Changes

After Tsushima argued that its diplomatic and trade interactions with Korea constituted an important service to the shogunate in terms of intelligence and national defense, in [[1748]] both Tsushima and Satsuma were exempted from military or corvée obligations related to the defense of the port of [[Nagasaki]], an obligation otherwise shared by all other Kyushu ''daimyô''.<ref>Hellyer, 68.</ref>

After Tsushima argued that its diplomatic and trade interactions with Korea constituted an important service to the shogunate in terms of intelligence and national defense, in [[1748]] both Tsushima and Satsuma were exempted from military or corvée obligations related to the defense of the port of [[Nagasaki]], an obligation otherwise shared by all other Kyushu ''daimyô''.<ref>Hellyer, 68.</ref>

The economic benefits for Satsuma of the arrangement came chiefly in the ability to import Chinese silks, medicinal products, and other luxury goods, obtained by Ryukyuan envoys in China (or as gifts from [[Chinese investiture envoys]] who came to Ryûkyû), and to sell those goods at market in Japan. Right around the same time that Satsuma was experiencing difficulties with the shogunate permitting them to send Ryukyuan embassy missions to Edo, the shogunate's monetary policies were creating other very severe problems for the domain. In [[1711]], the shogunate debased the currency to an all-time low, producing silver ingots that were only 20% [[silver]]. Satsuma complained that as 80% ingots had been the standard, sending Ryukyuan envoys to China with 20% ingots would not only make it much more expensive (in number of ingots) to purchase goods, but would also risk Ryûkyû losing face with China, and Satsuma losing face with Ryûkyû. [[Tsushima han]], which had an exclusive privilege to engaging in trade with [[Joseon|Korea]], and which was by far the chief source in Japan of the highly-demanded product [[ginseng]], similarly complained, and was granted permission to use 80% ingots; Satsuma was not so successful, being granted permission to use 64% ingots. The shogunate returned to producing 80% silver ingots only a few years later, in [[1715]], but seeking to find a way of stemming the flow of silver out of the country, restricted further the amount of silver Satsuma could send out of the country. Whereas they had previously been permitted to provide 800 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' of silver to Ryûkyû for [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]] and 400 ''kan'' for gifts given to [[Chinese investiture envoys]] visiting Ryûkyû, these amounts were now limited to 600 and 300 ''kan'' respectively.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref>

The economic benefits for Satsuma of the arrangement came chiefly in the ability to import Chinese silks, medicinal products, and other luxury goods, obtained by Ryukyuan envoys in China (or as gifts from [[Chinese investiture envoys]] who came to Ryûkyû), and to sell those goods at market in Japan. Right around the same time that Satsuma was experiencing difficulties with the shogunate permitting them to send Ryukyuan embassy missions to Edo, the shogunate's monetary policies were creating other very severe problems for the domain. In [[1711]], the shogunate debased the currency to an all-time low, producing silver ingots that were only 20% [[silver]]. Satsuma complained that as 80% ingots had been the standard, sending Ryukyuan envoys to China with 20% ingots would not only make it much more expensive (in number of ingots) to purchase goods, but would also risk Ryûkyû losing face with China, and Satsuma losing face with Ryûkyû. [[Tsushima han]], which had an exclusive privilege to engaging in trade with [[Joseon|Korea]], and which was by far the chief source in Japan of the highly-demanded product [[ginseng]], similarly complained, and was granted permission to use 80% ingots; Satsuma was not so successful, being granted permission to use 64% ingots. The shogunate returned to producing 80% silver ingots only a few years later, in [[1715]], but seeking to find a way of stemming the flow of silver out of the country, restricted further the amount of silver Satsuma could send out of the country. Whereas they had previously been permitted to provide 800 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' of silver to Ryûkyû for [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]] and 400 ''kan'' for gifts given to Chinese [[investiture]] envoys visiting Ryûkyû, these amounts were now limited to 600 and 300 ''kan'' respectively.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref>

Satsuma experienced further economic/commercial difficulties beginning in the late 1780s to early 1790s, when [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]], as part of broader efforts to limit Japan's foreign trade activities, restricted Satsuma to selling only silk and silk [[damask]] - two particularly less profitable products - at [[Kyoto]], obliging them to consume all other Chinese and Ryukyuan goods they imported within the domain. This struck a severe blow, nearly defeating entirely the economic purpose of Satsuma's links with Ryûkyû. Satsuma petitions to the shogunate in [[1801]] to reverse the imposition, or to expand the variety of permitted goods, were rejected. However, over the course of the 1810s-1820s, a series of famines and other problems in Ryûkyû offered Satsuma the opportunity to press its claims, asserting that the Nagasaki trade was essential to Ryûkyû's financial well-being. In [[1825]], the shogunate finally relented, not only allowing Satsuma to sell a variety of different goods on the market, but also making official limits on the total volume of sale significantly more lenient, increasing the amount from 900 ''kan'', stipulated in [[1716]], to 1,720 ''kan''.<ref>Hellyer, 132.</ref> These restrictions were further loosened in [[1846]], with Satsuma now being able to sell a full sixteen stipulated types of goods at the Osaka and Kyoto markets, albeit under a tighter limit on total volume of trade - 1,200 ''kan'' instead of the previous 1,720.<ref>158-159.</ref>

Satsuma experienced further economic/commercial difficulties beginning in the late 1780s to early 1790s, when [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]], as part of broader efforts to limit Japan's foreign trade activities, restricted Satsuma to selling only silk and silk [[damask]] - two particularly less profitable products - at [[Kyoto]], obliging them to consume all other Chinese and Ryukyuan goods they imported within the domain. This struck a severe blow, nearly defeating entirely the economic purpose of Satsuma's links with Ryûkyû. Satsuma petitions to the shogunate in [[1801]] to reverse the imposition, or to expand the variety of permitted goods, were rejected. However, over the course of the 1810s-1820s, a series of famines and other problems in Ryûkyû offered Satsuma the opportunity to press its claims, asserting that the Nagasaki trade was essential to Ryûkyû's financial well-being. In [[1825]], the shogunate finally relented, not only allowing Satsuma to sell a variety of different goods on the market, but also making official limits on the total volume of sale significantly more lenient, increasing the amount from 900 ''kan'', stipulated in [[1716]], to 1,720 ''kan''.<ref>Hellyer, 132.</ref> These restrictions were further loosened in [[1846]], with Satsuma now being able to sell a full sixteen stipulated types of goods at the Osaka and Kyoto markets, albeit under a tighter limit on total volume of trade - 1,200 ''kan'' instead of the previous 1,720.<ref>158-159.</ref>