Changes

The VOC was originally founded in 1602, as the result of the merger of a number of different firms which had previously been in competition with one another; these firms united under a board of directors known as the Seventeen Gentlemen, forming the United East India Company.<ref>Matsuda, 77.</ref> Based at Amsterdam, a city with perhaps the most efficient money market and lowest interest rates in the world, the VOC raised ten times the capital of the [[English East India Company]].<ref name=tignor/> Like the English East India Company, the VOC was granted a monopoly on all trade “East of the Cape of Good Hope but also in and beyond the straits of Magellan,” and (so far as the Dutch authorities had power to say so) access to all “Islands, Ports, Havens, Cities, Creeks, Towns, and Places” in that vast region; though they faced competition from the English, Portuguese, and various groups of Asian merchants, the VOC were to have no competition from other Dutch organizations. The Company enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, and even state-like powers, including engaging in diplomacy, deploying military forces, and claiming territory, even as it simultaneously enjoyed considerable support from the Dutch Republic.<ref>Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” ''Journal of World History'' 24:2 (2013), 352.</ref>

The VOC was originally founded in 1602, as the result of the merger of a number of different firms which had previously been in competition with one another; these firms united under a board of directors known as the Seventeen Gentlemen, forming the United East India Company.<ref>Matsuda, 77.</ref> Based at Amsterdam, a city with perhaps the most efficient money market and lowest interest rates in the world, the VOC raised ten times the capital of the [[English East India Company]].<ref name=tignor/> Like the English East India Company, the VOC was granted a monopoly on all trade “East of the Cape of Good Hope but also in and beyond the straits of Magellan,” and (so far as the Dutch authorities had power to say so) access to all “Islands, Ports, Havens, Cities, Creeks, Towns, and Places” in that vast region; though they faced competition from the English, Portuguese, and various groups of Asian merchants, the VOC were to have no competition from other Dutch organizations. The Company enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, and even state-like powers, including engaging in diplomacy, deploying military forces, and claiming territory, even as it simultaneously enjoyed considerable support from the Dutch Republic.<ref>Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” ''Journal of World History'' 24:2 (2013), 352.</ref>

The Dutch originally established their presence in Japan with a [[factory]] in [[Hirado]] in [[1609]]. [[Nicolaes Puyck]] and [[Abraham van den Broecke]] led a small mission to [[Sunpu]], where they presented two cases of raw [[silk]], some [[lead]], and two gold goblets to [[Tokugawa Ieyasu]] as gifts, promising that later ships would have much more considerable cargoes. Ieyasu granted their request for trade, and presented them with a sword, a sign of the binding of a relationship.<ref>Cynthia Viallé, "In Aid of Trade: Dutch Gift-Giving in Tokugawa Japan," ''Tokyo daigaku shiryôhensanjo kenkyû kiyô'' 16 (2006), 58.</ref>

The Dutch originally established their presence in Japan with a [[factory]] in [[Hirado]] in [[1609]]. [[Nicolaes Puyck]] and [[Abraham van den Broecke]] led a small mission to [[Sunpu]], where they presented two cases of raw [[silk]], some [[lead]], and two gold goblets to [[Tokugawa Ieyasu]] as gifts, promising that later ships would have much more considerable cargoes. Ieyasu granted their request for trade, and presented them with a sword, a sign of the binding of a relationship.<ref>Cynthia Viallé, "In Aid of Trade: Dutch Gift-Giving in Tokugawa Japan," ''Tokyo daigaku shiryôhensanjo kenkyû kiyô'' 16 (2006), 58.</ref> Representatives of the Company continued to receive swords, suits of armor, and other gifts from the shogunate on numerous occasions over the course of the Edo period. However, it was Company policy that gifts given to VOC envoys (e.g. by the shogun) could not be kept, but had to be forwarded to their superiors. Much of the collections of the ''stadtholders'' (chief magistrates of the United Provinces of the Netherlands) was dispersed in conjunction with the French invasion of the Netherlands in the 1790s, and as a result the current whereabouts of these numerous Japanese swords, suits of armor, etc. are unknown.<ref>Viallé, 59.</ref>

(The [[English East India Company]] established their Hirado factory in [[1613]], and closed it in [[1623]], leaving the Japan trade at that time.) The Dutch presence in Japan was quite precarious for its first few decades, encountering numerous difficulties, and engaging in much negotiation, demands, concessions, and conflict. A very elaborate and expensive [[1627]] mission to [[Edo]] led by [[Pieter Nuyts]] was refused an audience with the shogun, and its gifts rejected; Nuyts and his men ended up fleeing Edo in the middle of the night. Nuyts became head of the Company's operations in Taiwan the following year, but his conflicts with the Japanese continued, leading to a Japanese raid on Fort Zeelandia. Nuyts was captured (at that time, in [[1628]]) and Japanese trade with the VOC was terminated; four years later, the shogunate agreed to resume trade in exchange for Nuyts' imprisonment in Edo - he was held for three and a half years.<ref>Clulow, ''The Company and the Shogun'', 1-2.; Gary Leupp, ''Interracial Intimacy in Japan: Western Men and Japanese Women, 1543-1900'', A&C Black (2003), 8, 61-63.</ref> The VOC later presented the shogunate with an elaborate candelabra (which can still be seen at [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]] today), along with several other gifts, as a show of gratitude for the shogunate's forgiveness and re-opening of trade relations.<ref>Viallé, 57-58.</ref> While many historical narratives of Japanese history, or of Dutch-Japanese relations, by necessity skim over these details to present a more general overview, historian Adam Clulow emphasizes that neither the Dutch position in Japan, nor the Dutch relationship to the shogun, were obvious or automatic (or peaceful) from the beginning, but rather that these things only settled down into a standard form as the end result of considerable negotiation and conflict. Over the course of their time in Japan, the Dutch were forced to adapt, considerably, to the circumstances circumscribed by the shogunate: though the Company engaged in considerable maritime violence against its rivals in the early decades of the 17th century, this was forced to be reduced dramatically; the VOC also had to convince the shogunate of its legal and rightful ability to engage in diplomatic negotiations, and had to defend its possession, administration, and exploitation of colonial territories against shogunal suspicions and concerns.<ref>Clulow, ''The Company and the Shogun'', 16-17.</ref>

(The [[English East India Company]] established their Hirado factory in [[1613]], and closed it in [[1623]], leaving the Japan trade at that time.) The Dutch presence in Japan was quite precarious for its first few decades, encountering numerous difficulties, and engaging in much negotiation, demands, concessions, and conflict. A very elaborate and expensive [[1627]] mission to [[Edo]] led by [[Pieter Nuyts]] was refused an audience with the shogun, and its gifts rejected; Nuyts and his men ended up fleeing Edo in the middle of the night. Nuyts became head of the Company's operations in Taiwan the following year, but his conflicts with the Japanese continued, leading to a Japanese raid on Fort Zeelandia. Nuyts was captured (at that time, in [[1628]]) and Japanese trade with the VOC was terminated; four years later, the shogunate agreed to resume trade in exchange for Nuyts' imprisonment in Edo - he was held for three and a half years.<ref>Clulow, ''The Company and the Shogun'', 1-2.; Gary Leupp, ''Interracial Intimacy in Japan: Western Men and Japanese Women, 1543-1900'', A&C Black (2003), 8, 61-63.</ref> In [[1635]], the VOC presented the shogunate with an elaborate candelabra, along with several other gifts, as a show of gratitude for the shogunate's forgiveness and re-opening of trade relations; reportedly, the shogun was so pleased with the gifts that he agreed to release Nuyts.<ref>Viallé, 57-58.</ref> The Company gave another brass candelabra to the shogunate as a gift in [[1640]], which can still be seen on display at [[Nikko Toshogu|Nikkô Tôshôgû]] today.<ref>Incidentally, the Company also gave a brass candelabra to Shah Jahan, ruler of India, that same year; the Shah is said to have been terribly unimpressed with the gift, expecting lavish gifts to be in silver or gold, and not brass. Viallé 60-61.</ref> While many historical narratives of Japanese history, or of Dutch-Japanese relations, by necessity skim over these details to present a more general overview, historian Adam Clulow emphasizes that neither the Dutch position in Japan, nor the Dutch relationship to the shogun, were obvious or automatic (or peaceful) from the beginning, but rather that these things only settled down into a standard form as the end result of considerable negotiation and conflict. Over the course of their time in Japan, the Dutch were forced to adapt, considerably, to the circumstances circumscribed by the shogunate: though the Company engaged in considerable maritime violence against its rivals in the early decades of the 17th century, this was forced to be reduced dramatically; the VOC also had to convince the shogunate of its legal and rightful ability to engage in diplomatic negotiations, and had to defend its possession, administration, and exploitation of colonial territories against shogunal suspicions and concerns.<ref>Clulow, ''The Company and the Shogun'', 16-17.</ref>

Fort Zeelandia was established on Taiwan in [[1624]], and served as a powerful entrepot (intermediary trading port) for trade with both China and Japan. In [[1639]], the Dutch exported 1.85 million [[tael]]s of [[silver]] (527,250 florins) from Japan via Taiwan. One of the fort's chief individual trading partners was the smuggler/pirate/trader [[Zheng Zhilong]], who traded [[gold]], silks, and other goods to the Dutch in exchange for Japanese silver, but also competed against them. His son, [[Zheng Chenggong]] (aka Coxinga), later drove the Dutch out of Taiwan entirely, seizing Fort Zeelandia in [[1662]].<ref>Jansen, 26-27.</ref> It was only after this that Batavia came to eclipse Taiwan as the VOC's chief trading post in the region.<ref>Shimada, Ryuto. “Economic Links with Ayutthaya: Changes in Networks between Japan, China, and Siam in the Early Modern Period.” ''Itinerario'' 37, no. 03 (December 2013): 94.</ref>

Fort Zeelandia was established on Taiwan in [[1624]], and served as a powerful entrepot (intermediary trading port) for trade with both China and Japan. In [[1639]], the Dutch exported 1.85 million [[tael]]s of [[silver]] (527,250 florins) from Japan via Taiwan. One of the fort's chief individual trading partners was the smuggler/pirate/trader [[Zheng Zhilong]], who traded [[gold]], silks, and other goods to the Dutch in exchange for Japanese silver, but also competed against them. His son, [[Zheng Chenggong]] (aka Coxinga), later drove the Dutch out of Taiwan entirely, seizing Fort Zeelandia in [[1662]].<ref>Jansen, 26-27.</ref> It was only after this that Batavia came to eclipse Taiwan as the VOC's chief trading post in the region.<ref>Shimada, Ryuto. “Economic Links with Ayutthaya: Changes in Networks between Japan, China, and Siam in the Early Modern Period.” ''Itinerario'' 37, no. 03 (December 2013): 94.</ref>