Line 15: |
Line 15: |
| The Tokugawa state has been described as a "compound state"<ref>Ravina, Mark. "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan." ''Journal of Asian Studies''. 54:4 (Nov 1995). p1017.</ref>, not a single unified state under a central government with absolute powers. The shogunate exerted direct control over roughly 15 percent of the archipelago, or roughly four million ''[[koku]]'' worth of lands. The ''[[hatamoto]]'' (direct vassals of the shogunate) controlled roughly ten percent, while about 500,000 ''koku'' worth of land was controlled by the Imperial family, major temples, and other such groups. The remaining 75 percent of the archipelago was controlled by the ''daimyô'', who enjoyed a considerable degree of independence in the internal affairs of their domains (''han'').<ref>Ravina. "State-Building." p1000.</ref>. Within a domain, the ''daimyô'' had more authority, or rather more direct authority, than the shogunate, which very rarely made efforts to directly impose or enforce policy within a domain. For this reason, a variety of systems were established to ensure the peace and to prevent ''daimyô'' rebellion. | | The Tokugawa state has been described as a "compound state"<ref>Ravina, Mark. "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan." ''Journal of Asian Studies''. 54:4 (Nov 1995). p1017.</ref>, not a single unified state under a central government with absolute powers. The shogunate exerted direct control over roughly 15 percent of the archipelago, or roughly four million ''[[koku]]'' worth of lands. The ''[[hatamoto]]'' (direct vassals of the shogunate) controlled roughly ten percent, while about 500,000 ''koku'' worth of land was controlled by the Imperial family, major temples, and other such groups. The remaining 75 percent of the archipelago was controlled by the ''daimyô'', who enjoyed a considerable degree of independence in the internal affairs of their domains (''han'').<ref>Ravina. "State-Building." p1000.</ref>. Within a domain, the ''daimyô'' had more authority, or rather more direct authority, than the shogunate, which very rarely made efforts to directly impose or enforce policy within a domain. For this reason, a variety of systems were established to ensure the peace and to prevent ''daimyô'' rebellion. |
| | | |
− | Each ''han'' was ordered in 1615 to destroy all but one castle in its territory<ref>Sakai, Robert. "Feudal Society and Modern Leadership in Satsuma-han." ''Journal of Asian Studies'' 16:3 (May 1957). pp366-7.</ref>, and was not allowed to make repairs or expansions upon the domain's defenses without shogunate approval. Samurai were restricted to the castle towns, so as to prevent them from organizing rebellions or building armies in the countryside, and marriages between ''daimyô'' clans, which could represent the beginnings of alliances, were similarly forbidden without shogunate approval<ref>Sansom. pp7-8.</ref>. The ''[[sankin kotai|sankin kôtai]]'' system was another key element of these restrictive measures. Initially voluntary, the system was made mandatory in 1635; ''daimyô'' were obligated to maintain a residence in Edo, where members of their close family would reside as hostages against the ''daimyô's'' disobedience or rebellion. The ''daimyô'' were also obligated to make annual journeys to Edo<ref>Sansom. p20f.</ref>, and to reside there for half of each year; the massive expenses associated with these journeys served to place limits on even the wealth of the most powerful ''daimyô''. | + | Each ''han'' was ordered in 1615 to destroy all but one castle in its territory<ref>Sakai, Robert. "Feudal Society and Modern Leadership in Satsuma-han." ''Journal of Asian Studies'' 16:3 (May 1957). pp366-7.</ref>, and was not allowed to make repairs or expansions upon the domain's defenses without shogunate approval. Samurai were restricted to the [[castle town]]s, so as to prevent them from organizing rebellions or building armies in the countryside, and marriages between ''daimyô'' clans, which could represent the beginnings of alliances, were similarly forbidden without shogunate approval<ref>Sansom. pp7-8.</ref>. The ''[[sankin kotai|sankin kôtai]]'' system was another key element of these restrictive measures. Initially voluntary, the system was made mandatory in 1635; ''daimyô'' were obligated to maintain a residence in Edo, where members of their close family would reside as hostages against the ''daimyô's'' disobedience or rebellion. The ''daimyô'' were also obligated to make annual journeys to Edo<ref>Sansom. p20f.</ref>, and to reside there for half of each year; the massive expenses associated with these journeys served to place limits on even the wealth of the most powerful ''daimyô''. |
| | | |
| The early decades of the Edo period were also marked by extensive foreign trade and cultural exchange. Continuing a system established by [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]], the shogunate sent formally licensed ships called ''[[shuinsen]]'' (vermillion seal ships) throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region's seas were overrun with pirates and raiders, known as ''[[wako|wakô]]'' throughout the Sengoku period and the 17th century<ref>Arano, Yasunori. "The Entrenchment of the Concept of 'National Seclusion'". ''Acta Asiatica'' vol 67 (1994). p98.</ref>; in theory, these licenses helped foreign authorities distinguish legitimate traders from ''wakô''. | | The early decades of the Edo period were also marked by extensive foreign trade and cultural exchange. Continuing a system established by [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]], the shogunate sent formally licensed ships called ''[[shuinsen]]'' (vermillion seal ships) throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region's seas were overrun with pirates and raiders, known as ''[[wako|wakô]]'' throughout the Sengoku period and the 17th century<ref>Arano, Yasunori. "The Entrenchment of the Concept of 'National Seclusion'". ''Acta Asiatica'' vol 67 (1994). p98.</ref>; in theory, these licenses helped foreign authorities distinguish legitimate traders from ''wakô''. |
Line 79: |
Line 79: |
| ==Economy and Trade== | | ==Economy and Trade== |
| The Edo period saw considerable economic growth, including the intensification of agriculture; the expansion of domestic trade networks along road, river, and sea; the growth of merchant guilds and of proto-industrial production networks; and the emergence of a system of [[rice brokers]] which represented the first futures market in the world and something of a proto-modern banking system. | | The Edo period saw considerable economic growth, including the intensification of agriculture; the expansion of domestic trade networks along road, river, and sea; the growth of merchant guilds and of proto-industrial production networks; and the emergence of a system of [[rice brokers]] which represented the first futures market in the world and something of a proto-modern banking system. |
| + | |
| + | Guilds, abolished under [[Oda Nobunaga]], were reinstated over the course of the period, with merchants paying a small fee for membership in organizations which enjoyed monopoly privileges at the marketplaces.<ref name=craig79>Albert Craig, 79-80.</ref> The lords of many domains also secured for themselves monopolies on certain goods; to name one example, the [[Shimazu clan]] lords of [[Satsuma han]] held a shogunate-recognized monopoly on trade in sugar. |
| | | |
| In the late 18th century, merchant houses worth more than 200,000 ''[[currency|ryô]]'' numbered more than two hundred. With one ''ryô'' being ostensibly equal in value to one ''koku'', this made the wealth of these merchant houses equivalent to that of some of the wealthiest ''daimyô''.<ref name=brief135/> | | In the late 18th century, merchant houses worth more than 200,000 ''[[currency|ryô]]'' numbered more than two hundred. With one ''ryô'' being ostensibly equal in value to one ''koku'', this made the wealth of these merchant houses equivalent to that of some of the wealthiest ''daimyô''.<ref name=brief135/> |
| | | |
− | Though taxation rates differed dramatically by region, farmers on average paid roughly 33-50% of their agricultural yields in taxes to their lords. For fishermen, the percentage of their catch was lower, around 20-40%. Throughout the period, only about one-third of taxes were paid in cash, with the rest paid in agricultural & other products and commodities.<ref>Craig, 71.</ref> Taxes were based on land surveys conducted chiefly in the 17th century; reassessments of agricultural productivity were rare in the 18th and 19th centuries, and tax rates remained largely stable.<ref name=craig79>Craig, 79.</ref> | + | Though taxation rates differed dramatically by region, farmers on average paid roughly 33-50% of their agricultural yields in taxes to their lords. For fishermen, the percentage of their catch was lower, around 20-40%. Throughout the period, only about one-third of taxes were paid in cash, with the rest paid in agricultural & other products and commodities.<ref name=craig71>Albert Craig, 71-72.</ref> Taxes were based on land surveys conducted chiefly in the 17th century; reassessments of agricultural productivity were rare in the 18th and 19th centuries, and tax rates remained largely stable.<ref name=craig79/> |
| | | |
| *kaikin | | *kaikin |
Line 102: |
Line 104: |
| The population of the archipelago at the beginning of the Tokugawa period is estimated at roughly 18 million people, expanding to around 30 million by around 1750. The population fluctuated but did not grow significantly after that; records from [[1872]] indicate a population of 33.1 million.<ref name=brief133>Schirokauer, et al., 133.</ref> | | The population of the archipelago at the beginning of the Tokugawa period is estimated at roughly 18 million people, expanding to around 30 million by around 1750. The population fluctuated but did not grow significantly after that; records from [[1872]] indicate a population of 33.1 million.<ref name=brief133>Schirokauer, et al., 133.</ref> |
| | | |
− | Samurai are believed to have comprised, during the Edo period, roughly six percent of the population of the archipelago, while merchants or townsmen (''chônin'') comprised another 7-8%, and peasants or villagers (''hyakushô'') the remaining 87% or so.<ref>Craig, 71-72.</ref> Government work was the chief avenue seen as an honorable path for samurai, while most forms of merchant or artisan (craftsman/manufacture) work, as well as agricultural labor, were seen as being beneath them, unfitting for someone of samurai status. Since samurai were so numerous, however, and there were only so many government positions, by [[1705]], it is believed that roughly one-quarter of the shogun's vassals were unemployed.<ref>*Craig, Teruko (trans.). ''Musui's Story: The Autobiography of a Tokugawa Samurai''. University of Arizona Press, 1988. p.xii.</ref> | + | Samurai are believed to have comprised, during the Edo period, roughly six percent of the population of the archipelago, while merchants or townsmen (''chônin'') comprised another 7-8%, and peasants or villagers (''hyakushô'') the remaining 87% or so.<ref name=craig71/> Government work was the chief avenue seen as an honorable path for samurai, while most forms of merchant or artisan (craftsman/manufacture) work, as well as agricultural labor, were seen as being beneath them, unfitting for someone of samurai status. Since samurai were so numerous, however, and there were only so many government positions, by [[1705]], it is believed that roughly one-quarter of the shogun's vassals were unemployed.<ref>Craig, Teruko (trans.). ''Musui's Story: The Autobiography of a Tokugawa Samurai''. University of Arizona Press, 1988. p.xii.</ref> |
| | | |
| Samurai earned their incomes as stipends paid by their lords in fixed amounts of rice (measured in ''[[koku]]''). Roughly 80% of ''daimyô'' were paying out stipends to their retainers by 1700, and roughly 90% of samurai were reliant on such stipends by 1800, with only ten percent earning their incomes more directly, locally.<ref name=brief133/> As stipends were not reassessed and rarely increased (without a promotion in rank or position), by the late Edo period, many samurai became impoverished, even as many members of the commoner townsman class (''[[chonin|chônin]]'') became wealthier and wealthier, earning their incomes off economic activity (i.e. manufacture and trade). | | Samurai earned their incomes as stipends paid by their lords in fixed amounts of rice (measured in ''[[koku]]''). Roughly 80% of ''daimyô'' were paying out stipends to their retainers by 1700, and roughly 90% of samurai were reliant on such stipends by 1800, with only ten percent earning their incomes more directly, locally.<ref name=brief133/> As stipends were not reassessed and rarely increased (without a promotion in rank or position), by the late Edo period, many samurai became impoverished, even as many members of the commoner townsman class (''[[chonin|chônin]]'') became wealthier and wealthier, earning their incomes off economic activity (i.e. manufacture and trade). |