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In the end, the ''bugyô'' provided the British water, two cows, four sheep, and other food & provisions. The British released their captives and left the following morning. Matsudaira committed suicide that night, and a few hours later 8,000 troops arrived from Fukuoka han to serve as reinforcements and to attack the ''Phaeton'', which was now gone.
In the end, the ''bugyô'' provided the British water, two cows, four sheep, and other food & provisions. The British released their captives and left the following morning. Matsudaira committed suicide that night, and a few hours later 8,000 troops arrived from Fukuoka han to serve as reinforcements and to attack the ''Phaeton'', which was now gone.
==Aftermath & Analysis==
===Matsudaira's Account===
Before committing ''[[seppuku]]'', Matsudaira left behind a written account of his interpretation of the events which unfolded, and of where blame should be placed. Noell Wilson argues that among the chief motives behind his suicide were an acknowledgement of his failure to obey shogunate policy, which demanded that Nagasaki harbor be denied to foreigners other than the Dutch and Chinese, and that the British ship should have been destroyed. In killing himself, he pre-empted any formal trial and sentence, and thus saved his own family from harm or death, as was standard in such cases of ''seppuku'' committed in order to preserve or protect family honor.
Before committing ''[[seppuku]]'', Matsudaira left behind a written account of his interpretation of the events which unfolded, and of where blame should be placed. Noell Wilson argues that among the chief motives behind his suicide were an acknowledgement of his failure to obey shogunate policy, which demanded that Nagasaki harbor be denied to foreigners other than the Dutch and Chinese, and that the British ship should have been destroyed. In killing himself, he pre-empted any formal trial and sentence, and thus saved his own family from harm or death, as was standard in such cases of ''seppuku'' committed in order to preserve or protect family honor.
In his account, Matsudaira chastises his own men for failing to protect the Dutch agents, who were officially under the protection of the shogunate, from their abduction at the hands of the British. He then also rebukes Saga han for its failure to have enough men actively stationed in the harbor. It would seem, however, that even at the time it was unclear whether policy or precedent called for Saga troops to require permission from the Nagasaki ''bugyô'' to withdraw from their posts. Rather, it was standard for troops to withdraw - without explicit permission from the ''bugyô'' - after the Dutch ships left for the season; no Dutch ship had arrived nor was expected that summer.
In his account, Matsudaira chastises his own men for failing to protect the Dutch agents, who were officially under the protection of the shogunate, from their abduction at the hands of the British. He then also rebukes Saga han for its failure to have enough men actively stationed in the harbor. It would seem, however, that even at the time it was unclear whether policy or precedent called for Saga troops to require permission from the Nagasaki ''bugyô'' to withdraw from their posts. Rather, it was standard for troops to withdraw - without explicit permission from the ''bugyô'' - after the Dutch ships left for the season; no Dutch ship had arrived nor was expected that summer.
Matsudaira also argues that those in the position of Nagasaki ''bugyô'' should not be ''[[hatamoto]]'', as he was, with no forces of his own to call upon, but should instead be ''daimyô'', with their own armies, however small, upon which they could rely. It was the disparity between his rank or position and that of the ''daimyô'' of Saga and Fukuoka that exacerbated ambiguities in the command hierarchy of the defense of Nagasaki harbor. Nagasaki ''bugyô'' had initially been ''daimyô'', but this practice had come to an end quite early in the Edo period, as the result of misconduct on the part of [[Takenaka Shigeyoshi]], Nagasaki ''bugyô'' from 1629-1633, and ''daimyô'' of [[Funai han]].
Matsudaira also argues that those in the position of Nagasaki ''bugyô'' should not be ''[[hatamoto]]'', as he was, with no forces of his own to call upon, but should instead be ''daimyô'', with their own armies, however small, upon which they could rely. It was the disparity between his rank or position and that of the ''daimyô'' of Saga and Fukuoka that exacerbated ambiguities in the command hierarchy of the defense of Nagasaki harbor. Nagasaki ''bugyô'' had initially been ''daimyô'', but this practice had come to an end quite early in the Edo period, as the result of misconduct on the part of [[Takenaka Shigeyoshi]], Nagasaki ''bugyô'' from [[1629]]-[[1633]], and ''daimyô'' of [[Funai han]].
Some sources argue that fiscal difficulties on the part of Saga han were to blame for an inability to muster sufficient forces; yet, while Saga may have indeed been experiencing financial difficulties, other sources argue that complacency borne out of the extreme rarity of incidents in which martial defense was called for, was truly to blame for chronic shortfalls in manpower.
Though his reasons for doing so are unknown, Matsudaira focused on this manpower issue in his writing, making no mention of the condition or quality of weaponry as an issue.
Some sources argue that fiscal difficulties on the part of Saga han were to blame for an inability to muster sufficient forces; yet, while Saga may have indeed been experiencing financial difficulties, other sources argue that complacency borne out of the extreme rarity of incidents in which martial defense was called for, was truly to blame for chronic shortfalls in manpower.
==Aftermath==
===Punishments===
Whatever the cause of these shortfalls may have been, Saga was punished by the shogunate for its role in the Phaeton Incident playing out as it did. The Saga ''daimyô'', [[Nabeshima Narinao]], was placed under house arrest for roughly three months (from 1808/11/24 until [[1809]]/2/21), and various festivals and other activities were banned within the domain. The two heads of the fortifications at Nagasaki, Chiba Saburôemon and Kanbara Jiemon, both samurai from Saga, were ordered on 1808/9/27 to commit suicide, while Nagasaki intelligence officer Seki Dennojô was stripped of his post, Matsumoto Saburô, chief counselor of [[Fukahori han]] committed suicide, and ten other Saga officers charged with command of the cannon were placed under house arrest until the following year.
Though the incident exclusively concerned samurai responsibilities, all residents of Saga, including peasants and merchants, were subjected to a variety of punishment measures, including temporary bans on shaving one's forelocks (''[[sakayaki]]''), and having travelers from elsewhere stay at inns or the like within Saga. Merchants were required to shutter their shops, and the people of Saga were forbidden from leaving the domain and traveling, for a time.
Finally, Saga was relieved of its harbor defense duties for the year.
Fukuoka han, which like Saga had also not provided anywhere near the sufficient number of troops necessary to defend the harbor, emerged almost entirely blame-free, due to ambiguities in precedent and policy as to the responsibilities of the "off-duty" domain in any given season. Fukuoka officials made use of these ambiguities to argue Fukuoka's blamelessness; the domain was not only spared the punishments visited upon Saga, but in fact was granted the privilege of appointing a temporary Nagasaki ''bugyô'' to replace the late Matsudaira, until the new ''bugyô'' appointed by the shogunate, [[Magaribuchi Kagetsuyu]], arrived from Edo. He did so on 9/3, taking up the duties held since 8/26 (roughly one week earlier) by [[Tsukinari Shigezaemon]], the Fukuoka appointee.
===Reforms===
The ''Phaeton'' Incident, along with encounters with Russians in previous years, highlighted the need for improvement to harbor defenses. Some improvements were made to weapons and fortifications, though little dramatic change was made where historian Noell Wilson argues it was likely needed most - in the organizational aspects of the harbor defense, including the hierarchy of command and the distribution of responsibility between the shogunate and the ''han'' (specifically Saga and Fukuoka ''han'').
One notable change was the institution of a system of warning of harbor intrusion, making use of temple bells to sound the alarm. The temples of Sôryûji, Ryûtaiji, and Ganshôji were assigned the responsibility of ringing theirs first, in response to which other temples would sound their bells - in a different manner than when issuing other communications, such as the alarm for a fire in the city - and certain designated individuals would run from town to town to spread the word in person. All of this was meant to help effect the quicker arrival of (additional) samurai forces to the harbor when necessary. This temple bell warning system was first tested on 1809/5/20, but proved an ineffective failure, largely because many mistook the bells for the fire alarm after all, and many others did not hear the bells at all. At best, the system as established was meant to be heard throughout Nagasaki, and only Nagasaki; no system had been put into place at the time to effectively and efficiently then convey that message to [[Saga castle|Saga]] and [[Fukuoka castle]]s. The system was quickly abandoned.
Over the next two years after the incident, the fortifications at Nagasaki were expanded somewhat, upon the orders of the shogunate. Fukuoka han constructed new gun batteries at five locations in 1809, and Saga expanded existing fortifications at four locations in [[1810]]. Meanwhile, the shogunate also ordered the two domains to double the amount of ammunition on hand at the harbor fortifications; between the two, they provided less than half of what was demanded, which was still more than could be fired with the amount of [[gunpowder]] available.
Finally, the shogunate attempted to implement a system by which Dutch ships could verify their identity through the use of a set of signals employing flags and lanterns. Additional edicts called for Nagasaki locals to lend their weapons and boats to the effort of defending the harbor. Yet, in the end, the physical defenses remained inadequate, the Nagasaki ''bugyô'' remained powerless to unequivocally directly command any significant number of forces at all, and significant ambiguities remained in the extent to which Saga and Fukuoka were each responsible for contributing to the defense, and for obeying the Nagasaki ''bugyô''.
==References==
==References==