Changes

*''Japanese'': 倭寇 ''(wakou; C: wōkòu; K: waegu)''

*''Japanese/Chinese/Korean'': [[倭]]寇 ''(wakou / wōkòu / waegu)''

The ''wakô'' were raiders, pirates, or brigands active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref>

The ''wakô'' were medieval East Asian seafarers often described as raiders, pirates, or brigands, active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, with the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese, Korean, Ryukyuan, or from mixed or ambiguous ethnic or national backgrounds.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref><ref name=miki>Watanabe Miki, “Shifting Representations of Ryukyuans between Early Modern China and Japan,” in Caroli (ed.), ''Imagined Okinawa: Challenge from Time and Space'', Ca' Foscari University in Venice (2015), 197.</ref> Because of the [[Muromachi shogunate|Muromachi shogunate's]] weak control over [[Kyushu]], and the lack of any centralized authority in the [[Ryukyu Islands]] (especially prior to the 16th century), these regions became major centers of ''wakô'' activity, and Japanese came to be used as a common language among the ''wakô''. However, while many ''wakô'' groups enjoyed some kind of relationship with local authorities such as samurai houses or the [[Seiseifu]] in Kyushu, they were not in truth controlled by or otherwise "belonging to" Japan, or Ryûkyû.<ref name=smits40>Gregory Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', University of Hawaii Press (2019), 39-40.</ref> While Chinese and Korean perspectives on these figures has colored their characterization today as "brigands" and "pirates," scholars such as [[Peter Shapinsky]] suggest the English term "sea lords"; while not denying the fact that ''wakô'' were often violent, self-serving, power-seeking, and so forth much like warlords more generally, thinking of them as "sea lords" may help permit or encourage a different (no less violent, but perhaps less criminal or marginal) perspective on their activities and political positions.<ref>Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', 121.; Peter Shapinsky, ''Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan'', University of Michigan Press (2005).</ref>

Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved.

Chinese primarily sources of the mid-16th century identify the ''wakô'' problem at that time in particular as stemming chiefly from the activities of merchants and others in China, who hired or otherwise encouraged Japanese to be involved. Some scholarship suggests that from the very beginning of the [[Ming Dynasty]] in China ([[1368]]-[[1644]]), the anti-maritime policies of the [[Hongwu Emperor|first Ming emperor]] - forcing coastal communities to [[qianjie|move inland]], and trying to monopolize all maritime trade under the throne - were a chief ''cause'' of, rather than a response to, the proliferation of smugglers, who then became brigands or pirates.

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th century, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

 

Only after the [[Korean Invasions]] of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] in the 1590s, in which organized samurai invasion forces were labeled by the Chinese and Koreans as ''wakô'', i.e. as pirates or brigands, it would seem, did the earlier history of the ''wakô'' come to be colored, in Chinese and Korean sources, by implications or assumptions that the ''wakô'' were somehow agents of a central Japanese authority. Though documents written in the 16th century generally identify Chinese as having been the source of encouragement for piratical activities, those written in the 17th century and later, especially the ''[[Ming shi]]'' ("Official History of the Ming Dynasty") generally implicate the Japanese authorities in organizing and backing the ''wakô'', or at the very least refusing to take action to curb ''wakô'' activities. In the 20th-21st centuries, scholarship and school textbooks, closely based upon these later 17th century sources, have come to link the ''wakô'', and the foreign relations policies of the Japanese authorities at the time, with transhistorical notions of the Japanese as militant and expansionist.

==Early Wakô==

==Early Wakô==

During the reign of the first emperor of [[Ming Dynasty|Ming]], great efforts were made to establish coastal fortifications to defend against the so-called "Japanese pirates." However, raids and attacks on the Chinese coast at this time were led primarily not by Japanese, but by the Emperor's Chinese political rivals.<ref name=so209/> The [[Hongwu Emperor]] sought to restore relations with the [[Ashikaga shogunate]], and to get the shogunate to take action to curb ''wakô'' attacks, but, perhaps in part due to the chaos and disunity of the ''[[Nanboku-cho|Nanboku-chô]]'' period, the Emperor's efforts were unsuccessful. The Chinese Prime Minister [[Hu Weiyong]] was executed in [[1380]] for allegedly conspiring with the Japanese and with [[Yuan Dynasty|Yuan]] loyalists to overthrow the Ming; as a result of the discovery of this conspiracy, efforts to restore relations with Japan were ended.<ref>So. p3.</ref>

During the reign of the first emperor of [[Ming Dynasty|Ming]], great efforts were made to establish coastal fortifications to defend against the so-called "Japanese pirates." However, raids and attacks on the Chinese coast at this time were led primarily not by Japanese, but by the Emperor's Chinese political rivals.<ref name=so209/> The [[Hongwu Emperor]] sought to restore relations with the [[Ashikaga shogunate]], and to get the shogunate to take action to curb ''wakô'' attacks, but, perhaps in part due to the chaos and disunity of the ''[[Nanboku-cho|Nanboku-chô]]'' period, the Emperor's efforts were unsuccessful. The Chinese Prime Minister [[Hu Weiyong]] was executed in [[1380]] for allegedly conspiring with the Japanese and with [[Yuan Dynasty|Yuan]] loyalists to overthrow the Ming; as a result of the discovery of this conspiracy, efforts to restore relations with Japan were ended.<ref>So. p3.</ref>

The shogunate officially acknowledged Ming China as its [[suzerain]] in the 1390s, and entered into [[tribute|tributary relations]] which would continue through the 15th century. However, ''wakô'' raids occurred during this time as well. On occasion, the Japanese authorities would capture Japanese pirates and present them to the Ming authorities as proof that they were taking action, but the shogunate did not always demonstrate willingness to take action against the pirates. More to the point, despite the fact that the shogunate did not always have the ability to enforce order on the seas, to apprehend pirates, and to otherwise deal with the situation, the Ming Court seems to have been convinced that the shogunate had full power to control the raids.<ref>So. p4.</ref> This insistence on the part of the Chinese authorities would continue through the 16th century, and would prove a major obstacle to friendly relations between China and Japan.

The shogunate officially acknowledged Ming China as its [[suzerain]] in the 1390s, and entered into [[tribute|tributary relations]] which would continue through the 15th century. However, ''wakô'' raids occurred during this time as well. On occasion, the Japanese authorities would capture Japanese pirates and present them to the Ming authorities as proof that they were taking action, but the shogunate did not always demonstrate willingness to take action against the pirates. More to the point, despite the fact that the shogunate did not always have the ability to enforce order on the seas, to apprehend pirates, and to otherwise deal with the situation, the Ming Court seems to have been convinced that the shogunate had full power to control the raids.<ref>So. p4.</ref> This insistence on the part of the Chinese authorities would continue through the 16th century, and would prove a major obstacle to friendly relations between China and Japan.

''Wakô'' raids were a major problem for [[Joseon Dynasty]] Korea as well at this time, and remain a prominent issue in anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea today. Unable to secure agreements from the Ashikaga shogunate to take efforts to curb the piracy - after all, the pirates were not subjects of the shogunate, and in fact most were not even Japanese - the Joseon Court took matters into their own hands. In [[1419]], it launched a Joseon fleet of over 200 ships in an effort to destroy pirate bases on the island of [[Tsushima]]. The raids were successful, destroying many pirate ships and villages, but within a few years, the pirate activity returned. The court then turned to a different set of methods, granting titles and seals to members of certain samurai clans, including the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] of western Japan; these titles and seals conferred official permission to engage in authorized trade, in exchange for samurai assurances that they would take real steps to combat the piracy. In [[1443]], the Joseon court then entered into an arrangement with the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of Tsushima, granting the Sô an annual stipend of 200 ''[[koku]]'' of rice, official permission to send fifty trading ships to Korea each year, and permission to exact maritime fees and taxes on cargoes traveling to Korea, in exchange for the Sô ensuring that all trading ships bound for Korea from Japan were properly authorized, and taking action against those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 31.</ref> This marked a special relationship between the Sô and the Koreans, which would continue down to the 19th century. In the [[Edo period]], after the ''wakô'' problem had essentially come to an end, the Sô would continue to enjoy a unique position of power as the sole intermediaries effecting communication and interaction between the Joseon Court and Japan (now under the [[Tokugawa shogunate]]).

''Wakô'' raids were a major problem for [[Joseon Dynasty]] Korea as well at this time, and remain a prominent issue in anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea today. The period from roughly [[1350]] to [[1420]] is considered the earlier peak period (''zenki'') of ''wakô'' activity.<ref name=smits41/> Attacks on Korea grew in intensity around 1350, and especially around [[1375]] to [[1388]]; though the Korean court sent embassies to Kyoto in [[1366]] and at other times asking the Ashikaga shogunate to take action to curb the piracy, this was ultimately not within the shogunate's power, as the shogunate had little actual control over Kyushu, and a number of powerful ''wakô'' groups were both supporting and being supported by figures such as [[Prince Kaneyoshi]] of the [[Southern Court]], head of the [[Seiseifu]] and political rival to the emperors of the [[Northern Court]] with whom the Ashikaga were close. Knowing that spoils from ''wakô'' raids on Korea were supporting Kaneyoshi's armies, figures such as [[Imagawa Ryoshun|Imagawa Ryôshun]], [[Kyushu Tandai]] in service to the [[Northern Court]], attempted to suppress ''wakô'' activity, but overall had little success.<ref>Smits, ''Maritime Ryukyu'', 46.</ref>

 

Unable to secure agreements from the Ashikaga shogunate to take efforts to curb the piracy, the Joseon Court took matters into their own hands. In [[1419]], it launched a Joseon fleet of over 200 ships in an effort to destroy pirate bases on the island of [[Tsushima]]. The raids were successful, destroying many pirate ships and villages, but within a few years, the pirate activity returned. The court then turned to a different set of methods, granting titles and seals to members of certain samurai clans, including the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] of western Japan; these titles and seals conferred official permission to engage in authorized trade, in exchange for samurai assurances that they would take real steps to combat the piracy. In [[1443]], the Joseon court then entered into an arrangement with the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of Tsushima, granting the Sô an annual stipend of 200 ''[[koku]]'' of rice, official permission to send fifty trading ships to Korea each year, and permission to exact maritime fees and taxes on cargoes traveling to Korea, in exchange for the Sô ensuring that all trading ships bound for Korea from Japan were properly authorized, and taking action against those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 31.</ref> This marked a special relationship between the Sô and the Koreans, which would continue down to the 19th century. In the [[Edo period]], after the ''wakô'' problem had essentially come to an end, the Sô would continue to enjoy a unique position of power as the sole intermediaries effecting communication and interaction between the Joseon Court and Japan (now under the [[Tokugawa shogunate]]).

 

==Early 16th Century==

==Early 16th Century==

Though relations between Ming [[China]] and the Ashikaga shogunate were quite good for a time, with merchants from both countries engaging in official trade, by the early 16th century, tensions arose between the two powers. The increasingly weak shogunate did not wield strong control throughout Japan, let alone overseas, and was unable to curb or halt the attacks by Japanese pirates, acting independently, upon the Chinese coast.<ref name=so204>So. p204.</ref> By the 1530s, Sengoku (i.e. civil war in many parts of Japan) was in full swing, the shogunate held little power, and relations with China had fully soured.

Scholars identify a period from roughly [[1470]] to [[1600]] as the "latter period" (J: ''kôki'') of ''wakô'' activity.<ref name=smits41/> Though relations between Ming [[China]] and the Ashikaga shogunate were quite good for a time, with merchants from both countries engaging in official trade, by the early 16th century, tensions arose between the two powers. The increasingly weak shogunate did not wield strong control throughout Japan, let alone overseas, and was unable to curb or halt the attacks by Japanese pirates, acting independently, upon the Chinese coast.<ref name=so204>So. p204.</ref> By the 1530s, Sengoku (i.e. civil war in many parts of Japan) was in full swing, the shogunate held little power, and relations with China had fully soured.

Though the term ''wakô'' would come to be applied to a wide range of people, engaging in a wide range of activities, including Chinese traders and pirates, and Japanese traders, that is not to say that there were not, in fact, genuine Japanese pirates, raiders, brigands, or whatever term may wish to apply active on the seas at this time. The [[Murakami clan]]<!--see 村上水軍--> of [[Iyo province]], known for their piratical activities in the [[Inland Sea]], were among these; [[Murakami Zusho]], lord of Nôshima<!--能島--> is recorded as having led attacks on the Chinese coast, the Philippines, and parts of Indonesia. [[Iida Koichiro|Iida Kôichirô]] of Iyo and [[Kitaura Kanjuro|Kitaura Kanjûrô]] of [[Bingo province|Bingo]] are also known to have commanded raiding parties around this time. One contemporary source relates that "the seven bands" of ''wakô'', though presumably there were many more groups than that, grew to number as many as 1,000 men by 1555, if not earlier, incorporating people from a wide range of walks of life, including [[ronin]], fishermen, and others, mainly from Kyushu and Shikoku.<ref name=so1516>So. pp15-16.</ref>

 

Though the term ''wakô'' would come to be applied to a wide range of people, engaging in a wide range of activities, including Chinese traders and pirates, and Japanese traders, that is not to say that there were not, in fact, genuine Japanese pirates, raiders, brigands, or whatever term may wish to apply active on the seas at this time. The [[Murakami clan]]<!--see 村上水軍--> of [[Iyo province]], known for their piratical activities in the [[Inland Sea]], were among these; [[Murakami Zusho]], lord of Nôshima<!--能島--> is recorded as having led attacks on the Chinese coast, the Philippines, and parts of Indonesia. [[Iida Koichiro|Iida Kôichirô]] of Iyo and [[Kitaura Kanjuro|Kitaura Kanjûrô]] of [[Bingo province|Bingo]] are also known to have commanded raiding parties around this time. One contemporary source relates that "the seven bands" of ''wakô'', though presumably there were many more groups than that, grew to number as many as 1,000 men by 1555, if not earlier, incorporating people from a wide range of walks of life, including [[ronin]], fishermen, and others, mainly from Kyushu and Shikoku.<ref name=so1516>So. pp15-16.</ref> Despite Chinese conceptions or assertions that all of these pirates were "Japanese pirates," in fact the Ming authorities paid out different levels of rewards to anyone who captured or killed a pirate, depending on the identity (e.g. Chinese, Japanese, or Korean) of the pirate.<ref name=miki/>

Concurrent [[tribute]] missions sent by the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] and [[Hosokawa clan|Hosokawa families]] clashed in [[1523]], and burned Ningpo, becoming labeled as ''wakô''. The Chinese authorities responded by banning foreign trade in the area around Ningpo. This led in turn to a rise in illegal trade between the coastal Chinese on the one hand with Japanese and other foreigners. A number of Chinese officials and merchants came to owe great debts to Japanese (or other foreign) traders, and though they sought aid from the local authorities, the foreigners resorted to piracy in order to reclaim the funds owed them, and for survival in the face of Chinese authorities seeking to capture them for the crime of participating in illegal trade.<ref>So. p5.</ref> Denied access to a satisfactory volume of official trade<ref>The Ôuchi sent the last Japanese tribute mission to China in 1549, but as tribute missions only occurred once in a number of years, and only consisted of a small number of ships (and thus, brought limited revenues), the clan desired a greater volume of trade.</ref>, the Ôuchi clan remained prominent for some time in commanding, backing, or otherwise encouraging some ''wakô'' bands including those led by prominent figures from other provinces and regions. The Ôuchi are often cited as among the chief backers of the ''wakô'', and it is through them that many draw connections between the ''wakô'' and Japanese national ambitions. However, the clan was destroyed by the [[Mori clan|Môri]] in [[1557]], while ''wakô'' activity continued.<ref>So. pp16-17. While the Ôuchi are mentioned in some contemporary Japanese sources, So Kwan-wai notes that most contemporary Chinese sources emphasize the Chinese involvement in organizing and leading ''wakô'' bands, and do not mention the Ôuchi at all.</ref>

Concurrent [[tribute]] missions sent by the [[Ouchi clan|Ôuchi]] and [[Hosokawa clan|Hosokawa families]] clashed in [[1523]], and burned Ningpo, becoming labeled as ''wakô''. The Chinese authorities responded by banning foreign trade in the area around Ningpo. This led in turn to a rise in illegal trade between the coastal Chinese on the one hand with Japanese and other foreigners. A number of Chinese officials and merchants came to owe great debts to Japanese (or other foreign) traders, and though they sought aid from the local authorities, the foreigners resorted to piracy in order to reclaim the funds owed them, and for survival in the face of Chinese authorities seeking to capture them for the crime of participating in illegal trade.<ref>So. p5.</ref> Denied access to a satisfactory volume of official trade<ref>The Ôuchi sent the last Japanese tribute mission to China in 1549, but as tribute missions only occurred once in a number of years, and only consisted of a small number of ships (and thus, brought limited revenues), the clan desired a greater volume of trade.</ref>, the Ôuchi clan remained prominent for some time in commanding, backing, or otherwise encouraging some ''wakô'' bands including those led by prominent figures from other provinces and regions. The Ôuchi are often cited as among the chief backers of the ''wakô'', and it is through them that many draw connections between the ''wakô'' and Japanese national ambitions. However, the clan was destroyed by the [[Mori clan|Môri]] in [[1557]], while ''wakô'' activity continued.<ref>So. pp16-17. While the Ôuchi are mentioned in some contemporary Japanese sources, So Kwan-wai notes that most contemporary Chinese sources emphasize the Chinese involvement in organizing and leading ''wakô'' bands, and do not mention the Ôuchi at all.</ref>

As Chinese demand for, and Japanese supply of, silver rose in the 1530s-40s, a number of Chinese merchants established themselves at bases in Kyushu, selling expensive Chinese silks for Japanese silver, in violation of the Chinese bans. These merchants, including [[Wang Zhi]] (d. 1559), Chan Hai (d. 1556), Chen Dong (d. 1556), and Ye Ming (d. 1556), along with their mixed Chinese and Japanese crews, were considered '''wakô'' by the Chinese authorities as well, despite not being Japanese, and not being involved in any true piratical or raiding activities.<ref name=arano188>Arano. p188.</ref> One Chinese primary source indicates that the proportion of ethnic Chinese among the so-called "Japanese pirates" may have been as high as ninety percent.<ref>So. p205.</ref>

As Chinese demand for, and Japanese supply of, silver rose in the 1530s-40s, a number of Chinese merchants established themselves at bases in Kyushu, selling expensive Chinese silks for Japanese silver, in violation of the Chinese bans. These merchants, including [[Wang Zhi]] (d. 1559), Chan Hai (d. 1556), Chen Dong (d. 1556), and Ye Ming (d. 1556), along with their mixed Chinese and Japanese crews, were considered '''wakô'' by the Chinese authorities as well, despite not being Japanese, and not being involved in any true piratical or raiding activities.<ref name=arano188>Arano. p188.</ref> One Chinese primary source indicates that the proportion of ethnic Chinese among the so-called "Japanese pirates" may have been as high as ninety percent.<ref>So. p205.</ref>

Over time, the raids spread to encompass much of the South China coast. Though the pirates who emerged in the aftermath of the 1523 bans were largely traders, now regarded as smugglers under the ban, their crews gradually came to include people with little or no interest in trade, and more interest in violence and thievery. Huangyan, in Zhejiang province, fell in [[1552]] to a party of ''wakô'' said to number as many as 10,000.<ref name=so6>So. p6.</ref> Raiders traveled up the Yangtze and attacked cities along its shores the same year, and attacked Nanjing and Chaozhou in [[1555]]. By this time, many of the raiding parties made use of arquebuses (''[[teppo|teppô]]'').<ref name=so1516/> Over the course of the early 1550s, the ''wakô'' seized or simply defeated nearly every defense post along the coast, transforming many into their own bases of operations. The situation became particularly severe for the Chinese authorities when the pirate threat spread to Nanjing.<ref name=so6/>

Over time, the raids spread to encompass much of the South China coast. Though the pirates who emerged in the aftermath of the 1523 bans were largely traders, now regarded as smugglers under the ban, their crews gradually came to include people with little or no interest in trade, and more interest in violence and thievery. Huangyan, in Zhejiang province, fell in [[1552]] to a party of ''wakô'' said to number as many as 10,000.<ref name=so6>So. p6.</ref> Raiders traveled up the Yangtze and attacked cities along its shores the same year, and attacked Nanjing and Chaozhou in [[1555]]. By this time, many of the raiding parties made use of arquebuses (''[[teppo|teppô]]'');<ref name=so1516/> Meanwhile, the Ming armies were equipped with rather inferior firearms, as there were no centrally-coordinated factories or distribution depots, and generals were left to supply their armies on their own; as a result, Western-style firearms made by individual armies based on models had high failure rates, often failing to ignite, or even exploding in the soldier's hands.<ref>Huang, 170-171.</ref>

 

These coastal raids, in which ''wakô'' came onto land - sometimes fairly deeply inland - and attacked villages and outposts on land, constituted the majority of their activity, not seaborne combat. In fact, some Chinese sources from the time suggest that the raiders were far more effective at land battle than on the seas, and advocated trying to defeat them at sea, and to prevent them from coming on land.<ref>Huang, 169.</ref> Over the course of the early 1550s, the ''wakô'' seized or simply defeated nearly every defense post along the coast, transforming many into their own bases of operations. The situation became particularly severe for the Chinese authorities when the pirate threat spread to Nanjing.<ref name=so6/>

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>

For six months in [[1556]], Zheng Shungong, an envoy sent by Yang I, the Chinese official in charge of dealing with the ''wakô'', resided in Japan and collected information about the ''wakô''. In his report, published as "A Mirror of Japan" (日本一鑑, ''Riben Yijian''), he writes extensively about Chinese spurring Japanese to engage in piracy and raids on the Chinese coast; he makes no mention of the involvement of Japanese ''daimyô'', and portrays the ''wakô'' as decidedly headed by Chinese.<ref>So. p22.</ref>

For six months in [[1556]], Zheng Shungong, an envoy sent by [[Yang Yi]], the Chinese official in charge of dealing with the ''wakô'', resided in Japan and collected information about the ''wakô''. In his report, published as "A Mirror of Japan" (日本一鑑, ''Riben Yijian''), he writes extensively about Chinese spurring Japanese to engage in piracy and raids on the Chinese coast; he makes no mention of the involvement of Japanese ''daimyô'', and portrays the ''wakô'' as decidedly headed by Chinese.<ref>So. p22.</ref>

==Late 16th Century==

==Late 16th Century==

The ''wakô'' are generally said to have made their bases on Formosa, in the Ryukyus, and in ports, castle towns, and more remote coastal sites on Kyushu. However, the question of the extent to which regional ''[[daimyo|daimyô]]'', particularly in Kyushu, supported and enabled ''wakô'' activity is a contentious one, and one of the chief issues involved in the subject of ''wakô''. Arano asserts that the regional ''daimyô'' must have provided tacit consent, if not outright invitations, for these Chinese merchants to engage in such activities within their domains; the Chinese smugglers had similar relationships with local officials in China.<ref name=arano188/> As noted above, much of what was described as "''wakô''" activity was simply trade - illicit or otherwise - and not true piracy, in the sense of violent raids on coastal towns or on other ships. Chinese communities in Kyushu flourished in the 16th century, many of them located in castle towns, and directly encouraged and supported by the local ''daimyô''. Chinese communities brought Chinese trade, i.e. income, as well as skilled craftsmen and other talented workers, thus making the idea of supporting a local Chinese community quite attractive for ''daimyô''.<ref name=arano194>Arano. p194.</ref>

The ''wakô'' are generally said to have made their bases on Formosa, in the Ryukyus, and in ports, castle towns, and more remote coastal sites on Kyushu. However, the question of the extent to which regional ''[[daimyo|daimyô]]'', particularly in Kyushu, supported and enabled ''wakô'' activity is a contentious one, and one of the chief issues involved in the subject of ''wakô''. Arano asserts that the regional ''daimyô'' must have provided tacit consent, if not outright invitations, for these Chinese merchants to engage in such activities within their domains; the Chinese smugglers had similar relationships with local officials in China.<ref name=arano188/> As noted above, much of what was described as "''wakô''" activity was simply trade - illicit or otherwise - and not true piracy, in the sense of violent raids on coastal towns or on other ships. Chinese communities in Kyushu flourished in the 16th century, many of them located in castle towns, and directly encouraged and supported by the local ''daimyô''. Chinese communities brought Chinese trade, i.e. income, as well as skilled craftsmen and other talented workers, thus making the idea of supporting a local Chinese community quite attractive for ''daimyô''.<ref name=arano194>Arano. p194.</ref>

Most, if not all, residents of these Chinese communities in Kyushu traveled to Japan illegally (travel to Japan was, itself, after all, illegal under Ming law), though many also came against their will, either as prisoners of the ''wakô'', or of the samurai forces of Hideyoshi, who brought back many prisoners of war to Japan when he [[Korean Invasions|invaded Korea in the 1590s]].<ref name=arano194/>

Most, if not all, residents of these Chinese communities in Kyushu traveled to Japan illegally (travel to Japan was, itself, after all, illegal under Ming law), though many also came against their will, either as prisoners of the ''wakô'', or of the samurai forces of Hideyoshi, who brought back many prisoners of war to Japan when he [[Korean Invasions|invaded Korea in the 1590s]].<ref name=arano194/> Many captured by the ''wakô'' were sold as slaves; some 200-300 Chinese, for example, are known to have been kept as slaves in Takasu, [[Satsuma province]], in the mid-16th century. Chinese and Japanese pirates captured Chinese and Japanese alike, selling them as slaves to willing buyers in the opposite land.<ref>Arano, 195.</ref>

==Decline of the Wakô==

==Decline of the Wakô==

[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] helped further weaken the ''wakô'' with a [[1588]] edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial ''daimyô'' to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the ''wakô''.<ref name=arano190>Arano. p190.</ref>

[[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] helped further weaken the ''wakô'' with a [[1588]] edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial ''daimyô'' to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the ''wakô''.<ref name=arano190>Arano. p190.</ref>

Though the actual ''wakô'' were somewhat weakened by these and other steps taken by Hideyoshi, his invasions of Korea in the 1590s were viewed by China and Korea as part and parcel of the ''wakô'' phenomenon. His samurai forces, who raided, plundered, and pillaged, destroying and stealing much financial and cultural property, and kidnapping many craftsmen (especially potters) and others, were seen as no different from the ''wakô'' pirates.<ref>Arano. p197.</ref> This is somewhat ironic, as, according to some sources, Hideyoshi's goal in invading Korea was to press China for access to the so-called "tally trade" (''[[kango boeki|kangô bôeki]]'')<ref>Arano. pp206-207. Arano asserts that Hideyoshi believed that by demonstrating Japan's military supremacy, Japan could thus rightfully claim "civilized" non-barbarian status within the [[Sinocentric world order]], and a right to access to trade.</ref>, the very same formal trade relations which China which were cut off by the Ming court in response to Japanese refusal or inability to curb ''wakô'' raids.

Though the actual ''wakô'' were somewhat weakened by these and other steps taken by Hideyoshi, his invasions of Korea in the 1590s were viewed by China and Korea as part and parcel of the ''wakô'' phenomenon. His samurai forces, who raided, plundered, and pillaged, destroying and stealing much financial and cultural property, and kidnapping many craftsmen (especially potters) and others, were seen as no different from the ''wakô'' pirates.<ref>Arano. p197.</ref> This is somewhat ironic, as, according to some sources, Hideyoshi's goal in invading Korea was to press China for access to the so-called "tally trade" (''[[kango boeki|kangô bôeki]]'')<ref>Arano. pp206-207. Arano asserts that Hideyoshi believed that by demonstrating Japan's military supremacy, Japan could thus rightfully claim "civilized" non-barbarian status within the [[Sinocentric world order]], and a right to access to trade.</ref>, the very same formal trade relations which were cut off by the Ming court in response to Japanese refusal or inability to curb ''wakô'' raids.

In the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate, various efforts were made to gain access to formal Chinese trade, thus curbing the ''wakô'' phenomenon by diminishing the situations under which traders between China and Japan would be considered "pirates."

In the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate, various efforts were made to gain access to formal Chinese trade, thus curbing the ''wakô'' phenomenon by diminishing the situations under which traders between China and Japan would be considered "pirates."

A letter sent by the shogunate to the Governor-General of Fujian in [[1610]] was among these efforts. The letter was drafted by [[Hayashi Razan]] and ''[[Nagasaki bugyo|Nagasaki bugyô]]'' [[Hasegawa Sahyoe|Hasegawa Sahyôe]], and passed through the hands of [[Honda Masazumi]] and the Chinese merchant [[Zhou Xingru]], who had in fact come to Japan in order to complain about the pirates. The letter was aimed chiefly at seeking normalized relations with China, and access to the official tally trade. It offers that [[Nagasaki]] will be formally opened as a port for traders from Fujian, and offers that a formal Japanese mission will be sent to China once access to formal trade is obtained. The letter also requests that wood, water, or other supplies be provided to Japanese sailors who find their way to Chinese shores in an emergency (shipwreck, drifting off-course, etc.), but explains the [[red seal ships]] system, and grants permission to the Chinese authorities to punish as a pirate anyone not carrying a vermillion-sealed license.<ref>Arano. p209.</ref> By 1620, however, the shogunate gave up on trying to restore relations with China.<ref>Arano. p210.</ref>

A letter sent by the shogunate to the Governor-General of Fujian in [[1610]] was among these efforts. The letter was drafted by [[Hayashi Razan]] and ''[[Nagasaki bugyo|Nagasaki bugyô]]'' [[Hasegawa Fujihiro|Hasegawa Sahyôe]], and passed through the hands of [[Honda Masazumi]] and the Chinese merchant [[Zhou Xingru]], who had in fact come to Japan in order to complain about the pirates. The letter was aimed chiefly at seeking normalized relations with China, and access to the official tally trade. It offers that [[Nagasaki]] will be formally opened as a port for traders from Fujian, and offers that a formal Japanese mission will be sent to China once access to formal trade is obtained. The letter also requests that wood, water, or other supplies be provided to Japanese sailors who find their way to Chinese shores in an emergency (shipwreck, drifting off-course, etc.), but explains the [[red seal ships]] system, and grants permission to the Chinese authorities to punish as a pirate anyone not carrying a vermillion-sealed license.<ref>Arano. p209.</ref> By 1620, however, the shogunate gave up on trying to restore relations with China.<ref>Arano. p210.</ref>

The imposition of [[kaikin|maritime restrictions]] in the 1630s dealt a major blow to the ''wakô''. All but three ports<ref>Plus the more land-based "port" of access in [[Matsumae han]] for interactions and trade with [[Ainu]].</ref> were closed to foreign trade, and Japanese were forbidden from leaving the country or returning. ''Wakô'' activity still continued among Japanese, and others, based overseas, who traded (or raided) in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, as well as among, presumably, some small number of smugglers who continued to engage in illegal operations along the Kyushu coast. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty in [[1644]], Ming loyalists continued to fight against the [[Manchus|Manchu]] conquest for forty years; these loyalists, and others associated with them, may have been at times referred to as ''wakô'' in Qing documents.

The imposition of [[kaikin|maritime restrictions]] in the 1630s dealt a major blow to the ''wakô''. All but three ports<ref>Plus the more land-based "port" of access in [[Matsumae han]] for interactions and trade with [[Ainu]].</ref> were closed to foreign trade, and Japanese were forbidden from leaving the country or returning. ''Wakô'' activity still continued among Japanese, and others, based overseas, who traded (or raided) in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, as well as among, presumably, some small number of smugglers who continued to engage in illegal operations along the Kyushu coast. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty in [[1644]], Ming loyalists continued to fight against the [[Manchus|Manchu]] conquest for forty years; these loyalists, and others associated with them, may have been at times referred to as ''wakô'' in Qing documents.