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The chief opponents of the invasion included [[Kido Koin|Kido Kôin]], [[Okubo Toshimichi|Ôkubo Toshimichi]], and [[Saigo Tsugumichi|Saigô Tsugumichi]]. While some may have opposed the invasion entirely, Ôkubo expressed that Japan simply was not ready ''yet'', and should not invade Korea yet at that time, citing chiefly issues of preparedness and the vast economic cost. Ôkubo also expressed fears that if the war in Korea should go badly at all, it would present far too great an opportunity for Russia or Britain to then come to "interfere in our internal affairs." He advocated strengthening the economy and the military, industrializing further, securing Japan's independence, and revising the [[Unequal Treaties]] before attempting any such invasion.<ref>David Lu, ''Japan: A Documentary History'', ME Sharpe (1997), 325-326.</ref> Kido, meanwhile, along with [[Oshima Tomonojo|Ôshima Tomonojô]] and certain other Tsushima officials, initially supported a punitive mission against Korea; however, by 1873, Kido had changed his mind, and now encouraged the government to focus on domestic affairs.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 245.</ref>

The chief opponents of the invasion included [[Kido Koin|Kido Kôin]], [[Okubo Toshimichi|Ôkubo Toshimichi]], and [[Saigo Tsugumichi|Saigô Tsugumichi]]. While some may have opposed the invasion entirely, Ôkubo expressed that Japan simply was not ready ''yet'', and should not invade Korea yet at that time, citing chiefly issues of preparedness and the vast economic cost. Ôkubo also expressed fears that if the war in Korea should go badly at all, it would present far too great an opportunity for Russia or Britain to then come to "interfere in our internal affairs." He advocated strengthening the economy and the military, industrializing further, securing Japan's independence, and revising the [[Unequal Treaties]] before attempting any such invasion.<ref>David Lu, ''Japan: A Documentary History'', ME Sharpe (1997), 325-326.</ref> Kido, meanwhile, along with [[Oshima Tomonojo|Ôshima Tomonojô]] and certain other Tsushima officials, initially supported a punitive mission against Korea; however, by 1873, Kido had changed his mind, and now encouraged the government to focus on domestic affairs.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 245.</ref>

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