to face Ieyasu. Ieyasu, though, was unwilling to take any chances, especially given his own advanced age. He engineered a pretext for war in [[1614]] over a convoluted and supposed slight that involved the casting of a great bell. At this point Hideyori had felt compelled to open the gates of Osaka to thousands of ronin for self-defense, and now found himself under attack. The initial Tokugawa assault (called the Osaka Winter Campaign) was repulsed bloodily, and despite the protests of Hidetada Ieyasu sought an indirect resolution of the situation. Guessing that the matron of the castle, Hideyori's mother Yodo-gimi, was a weak link that could be exploited, Ieyasu ordered that her location be determined and cannon fire directed in that area. This had the desired effect and to the shock of the defending generals, Yodo-gimi convinced Hideyori to negotiate. Ieyasu was seemingly magnanimous. He promised the defenders that he would honor a peaceful solution to the crisis, and that Hideyori would be allowed to retain his holdings in the Settsu-Kwatchi area. Moreover, no action would be taken against any member of the defending army. Hideyori, who had probably never wanted a war with a man he had grown up considering an uncle in the first place, agreed and ordered his followers to stand down. Ieyasu made a show of arranging for his army to withdraw, then promptly arranged for Osaka's outer moat to be filled in, the actual deed being done by [[Honda Masazumi]]. Hideyori protested, and Ieyasu ultimately revoked his peace offer. The Osaka Summer Campaign essentially revolved around the climactic Battle of Tennoji in June [[1615]], the last great samurai battle and a Tokugawa victory. With the defeat of his army and the Tokugawa pouring through Osaka's gates, Hideyori and his mother committed suicide. In the aftermath Ieyasu personally ordered that Hideyori's infant son be executed and Osaka Castle largely dismantled.

==Death==

==Death==

The following year, Ieyasu fell ill and died in bed. Unlike Hideyoshi, he could pass away secure in the future of his house. Over the course of his life, he had had 11 sons and four daughters.<ref name=arai110/>

[[File:Yomeimon.jpg|right|thumb|400px|The famous Yômeimon gate at [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]]]]

In [[1616]], the year after his final victory over the Toyotomi, Ieyasu fell ill and died in bed. Unlike Hideyoshi, he could pass away secure in the future of his house. Over the course of his life, he had had 11 sons and four daughters.<ref name=arai110/>

The dynasty Ieyasu had created was exceedingly solid, with three sub-branches (the [[Kishu Tokugawa clan|Kii]], [[Owari Tokugawa clan|Owari]], and [[Mito Tokugawa clan|Mito]]) maintained for the sole purpose of providing an heir should the main branch fail to produce one. The daimyo were weary of war, and more or less content to enjoy the fruits of their labors. There would be disputes and grievances, but with the exception of the short and bloody [[Shimabara Rebellion]], Japan would enjoy peace for over two hundred years. At the same time, Tokugawa Ieyasu had another legacy - never before had Japan been as socially rigid, nor had the common man and woman had so little control over their own lives. The daimyo - especially those tagged as [[tozama]] - would also suffer the brunt of the fledgling Tokugawa's heavy-handedness, with relief coming only after the death of the third shogun Iemitsu in [[1651]].  

The dynasty Ieyasu had created was exceedingly solid, with three sub-branches (the [[Kishu Tokugawa clan|Kii]], [[Owari Tokugawa clan|Owari]], and [[Mito Tokugawa clan|Mito]]) maintained for the sole purpose of providing an heir should the main branch fail to produce one. The daimyo were weary of war, and more or less content to enjoy the fruits of their labors. There would be disputes and grievances, but with the exception of the short and bloody [[Shimabara Rebellion]], Japan would enjoy peace for over two hundred years. At the same time, Tokugawa Ieyasu had another legacy - never before had Japan been as socially rigid, nor had the common man and woman had so little control over their own lives. The daimyo - especially those tagged as [[tozama]] - would also suffer the brunt of the fledgling Tokugawa's heavy-handedness, with relief coming only after the death of the third shogun Iemitsu in [[1651]].  

Upon his death, Ieyasu left a massive collection of heirlooms, including more than 1,000 swords, and numerous ceramics, paintings, works of calligraphy, and tea instruments. The collection was divided between the Kii, Mito, Owari, and shogunal houses, with some objects being interned with Ieyasu in his grave.<ref>Morgan Pitelka. "Art, Agency, and Networks in the Career of Tokugawa Ieyasu." in ''A Companion to Asian Art and Architecture''. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 460-461.</ref>

Upon his death, Ieyasu left a massive collection of heirlooms, including more than 1,000 swords, and numerous ceramics, paintings, works of calligraphy, and tea instruments. The collection was divided between the Kii, Mito, Owari, and shogunal houses, with some objects being interned with Ieyasu in his grave.<ref>Morgan Pitelka. "Art, Agency, and Networks in the Career of Tokugawa Ieyasu." in ''A Companion to Asian Art and Architecture''. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, 460-461.</ref>

Ieyasu was originally buried at [[Sunpu Castle]], and enshrined as a [[Shinto]] deity, Tôshô Daigongen, at a shrine established nearby and called [[Kunozan Toshogu|Kunôzan Tôshôgû]]. [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]], Ieyasu's grandson, later established in [[1636]] a shrine in [[Nikko|Nikkô]] (to the north of Edo). Ieyasu's remains were transferred to this new [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]], which then became the chief shrine dedicated to the deified Ieyasu.

In accordance with his own instructions, Ieyasu was originally buried at [[Sunpu Castle]], and enshrined as a [[Shinto]] deity, Tôshô Daigongen, at a [[Yoshida Shinto]] shrine established nearby and called [[Kunozan Toshogu|Kunôzan Tôshôgû]]. His image was installed there as well, facing west, so as to pacify and protect the western provinces. He also ordered that a small hall be built at [[Nikko|Nikkô]] (in the mountains near Edo) a year later, so that he could act as protector deity of the eight [[provinces]] of [[Kanto|Kantô]].<ref name=nakai177>Kate Wildman Nakai, ''Shogunal Politics'', Harvard University Press (1988), 177.</ref>

 

However, within the same year of his death, the Buddhist priest and shogunal advisor [[Tenkai]] managed to push [[Bonshun]] (head Buddhist priest associated with Kunôzan Tôshôgû) and [[Ishin Suden|Ishin Sûden]] (another prominent Buddhist monk & shogunal advisor) aside as he arranged for himself to oversee mourning ceremonies at the Tokugawa clan temple of [[Zojo-ji|Zôjô-ji]] in Edo. Tenkai then also arranged for Ieyasu to be deified not as a ''myôjin'' ("bright deity") in the Yoshida Shinto tradition as Ishin Sûden had supported, but rather as a ''daigongen'' ("great avatar") in the [[Tendai]] Buddhism-associated [[Sanno Ichijitsu|Sannô Ichijitsu]] school of Shinto. An envoy from the Imperial court visited Kunôzan and formally bestowed the title of ''daigongen'' upon Ieyasu in [[1617]], in conjunction with the first anniversary of his death.<ref name=nakai177/>

 

Ieyasu's body was then moved to Nikkô, and his spirit was then installed as the chief deity at a new shrine there on [[1617]]/4/17, the anniversary of his death.<ref name=pitelka147>Pitelka, ''Spectacular Accumulation'', 147.</ref><ref name=nakai177/> This deification of Ieyasu followed a pattern, or precedent, set by Toyotomi Hideyoshi before him, and emulated, or repeated, by both [[Tokugawa Hidetada]] and [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]] after him. The shogunate then began in the 1630s-1660s to take efforts to discourage, prevent, or even outlaw others from being deified similarly, something the shogunate perceived as a threat to Tokugawa power and supremacy. At least fifteen ''daimyô'' nevertheless received Shinto burials and ''[[kami]]'' names/titles from priests of the [[Yoshida Shinto]] sect, despite the shogunate's efforts to maintain Tokugawa deification as unique.<ref>Evelyn Rawski, ''Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives'', Cambridge University Press (2015), 121.</ref>

 

Construction continued at Nikkô, and shoguns paid formal visits in [[1619]] and [[1622]],<ref name=pitelka147/> but it was under [[Tokugawa Iemitsu]], Ieyasu's grandson, that [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]] is said to have been formally established in [[1636]]. This then became the chief shrine dedicated to the deified Ieyasu. The shrine was officially elevated from a ''jinja'' to a ''jingû'' (a higher level of shrine) in [[1645]].<ref>Nakai, 178.</ref>

==Legacy==

==Legacy==