Line 32: |
Line 32: |
| ::#A Japanese garrison was to be stationed in Ryûkyû. | | ::#A Japanese garrison was to be stationed in Ryûkyû. |
| ::#Shô Tai was to journey to Tokyo and pay his respects to the Emperor.<ref>Uemura. p119.</ref> | | ::#Shô Tai was to journey to Tokyo and pay his respects to the Emperor.<ref>Uemura. p119.</ref> |
− | The Ryukyuan officials agreed to a number of the stipulations, including the sending of students to Tokyo, but rejected the majority of the demands, including the abolition of [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]], and the exclusive use of the Japanese calendar (as that would interfere with relations with China). They argued that societal circumstances and differences precluded the implementation of Japanese systems of administration and law in Ryûkyû, and agreed begrudgingly to a Japanese garrison so long as it was small. Furthermore, they asserted that Shô Tai could not travel to Tokyo because of his illness, a point that most historians attribute to efforts by the Ryukyuan authorities to avoid the king having to formally express his submission to the Japanese Emperor; the king's illness (or that of the queen regent) had been cited in times past as a delaying tactic, and as a tactic to rebuff, for example, foreign agents such as [[Commodore Perry]].<ref>Kerr, George. ''Okinawa: The History of an Island People''. Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing, 2000. pp310, 363, 372.</ref> Matsuda Michiyuki and [[Tominokoji Takanao|Tominokôji Takanao]], meeting directly with the king and seeing his state, however, seem to have believed he was genuinely ill.<ref>Donald Keene, ''Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912'', Columbia University Press (2002), 304.</ref> | + | The Ryukyuan officials agreed to a number of the stipulations, including the sending of students to Tokyo, but rejected the majority of the demands, including the abolition of [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]], and the exclusive use of the Japanese calendar (as that would interfere with relations with China). They argued that societal circumstances and differences precluded the implementation of Japanese systems of administration and law in Ryûkyû, and agreed begrudgingly to a Japanese garrison so long as it was small. Furthermore, they asserted that Shô Tai could not travel to Tokyo because of his illness, a point that most historians attribute to efforts by the Ryukyuan authorities to avoid the king having to formally express his submission to the Japanese Emperor; the king's illness (or that of the queen regent) had been cited in times past as a delaying tactic, and as a tactic to rebuff, for example, foreign agents such as [[Commodore Perry]].<ref>Kerr, George. ''Okinawa: The History of an Island People''. Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing, 2000. pp310, 363, 372.</ref> Matsuda Michiyuki and [[Tominokoji Takanao|Tominokôji Takanao]], meeting directly with the king and seeing his state in April 1879, however, seem to have believed he was genuinely ill.<ref>Donald Keene, ''Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912'', Columbia University Press (2002), 304.</ref> |
| | | |
| [[Ikegusuku ueekata]] and several other Ryukyuan officials accompanied Matsuda back to Tokyo, in order to complain more formally, officially and directly. Ikegusuku or other representatives of the court remained in Tokyo for a full year, until October 1876, consistently rejecting Japanese demands. As the Ryukyuan opposition was most strongly focused on defending the desire for continued tributary relations with China, Matsuda saw that Japan continued to gradually encroach upon Ryukyuan internal (domestic) authority, gradually seizing control of internal Ryukyuan affairs. One of the first steps was the imposition of Japanese criminal codes and law enforcement in Ryûkyû, managed through the local branch office of the Ministry of the Interior. A military base, housing the [[Kumamoto Garrison]], was established soon afterwards. | | [[Ikegusuku ueekata]] and several other Ryukyuan officials accompanied Matsuda back to Tokyo, in order to complain more formally, officially and directly. Ikegusuku or other representatives of the court remained in Tokyo for a full year, until October 1876, consistently rejecting Japanese demands. As the Ryukyuan opposition was most strongly focused on defending the desire for continued tributary relations with China, Matsuda saw that Japan continued to gradually encroach upon Ryukyuan internal (domestic) authority, gradually seizing control of internal Ryukyuan affairs. One of the first steps was the imposition of Japanese criminal codes and law enforcement in Ryûkyû, managed through the local branch office of the Ministry of the Interior. A military base, housing the [[Kumamoto Garrison]], was established soon afterwards. |
Line 38: |
Line 38: |
| Several Ryukyuan officials, including [[Kochi ueekata|Kôchi ueekata]], secretly left for China in December 1876, meeting with Chinese officials in Fuzhou and securing promises that China would aim to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. [[He Ruzhang]], a new Resident Diplomatic Minister, arrived in Tokyo in December 1877, after meeting with Ryukyuan officials in [[Kobe]]; over the course of the next year, he would speak with Ryukyuan and Japanese officials on a number of occasions, and send reports back to Beijing requesting that strong measures be taken. Meanwhile, Ryukyuan officials sent letters to the American, French, and Dutch representatives in Tokyo, referring to their countries' respective treaties with the Kingdom of Ryûkyû, and complaining of Tokyo's behavior and intentions. In total, no fewer than fourteen petitions were sent to the Tokyo government, requesting a return to (or maintenance of) the dual relationship, famously claiming that "Japan is our father and China is our mother," to which the Meiji government responded that "for a country to serve two emperors is like a wife serving two husbands."<ref>Keene, 302.</ref> | | Several Ryukyuan officials, including [[Kochi ueekata|Kôchi ueekata]], secretly left for China in December 1876, meeting with Chinese officials in Fuzhou and securing promises that China would aim to resolve the situation through diplomatic means. [[He Ruzhang]], a new Resident Diplomatic Minister, arrived in Tokyo in December 1877, after meeting with Ryukyuan officials in [[Kobe]]; over the course of the next year, he would speak with Ryukyuan and Japanese officials on a number of occasions, and send reports back to Beijing requesting that strong measures be taken. Meanwhile, Ryukyuan officials sent letters to the American, French, and Dutch representatives in Tokyo, referring to their countries' respective treaties with the Kingdom of Ryûkyû, and complaining of Tokyo's behavior and intentions. In total, no fewer than fourteen petitions were sent to the Tokyo government, requesting a return to (or maintenance of) the dual relationship, famously claiming that "Japan is our father and China is our mother," to which the Meiji government responded that "for a country to serve two emperors is like a wife serving two husbands."<ref>Keene, 302.</ref> |
| | | |
− | Matsuda Michiyuki returned to Ryûkyû in January 1879, and again in March, this time bringing with him a considerable entourage including 160 military police, and 400 soldiers from the Kumamoto Garrison. In February, Beijing sent diplomatic communications formally urging Tokyo to not unilaterally annex the Ryukyus. On March 27, Matsuda presented to Prince Nakijin the formal document declaring the abolition of the Ryûkyû Kingdom and the annexation of its lands as Okinawa Prefecture. King Shô Tai was given until March 31 to vacate the castle and leave for Tokyo; there, he would officially submit to the Emperor, be stripped of his title as "King" (or, by this time, ''han'ô''), and be absorbed into the [[kazoku|Japanese peerage]] as a Marquis (''kôshaku''). The king did so on March 30, and Japanese authorities immediately took over [[Shuri castle]], installing a military garrison there. | + | Matsuda Michiyuki returned to Ryûkyû in January 1879, and again in March, this time bringing with him a considerable entourage including 160 military police, and 400 soldiers from the Kumamoto Garrison. In February, Beijing sent diplomatic communications formally urging Tokyo to not unilaterally annex the Ryukyus. On March 27, Matsuda presented to Prince Nakijin the formal document declaring the abolition of the Ryûkyû Kingdom and the annexation of its lands as Okinawa Prefecture. King Shô Tai was given until March 31 to vacate the castle and leave for Tokyo; there, he would officially submit to the Emperor, be stripped of his title as "King" (or, by this time, ''han'ô''), and be absorbed into the [[kazoku|Japanese peerage]] as a Marquis (''kôshaku''). The king vacated the castle sometime during that month of March, and Japanese authorities immediately took over [[Shuri castle]], installing a military garrison there. Though Matsuda initially insisted that the king's departure for Tokyo would be scheduled for April 18, after multiple petitions or appeals from literally hundreds of Ryukyuan court officials, he eventually relented, agreeing to postpone the king's departure for Tokyo to an as-yet-undetermined future date, but that Crown Prince [[Sho Ten|Shô Ten]] would have to come to Tokyo in the meantime. As [[Donald Keene]] explains, Matsuda and others believed that Ryukyuan efforts to delay the king's departure were a tactic to play for time in the hopes that Beijing might come to the kingdom's defense; Matsuda and others also believed that even if the king were to go to Tokyo, the crown prince, if left behind in Ryûkyû, could become the focal point of a resistance or rebellion. This way, Shô Ten could serve as a hostage in Tokyo, forcing Shô Tai to behave more cooperatively even if his own journey to Tokyo were postponed.<ref>Keene, 305.</ref> |
| | | |
| Over the ensuing months and years, Japanese control and administration would be, step by step, further expanded in the islands. Prefectural administration was dominated by Japanese officials, especially those from [[Satsuma han]] (now [[Kagoshima prefecture]]), and not by native Ryukyuans, least of all anyone formerly involved in the royal or ''han'' bureaucracy. [[Kinashi Seiichiro|Kinashi Seiichirô]] had been named Acting Governor of the not-yet-existent prefecture on March 3rd, but was replaced a few months later by [[Nabeshima Naoyoshi]], who is counted as the first Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, arriving on May 18th and serving in that capacity for almost exactly two years (until May 19, [[1881]]). Meanwhile, in March [[1880]], Tokyo communicated to the governments of the Western powers that Japan would now be taking on the responsibility of repaying any debts still owed to the Western powers by the Ryûkyû Kingdom. | | Over the ensuing months and years, Japanese control and administration would be, step by step, further expanded in the islands. Prefectural administration was dominated by Japanese officials, especially those from [[Satsuma han]] (now [[Kagoshima prefecture]]), and not by native Ryukyuans, least of all anyone formerly involved in the royal or ''han'' bureaucracy. [[Kinashi Seiichiro|Kinashi Seiichirô]] had been named Acting Governor of the not-yet-existent prefecture on March 3rd, but was replaced a few months later by [[Nabeshima Naoyoshi]], who is counted as the first Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, arriving on May 18th and serving in that capacity for almost exactly two years (until May 19, [[1881]]). Meanwhile, in March [[1880]], Tokyo communicated to the governments of the Western powers that Japan would now be taking on the responsibility of repaying any debts still owed to the Western powers by the Ryûkyû Kingdom. |