Changes

The Qing brought much of the central and southern parts of China under its control, including [[Hubei province|Hubei]], [[Shaanxi province|Shaanxi]], [[Sichuan province|Sichuan]] and all the coastal provinces,  within two years of taking Beijing, and finally secured control over [[Yunnan province]], on the border with Burma and Vietnam, in [[1659]].<ref name=tignor502>Robert Tignor, Benjamin Elman, et al, ''Worlds Together, Worlds Apart'', vol B, Fourth Edition, W.W. Norton & Co (2014), 502.</ref>

The Qing brought much of the central and southern parts of China under its control, including [[Hubei province|Hubei]], [[Shaanxi province|Shaanxi]], [[Sichuan province|Sichuan]] and all the coastal provinces,  within two years of taking Beijing, and finally secured control over [[Yunnan province]], on the border with Burma and Vietnam, in [[1659]].<ref name=tignor502>Robert Tignor, Benjamin Elman, et al, ''Worlds Together, Worlds Apart'', vol B, Fourth Edition, W.W. Norton & Co (2014), 502.</ref>

The Qing state, and society, was divided to a certain extent along ethnic lines. Qing leaders, considering the strengths and failures of previous nomadic dynasties, such as the [[Tangut]] [[Xi Xia]], the [[Khitan]] [[Liao Dynasty]], the Jurchen Jin Dynasty, and the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, realized the need for a careful balance between Sinicization and maintenance of steppe traditions. The adoption of certain aspects of Chinese culture, especially in terms of the structure of government, was necessary for a strong, stable, well-managed state, and for preventing rebellion amongst the Han Chinese, who greatly outnumbered the Manchus. At the same time, however, a maintenance of nomadic horseriding and martial traditions was necessary to retain the loyalty of Manchu, Jurchen, and Mongol followers, and to ensure that the Qing would be able to defend themselves from attack by other nomadic groups (as the Khitans and Jurchens failed to, in the past).

The Qing state, and society, was divided to a certain extent along ethnic lines. Qing leaders, considering the strengths and failures of previous nomadic dynasties, such as the [[Tangut]] [[Xi Xia]], the [[Khitan]] [[Liao Dynasty]], the Jurchen Jin Dynasty, and the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, realized the need for a careful balance between Sinicization and maintenance of steppe traditions. The adoption of certain aspects of Chinese culture, especially in terms of the structure of government, was necessary for a strong, stable, well-managed state, and for preventing rebellion amongst the Han Chinese, who greatly outnumbered the Manchus. At the same time, however, a maintenance of nomadic horseriding and martial traditions was necessary to retain the loyalty of Manchu, Jurchen, and Mongol followers, and to ensure that the Qing would be able to defend themselves from attack by other nomadic groups (as the Khitans and Jurchens failed to, in the past). The Qing Emperors did not officially name their heirs prior to their deaths; instead of any one of the imperial progeny being known as Crown Prince, the Emperor selected his heir secretly (regardless of age), keeping this selection sealed within an imperial vault. Only upon the Emperor's death was the vault opened, and the document naming the heir revealed.<ref name=akazaki628>[[Akazaki Kaimon]] 赤崎海門, ''[[Ryukaku danki|Ryûkaku danki]]'' 「琉客談記」 1796, reprinted in ''Shiseki shûran'' 「史籍集覧」, vol 16, Kyoto: Rinsen shoten (1996), 629.</ref>

Thus, Manchus, Mongols, and so-called "martial" Chinese (漢軍, C: ''Hàn jūn'', descendants of Han Chinese & Korean allies of the Manchus, chiefly from Manchuria and northern China, from prior to the fall of the Ming) were each organized into eight "banners," and were governed and administered not by Han Chinese officials, but by their fellow bannermen. In each of the major provincial cities, bannermen lived in garrisons separated from the other areas of the city, served in a separate administrative hierarchy, and took a separate set of [[Chinese imperial examinations|civil examinations]] to earn those administrative posts. These exams were offered not only in classical Chinese, but alternatively in the Mongol and Manchu languages, incorporated elements of military skill or prowess, and involved somewhat lower requirements for knowledge of Confucian classics, talent at Chinese poetry, and the like, as compared to the exams taken by Han Chinese candidates. In a system not entirely unlike the dyarchy (double rule) system of civil and military governors under the [[Kamakura shogunate|Kamakura]] and [[Muromachi shogunate]]s in Japan, which might be said to have governed the [[samurai]] while leaving civil administration to the Imperial Court, the Qing Court similarly appointed two officials - one from the banners, and one Chinese scholar-bureaucrat - to a great many posts within a government based on that of the Ming, with Six Ministries at its center. The Grand Secretariat was similarly kept in place, albeit with a mix of Manchu and Chinese secretaries.

Thus, Manchus, Mongols, and so-called "martial" Chinese (漢軍, C: ''Hàn jūn'', descendants of Han Chinese & Korean allies of the Manchus, chiefly from Manchuria and northern China, from prior to the fall of the Ming) were each organized into eight "banners," and were governed and administered not by Han Chinese officials, but by their fellow bannermen. No Han Chinese worked within the Imperial Palace; all palace servants and staff otherwise were Manchus.<ref name=akazaki628/> In each of the major provincial cities, bannermen lived in garrisons separated from the other areas of the city, served in a separate administrative hierarchy, and took a separate set of [[Chinese imperial examinations|civil examinations]] to earn those administrative posts. These exams were offered not only in classical Chinese, but alternatively in the Mongol and Manchu languages, incorporated elements of military skill or prowess, and involved somewhat lower requirements for knowledge of Confucian classics, talent at Chinese poetry, and the like, as compared to the exams taken by Han Chinese candidates. In a system not entirely unlike the dyarchy (double rule) system of civil and military governors under the [[Kamakura shogunate|Kamakura]] and [[Muromachi shogunate]]s in Japan, which might be said to have governed the [[samurai]] while leaving civil administration to the Imperial Court, the Qing Court similarly appointed two officials - one from the banners, and one Chinese scholar-bureaucrat - to a great many posts within a government based on that of the Ming, with Six Ministries at its center. The Grand Secretariat was similarly kept in place, albeit with a mix of Manchu and Chinese secretaries.

In Beijing, the various banners were settled in areas directly outside the [[Forbidden City|palace]] walls, thus surrounding the palace with the most loyal warriors, a pattern not entirely dissimilar from the [[Tokugawa shogunate|Tokugawa]] organization of [[Edo]]. Han Chinese were resettled in the southern half of the city only, and while this caused some consternation and economic hardship at first, the Chinese portion of the city quickly grew into a vibrantly active and prosperous commercial zone. Meanwhile, outside of the city, the Qing redistributed Ming Imperial farmland, and many of the estates of other Ming elites, giving roughly six acres apiece to over 40,000 Manchu bannermen, and some larger estates to a small number of senior Manchu officers. Some five million acres of farmland further from the city was similarly confiscated from Chinese farmers, many of whom then became vagabonds or bandits, but many of whom returned to the land as tenant farmers working for Manchu landlords.

In Beijing, the various banners were settled in areas directly outside the [[Forbidden City|palace]] walls, thus surrounding the palace with the most loyal warriors, a pattern not entirely dissimilar from the [[Tokugawa shogunate|Tokugawa]] organization of [[Edo]]. Han Chinese were resettled in the southern half of the city only, and while this caused some consternation and economic hardship at first, the Chinese portion of the city quickly grew into a vibrantly active and prosperous commercial zone. Meanwhile, outside of the city, the Qing redistributed Ming Imperial farmland, and many of the estates of other Ming elites, giving roughly six acres apiece to over 40,000 Manchu bannermen, and some larger estates to a small number of senior Manchu officers. Some five million acres of farmland further from the city was similarly confiscated from Chinese farmers, many of whom then became vagabonds or bandits, but many of whom returned to the land as tenant farmers working for Manchu landlords.

Official hierarchy among the "martial" Chinese was determined in large part by when one's family was first incorporated into the Qing state; those who surrendered early in the conquest of China, or prior to it, held the most elite positions.<ref>Spence, 41.</ref>

Official hierarchy among the "martial" Chinese was determined in large part by when one's family was first incorporated into the Qing state; those who surrendered early in the conquest of China, or prior to it, held the most elite positions.<ref>Spence, 41.</ref>

[[File:Ryukyu-qing-seal.jpg|right|thumb|300px|The royal seal of the [[Ryukyu Kingdom|Ryûkyû Kingdom]] during the Qing Dynasty, showing Chinese (琉球國王之印) in [[seal script]] on the right, and an inscription in the [[Manchu language]] on the left.]]

[[File:Ryukyu-qing-seal.jpg|right|thumb|300px|The royal seal of the [[Ryukyu Kingdom|Ryûkyû Kingdom]] during the Qing Dynasty, showing Chinese (琉球國王之印) in [[seal script]] on the right, and an inscription in the [[Manchu language]] on the left. As reproduced in ''Ryûkyû kokuô sappô no zu'', handscroll, date unknown, University of Hawaii Collection.]]

While the Manchu elite absolutely adopted Chinese practices, Confucian political philosophy, and government structures, to a great extent, inserting itself into Chinese systems of governance rather than overthrowing them, they at the same time made great efforts to maintain their martial, equestrian, steppe culture. The Court employed the Manchu language alongside Chinese in most if not all official documents, and powerfully promoted the language otherwise, and maintained complexes of yurts, in the manner of the khans of the steppes, alongside the Chinese-style wooden buildings of the [[Forbidden City|Imperial Palace]]. In addition, the [[Qianlong Emperor]] (r. [[1735]]-[[1796]]) developed strong ties with the [[Dalai Lama]], and built up [[Chengde]] as a religious center of [[Tibetan Buddhism]], a form of Buddhism which had been embraced by the Mongols and Manchus, and which is quite different from Chinese Buddhism in fundamental ways.

While the Manchu elite absolutely adopted Chinese practices, Confucian political philosophy, and government structures, to a great extent, inserting itself into Chinese systems of governance rather than overthrowing them, they at the same time made great efforts to maintain their martial, equestrian, steppe culture. The Court chiefly employed the Chinese language in court business and court ceremonies, but the Manchu language was spoken in more everyday verbal interactions within the Palace.<ref name=akazaki628/> Further, the Court used the Manchu language alongside Chinese in most if not all official documents, and powerfully promoted the language otherwise, and maintained complexes of yurts, in the manner of the khans of the steppes, alongside the Chinese-style wooden buildings of the [[Forbidden City|Imperial Palace]]. In addition, the [[Qianlong Emperor]] (r. [[1735]]-[[1796]]) developed strong ties with the [[Dalai Lama]], and built up [[Chengde]] as a religious center of [[Tibetan Buddhism]], a form of Buddhism which had been embraced by the Mongols and Manchus, and which is quite different from Chinese Buddhism in fundamental ways.

==Consolidation==

==Consolidation==

Russian traders and trappers began encroaching further upon Manchu and Chinese territory in the Amur River region in the 1660s, and the [[Kangxi Emperor]] (r. [[1661]]-[[1722]]) responded by establishing military colonies and driving the Russians away. These tensions were resolved to an extent by the [[1689]] [[Treaty of Nerchinsk]], negotiated via [[Society of Jesus|Jesuit]] translators, which permitted Russian traders to travel through the territory and all the way to Beijing, while forbidding Russian governmental intervention, settlement, or other more permanent activities in Manchuria.  

Russian traders and trappers began encroaching further upon Manchu and Chinese territory in the Amur River region in the 1660s, and the [[Kangxi Emperor]] (r. [[1661]]-[[1722]]) responded by establishing military colonies and driving the Russians away. These tensions were resolved to an extent by the [[1689]] [[Treaty of Nerchinsk]], negotiated via [[Society of Jesus|Jesuit]] translators, which permitted Russian traders to travel through the territory and all the way to Beijing, while forbidding Russian governmental intervention, settlement, or other more permanent activities in Manchuria.  

Following a series of successful conquests in which the Qing acquired millions of square miles of new territories in the west, the [[Treaty of Kiakhta]] in [[1727]] similarly arranged for border agreements and trade arrangements between China and Russia in this more western region, where the Qing vied not only with Russia, but also with Tibet and the western Mongols. Outer Mongolia fell to Qing forces in [[1697]], [[Zunghars|Zungharia]] (to the west of Mongolia) in [[1757]], and East Turkestan (incl. [[Uighur]] lands and the city of [[Kashgar]]) in [[1759]], with Tibet becoming a protectorate in [[1751]].<ref name=tignor502/> The Qing consolidated a number of these areas into a "new territory" (Xinjiang) in [[1768]]. Further border disputes between China and Russia over areas of Xinjiang would be addressed by a [[Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881)|Treaty of St. Petersburg]] in [[1881]]. Some of these lands had not been controlled by China since the [[Tang Dynasty]], while others had never previously come under Chinese control. Nevertheless, all of Xinjiang and Tibet (invaded in the 1720s) are today often claimed by Chinese as integral parts of historical/traditional China.

Following a series of successful conquests in which the Qing acquired millions of square miles of new territories in the west, the [[Treaty of Kiakhta]] in [[1727]] similarly arranged for border agreements and trade arrangements between China and Russia in this more western region, where the Qing vied not only with Russia, but also with Tibet and the western Mongols. Outer Mongolia fell to Qing forces in [[1697]], [[Zunghars|Zungharia]] (to the west of Mongolia) in [[1757]], and East Turkestan (incl. [[Uighur]] lands and the city of [[Kashgar]]) in [[1759]], with Tibet becoming a protectorate in [[1751]].<ref name=tignor502/> The Qing consolidated a number of these areas into a "new territory" (Xinjiang) in [[1768]]. Further border disputes between China and Russia over areas of Xinjiang would be addressed by a [[Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881)|Treaty of St. Petersburg]] in [[1881]]. Some of these lands had not been controlled by China since the [[Tang Dynasty]], while others had never previously come under Chinese control. Nevertheless, all of Xinjiang and Tibet (invaded in the 1720s) are today often claimed by Chinese as integral parts of historical/traditional China. The Qing administered these western territories loosely for a time, allowing local or native administrative structures to remain in place. Only in the late 19th century did the Court first decide to integrate these regions more fully into "China proper."

The Qing administered these western territories loosely for a time, allowing local or native administrative structures to remain in place. Only in the late 19th century did the Court first decide to integrate these regions more fully into "China proper."

Under the Qianlong Emperor, the Qing Empire engaged in [[Ten Great Campaigns]], including intervention in a succession dispute in Vietnam in [[1789]]; this ended in the expulsion of Chinese (Manchu) military force & civil control from Vietnam. The Chinese would fight for Vietnam again in [[1884]], this time [[Sino-French War|against the French]]. Siam's final tribute mission to China took place in [[1853]].

Under the Qianlong Emperor, the Qing Empire engaged in [[Ten Great Campaigns]], including intervention in a succession dispute in Vietnam in [[1789]]; this ended in the expulsion of Chinese (Manchu) military force & civil control from Vietnam. The Chinese would fight for Vietnam again in [[1884]], this time [[Sino-French War|against the French]].

The early encounters with Russia were to be just the beginning of broader and deeper interactions with Western powers. The [[1793]] British mission to the Court of the Qianlong Emperor led by [[George Lord Macartney]] is perhaps the most oft-discussed, but between the establishment of the Qing and the end of the [[Second Opium War]] in [[1860]], the Qing saw a total of 27 diplomatic missions from Western powers, including three from Britain, one from the United States, three from the Vatican, four from the Dutch, four from Portugal, and twelve from Russia.<ref>Erik Ringmar, "The Ritual/Performance Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis: European Diplomats at the Chinese Court," ''Rethinking Foreign Policy'' 101 (2012), 4.</ref>

 

Siam's final tribute mission to China took place in [[1853]].

The Taiping Rebellion ended in 1864, and the Imperial Court set in motion the [[Tongzhi Restoration]], a series of reforms aimed at slowing or reversing the dynasty's decline. While the expansion of foreign presence and influence in China at this time was widely seen in a negative light, the end of the Taiping Rebellion brought at least a respite from the war and chaos of previous decades, and is said to have been encouraging enough in that alone to warrant some calling the period a "revival" or "restoration." While China did not yet at this time set itself on the course towards industrialization, the economy was strengthened and expanded by a variety of agricultural policies, land reclamation projects, tax reforms, improvements in local administration, and so forth. Even among those who did advocate for an adoption of Western technologies (especially in military applications), the focus was on a restoration of virtuous government as conceived traditionally, according to Confucian ideals of the upright and virtuous gentleman scholar administrator.<ref>Wm. Theodore de Bary and Wing-sit Chan, ''Sources of Chinese Tradition'', vol 2, Columbia University Press (1964), 43-44.</ref>

The Taiping Rebellion ended in 1864, and the Imperial Court set in motion the [[Tongzhi Restoration]], a series of reforms aimed at slowing or reversing the dynasty's decline. While the expansion of foreign presence and influence in China at this time was widely seen in a negative light, the end of the Taiping Rebellion brought at least a respite from the war and chaos of previous decades, and is said to have been encouraging enough in that alone to warrant some calling the period a "revival" or "restoration." While China did not yet at this time set itself on the course towards industrialization, the economy was strengthened and expanded by a variety of agricultural policies, land reclamation projects, tax reforms, improvements in local administration, and so forth. Even among those who did advocate for an adoption of Western technologies (especially in military applications), the focus was on a restoration of virtuous government as conceived traditionally, according to Confucian ideals of the upright and virtuous gentleman scholar administrator.<ref>Wm. Theodore de Bary and Wing-sit Chan, ''Sources of Chinese Tradition'', vol 2, Columbia University Press (1964), 43-44.</ref>