Changes

*''Japanese/Chinese/Korean'': [[倭]]寇 ''(wakou / wōkòu / waegu)''

*''Japanese/Chinese/Korean'': [[倭]]寇 ''(wakou / wōkòu / waegu)''

The ''wakô'' were medieval East Asian seafarers often described as raiders, pirates, or brigands, active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, with the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese, Korean, Ryukyuan, or from mixed or ambiguous ethnic or national backgrounds.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref><ref name=miki>Watanabe Miki, “Shifting Representations of Ryukyuans between Early Modern China and Japan,” in Caroli (ed.), ''Imagined Okinawa: Challenge from Time and Space'', Ca' Foscari University in Venice (2015), 197.</ref> Because of the [[Muromachi shogunate|Muromachi shogunate's]] weak control over [[Kyushu]], and the lack of any centralized authority in the [[Ryukyu Islands]] (especially prior to the 16th century), these regions became major centers of ''wakô'' activity, and Japanese came to be used as a common language among the ''wakô''. However, while many ''wakô'' groups enjoyed some kind of relationship with local authorities such as samurai houses or the [[Seiseifu]] in Kyushu, they were not in truth controlled by or otherwise "belonging to" Japan, or Ryûkyû.<ref>Gregory Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', University of Hawaii Press (2019), 39-40.</ref>

The ''wakô'' were medieval East Asian seafarers often described as raiders, pirates, or brigands, active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, with the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese, Korean, Ryukyuan, or from mixed or ambiguous ethnic or national backgrounds.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref><ref name=miki>Watanabe Miki, “Shifting Representations of Ryukyuans between Early Modern China and Japan,” in Caroli (ed.), ''Imagined Okinawa: Challenge from Time and Space'', Ca' Foscari University in Venice (2015), 197.</ref> Because of the [[Muromachi shogunate|Muromachi shogunate's]] weak control over [[Kyushu]], and the lack of any centralized authority in the [[Ryukyu Islands]] (especially prior to the 16th century), these regions became major centers of ''wakô'' activity, and Japanese came to be used as a common language among the ''wakô''. However, while many ''wakô'' groups enjoyed some kind of relationship with local authorities such as samurai houses or the [[Seiseifu]] in Kyushu, they were not in truth controlled by or otherwise "belonging to" Japan, or Ryûkyû.<ref name=smits40>Gregory Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', University of Hawaii Press (2019), 39-40.</ref>

Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved. Some scholarship suggests that from the very beginning of the [[Ming Dynasty]] in China ([[1368]]-[[1644]]), the anti-maritime policies of the [[Hongwu Emperor|first Ming emperor]] - forcing coastal communities to [[qianjie|move inland]], and trying to monopolize all maritime trade under the throne - were a chief ''cause'' of, rather than a response to, the proliferation of smugglers, who then became brigands or pirates.

Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved. Some scholarship suggests that from the very beginning of the [[Ming Dynasty]] in China ([[1368]]-[[1644]]), the anti-maritime policies of the [[Hongwu Emperor|first Ming emperor]] - forcing coastal communities to [[qianjie|move inland]], and trying to monopolize all maritime trade under the throne - were a chief ''cause'' of, rather than a response to, the proliferation of smugglers, who then became brigands or pirates.

Though traditionally regarded as "brigands" or "pirates," many scholars today describe the ''wakô'' in broader, more complex terms. Though certainly operating on the fringes of the law, and in many cases resorting to violence, ''wakô'' represented a complex mix of adventurers, smugglers, traders, mercenaries, and so forth, more often engaging in violence for economic gain than out of a pure desire for violence or chaos.<ref>Gregory Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', University of Hawaii Press (2019), 39-40.</ref>

Though traditionally regarded as "brigands" or "pirates," many scholars today describe the ''wakô'' in broader, more complex terms. Though certainly operating on the fringes of the law, and in many cases resorting to violence, ''wakô'' represented a complex mix of adventurers, smugglers, traders, mercenaries, and so forth, more often engaging in violence for economic gain than out of a pure desire for violence or chaos.<ref name=smits40/>

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th-21st centuries, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th-21st centuries, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

==Early Wakô==

==Early Wakô==

The earliest extant usage of the term "wakô" (K: ''waegu'') may be in a [[1223]] entry in the ''[[History of Goryeo]]'' (''Goryeosa''); piracy or brigand-like activity in the East China Sea of course dates to long before that, however.<ref>Gregory Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', University of Hawaii Press (2019), 37.</ref>

The earliest extant usage of the term "wakô" (K: ''waegu'') may be in a [[1223]] entry in the ''[[History of Goryeo]]'' (''Goryeosa''); piracy or brigand-like activity in the East China Sea of course dates to long before that, however.<ref>Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', 37.</ref>

During the reign of the first emperor of [[Ming Dynasty|Ming]], great efforts were made to establish coastal fortifications to defend against the so-called "Japanese pirates." However, raids and attacks on the Chinese coast at this time were led primarily not by Japanese, but by the Emperor's Chinese political rivals.<ref name=so209/> The [[Hongwu Emperor]] sought to restore relations with the [[Ashikaga shogunate]], and to get the shogunate to take action to curb ''wakô'' attacks, but, perhaps in part due to the chaos and disunity of the ''[[Nanboku-cho|Nanboku-chô]]'' period, the Emperor's efforts were unsuccessful. The Chinese Prime Minister [[Hu Weiyong]] was executed in [[1380]] for allegedly conspiring with the Japanese and with [[Yuan Dynasty|Yuan]] loyalists to overthrow the Ming; as a result of the discovery of this conspiracy, efforts to restore relations with Japan were ended.<ref>So. p3.</ref>

During the reign of the first emperor of [[Ming Dynasty|Ming]], great efforts were made to establish coastal fortifications to defend against the so-called "Japanese pirates." However, raids and attacks on the Chinese coast at this time were led primarily not by Japanese, but by the Emperor's Chinese political rivals.<ref name=so209/> The [[Hongwu Emperor]] sought to restore relations with the [[Ashikaga shogunate]], and to get the shogunate to take action to curb ''wakô'' attacks, but, perhaps in part due to the chaos and disunity of the ''[[Nanboku-cho|Nanboku-chô]]'' period, the Emperor's efforts were unsuccessful. The Chinese Prime Minister [[Hu Weiyong]] was executed in [[1380]] for allegedly conspiring with the Japanese and with [[Yuan Dynasty|Yuan]] loyalists to overthrow the Ming; as a result of the discovery of this conspiracy, efforts to restore relations with Japan were ended.<ref>So. p3.</ref>

''Wakô'' raids were a major problem for [[Joseon Dynasty]] Korea as well at this time, and remain a prominent issue in anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea today. Unable to secure agreements from the Ashikaga shogunate to take efforts to curb the piracy - after all, the pirates were not subjects of the shogunate, and in fact most were not even Japanese - the Joseon Court took matters into their own hands. In [[1419]], it launched a Joseon fleet of over 200 ships in an effort to destroy pirate bases on the island of [[Tsushima]]. The raids were successful, destroying many pirate ships and villages, but within a few years, the pirate activity returned. The court then turned to a different set of methods, granting titles and seals to members of certain samurai clans, including the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] of western Japan; these titles and seals conferred official permission to engage in authorized trade, in exchange for samurai assurances that they would take real steps to combat the piracy. In [[1443]], the Joseon court then entered into an arrangement with the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of Tsushima, granting the Sô an annual stipend of 200 ''[[koku]]'' of rice, official permission to send fifty trading ships to Korea each year, and permission to exact maritime fees and taxes on cargoes traveling to Korea, in exchange for the Sô ensuring that all trading ships bound for Korea from Japan were properly authorized, and taking action against those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 31.</ref> This marked a special relationship between the Sô and the Koreans, which would continue down to the 19th century. In the [[Edo period]], after the ''wakô'' problem had essentially come to an end, the Sô would continue to enjoy a unique position of power as the sole intermediaries effecting communication and interaction between the Joseon Court and Japan (now under the [[Tokugawa shogunate]]).

''Wakô'' raids were a major problem for [[Joseon Dynasty]] Korea as well at this time, and remain a prominent issue in anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea today. Unable to secure agreements from the Ashikaga shogunate to take efforts to curb the piracy - after all, the pirates were not subjects of the shogunate, and in fact most were not even Japanese - the Joseon Court took matters into their own hands. In [[1419]], it launched a Joseon fleet of over 200 ships in an effort to destroy pirate bases on the island of [[Tsushima]]. The raids were successful, destroying many pirate ships and villages, but within a few years, the pirate activity returned. The court then turned to a different set of methods, granting titles and seals to members of certain samurai clans, including the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] of western Japan; these titles and seals conferred official permission to engage in authorized trade, in exchange for samurai assurances that they would take real steps to combat the piracy. In [[1443]], the Joseon court then entered into an arrangement with the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of Tsushima, granting the Sô an annual stipend of 200 ''[[koku]]'' of rice, official permission to send fifty trading ships to Korea each year, and permission to exact maritime fees and taxes on cargoes traveling to Korea, in exchange for the Sô ensuring that all trading ships bound for Korea from Japan were properly authorized, and taking action against those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 31.</ref> This marked a special relationship between the Sô and the Koreans, which would continue down to the 19th century. In the [[Edo period]], after the ''wakô'' problem had essentially come to an end, the Sô would continue to enjoy a unique position of power as the sole intermediaries effecting communication and interaction between the Joseon Court and Japan (now under the [[Tokugawa shogunate]]).

==Early 16th Century==

==Early 16th Century==