Changes

In [[1715]], shogunal advisor [[Arai Hakuseki]] oversaw the implementation of a new set of policies which limited Chinese ships to thirty, and Dutch to two, each year; his regulations also drew upon the Chinese [[kango boeki|tally trade]] system, giving each Chinese ship that left Nagasaki half of a seal which, when matched with the half retained by Nagasaki officials, would constitute a license to trade. These licenses were known as ''shinpai''. This, combined with the efforts of the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'', or customs-house, established in [[1698]], it was hoped, would severely cut down on smuggling.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 52-53.</ref>

In [[1715]], shogunal advisor [[Arai Hakuseki]] oversaw the implementation of a new set of policies which limited Chinese ships to thirty, and Dutch to two, each year; his regulations also drew upon the Chinese [[kango boeki|tally trade]] system, giving each Chinese ship that left Nagasaki half of a seal which, when matched with the half retained by Nagasaki officials, would constitute a license to trade. These licenses were known as ''shinpai''. This, combined with the efforts of the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'', or customs-house, established in [[1698]], it was hoped, would severely cut down on smuggling.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 52-53.</ref>

In the 18th century, the shogunate encouraged the expansion of the domestic production of [[sugar]], [[ginseng]], and [[silk]], in an effort to use import substitution measures to stem the dangerous flow of silver out of the country. As a result, fewer (though sometimes larger) Chinese ships came to trade. In the latter portion of this century, from [[1764]] onwards, on average eleven Chinese ships called at Nagasaki each year. While they continued to bring in sugar, ginseng, and silk for sale, they also continued to bring in other luxury goods, such as tortoiseshell, sandalwood, ivory, and a wide variety of [[kanpo|medicinal]] products such as herbs and roots. Japan regularly imported as many as one thousand Chinese books a year.<ref>Kang, David C. “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia.” ''Security Studies'' 19, no. 4 (2010): 607.</ref> [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]] expressed desires to more severely limit, or even eliminate entirely, Chinese trade at the port, emphasizing the value instead of encouraging the people of Nagasaki to pursue agriculture or industry, but knew it was not possible, as demand for medicinal goods was just too powerful. In [[1790]], he imposed restrictions, limiting the Chinese to only ten ships a year. Profits continued, however, unabated, and indeed soared, with the ''Nagasaki kaisho'' earning an unprecedented 2,742 ''kan'' in bullion imports via the supplemental trade in [[1801]].<ref>Hellyer, 109.</ref>

In the 18th century, the shogunate encouraged the expansion of the domestic production of [[sugar]], [[ginseng]], and [[silk]], in an effort to use import substitution measures to stem the dangerous flow of silver out of the country. As a result, fewer (though sometimes larger) Chinese ships came to trade. In the latter portion of this century, from [[1764]] onwards, on average eleven Chinese ships called at Nagasaki each year. While they continued to bring in sugar, ginseng, and silk for sale, they also continued to bring in other luxury goods, such as [[tortoiseshell]], [[sandalwood]], [[ivory]], and a wide variety of [[kanpo|medicinal]] products such as herbs and roots. Japan regularly imported as many as one thousand Chinese books a year.<ref>Kang, David C. “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia.” ''Security Studies'' 19, no. 4 (2010): 607.</ref> [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]] expressed desires to more severely limit, or even eliminate entirely, Chinese trade at the port, emphasizing the value instead of encouraging the people of Nagasaki to pursue agriculture or industry, but knew it was not possible, as demand for medicinal goods was just too powerful. In [[1790]], he imposed restrictions, limiting the Chinese to only ten ships a year. Profits continued, however, unabated, and indeed soared, with the ''Nagasaki kaisho'' earning an unprecedented 2,742 ''kan'' in bullion imports via the supplemental trade in [[1801]].<ref>Hellyer, 109.</ref>

Chinese trade at Nagasaki, at least within the "traditional" Edo period patterns, fell dramatically into decline in the late 1850s, in large part due to competition against Western traders and turmoil at home (especially related to the [[Taiping Rebellion]]). A set of three ships which sold goods at Nagasaki in [[1859]] but were then unable to return to China for a time were likely the last ones to deal directly with the shogunate's clearinghouse. After a few months of sitting in harbor, they resold at a loss the cargoes they had acquired in their initial exchanges. A group of Chinese merchants resident in the city formed a guild in [[1861]] in the hopes of working their way to dominance in the China-Japan trade in the port, but before long, most Chinese merchants simply took up working for, or working with, Western firms.<ref>Hellyer, 184.</ref>

Chinese trade at Nagasaki, at least within the "traditional" Edo period patterns, fell dramatically into decline in the late 1850s, in large part due to competition against Western traders and turmoil at home (especially related to the [[Taiping Rebellion]]). A set of three ships which sold goods at Nagasaki in [[1859]] but were then unable to return to China for a time were likely the last ones to deal directly with the shogunate's clearinghouse. After a few months of sitting in harbor, they resold at a loss the cargoes they had acquired in their initial exchanges. A group of Chinese merchants resident in the city formed a guild in [[1861]] in the hopes of working their way to dominance in the China-Japan trade in the port, but before long, most Chinese merchants simply took up working for, or working with, Western firms.<ref>Hellyer, 184.</ref>