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King Taejo was raised in a [[Yuan Dynasty]] commandery, the son of a Yuan official of Korean extraction; as such, he grew up with close [[Jurchen]], [[Mongol]], and [[Han Chinese]] associates, as well as those of Korean ethnicity. Following the fall of the Yuan, that commandery became a portion of Korean territory once again, and after taking the throne, Taejo began receiving [[tribute]] from the Jurchens immediately. Around a century later, Joseon had incorporated a number of Jurchen areas (and thus, many Jurchen people) into its territory, and had begun re-settling Koreans into the northern border regions. Six garrisons on the Tumen River (today the eastern part of North Korea's border with China and Russia) guarded these settlements.<ref>Adam Bohnet, “Ruling Ideology and Marginal Subjects: Ming Loyalism and Foreign Lineages in Late Chosŏn Korea.” ''Journal of Early Modern History'' 15:6 (January 2011): 484-485.</ref>
 
King Taejo was raised in a [[Yuan Dynasty]] commandery, the son of a Yuan official of Korean extraction; as such, he grew up with close [[Jurchen]], [[Mongol]], and [[Han Chinese]] associates, as well as those of Korean ethnicity. Following the fall of the Yuan, that commandery became a portion of Korean territory once again, and after taking the throne, Taejo began receiving [[tribute]] from the Jurchens immediately. Around a century later, Joseon had incorporated a number of Jurchen areas (and thus, many Jurchen people) into its territory, and had begun re-settling Koreans into the northern border regions. Six garrisons on the Tumen River (today the eastern part of North Korea's border with China and Russia) guarded these settlements.<ref>Adam Bohnet, “Ruling Ideology and Marginal Subjects: Ming Loyalism and Foreign Lineages in Late Chosŏn Korea.” ''Journal of Early Modern History'' 15:6 (January 2011): 484-485.</ref>
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''[[Wako|Wakô]]'' pirate raids on the Korean and Chinese coasts were perhaps the most major concern in Japan's relations with both Joseon Korea and [[Ming Dynasty]] China in the 15th-16th centuries. The ''wakô'' (lit. "Japanese pirates") were in fact people from all over the region, mainly Chinese, under the direct control of no central or prominent Japanese authority. Despite demands from Joseon and Ming to the [[Ashikaga shogunate]] to put an end to the piracy, it was not within the shogun's power to command the pirates. In the 15th century, Joseon made several attempts to curb or cut off this pirate activity, eventually entering into an arrangement in [[1443]] with the [[So clan|Sô samurai clan]] of [[Tsushima]], who were granted a variety of privileges in exchange for taking a leading role in ensuring that all Japanese trading ships traveling to Korea were properly licensed and authorized, and in taking care of those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Hellyer, 31.</ref> In the [[Edo period]], the Sô came to be the only Japanese traveling or communicating between Korea and Japan, wielding considerable power as the only intermediaries between the Joseon court and the [[Tokugawa shogunate]], overseeing and managing all trade and diplomatic interactions between the two lands.
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''[[Wako|Wakô]]'' pirate raids on the Korean and Chinese coasts were perhaps the most major concern in Japan's relations with both Joseon Korea and [[Ming Dynasty]] China in the 15th-16th centuries. Due to these pirate threats, the Korean court gave up on attempts to send formal missions to Southeast Asian courts after the 1390s. Trade in Southeast Asian goods continued, however, through Korea's contacts with China, Japan, and [[Ryukyu Kingdom|Ryûkyû]].<ref>Geoffrey Gunn, ''History Without Borders: The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000-1800'', Hong Kong University Press (2011), 217.</ref> The ''wakô'' (lit. "Japanese pirates") were in fact people from all over the region, mainly Chinese, under the direct control of no central or prominent Japanese authority. Despite demands from Joseon and Ming to the [[Ashikaga shogunate]] to put an end to the piracy, it was not within the shogun's power to command the pirates. In the 15th century, Joseon made several attempts to curb or cut off this pirate activity, eventually entering into an arrangement in [[1443]] with the [[So clan|Sô samurai clan]] of [[Tsushima]], who were granted a variety of privileges in exchange for taking a leading role in ensuring that all Japanese trading ships traveling to Korea were properly licensed and authorized, and in taking care of those which were not (i.e. the pirates).<ref>Hellyer, 31.</ref> In the [[Edo period]], the Sô came to be the only Japanese traveling or communicating between Korea and Japan, wielding considerable power as the only intermediaries between the Joseon court and the [[Tokugawa shogunate]], overseeing and managing all trade and diplomatic interactions between the two lands.
    
As the [[Manchus]] gained strength in Northeast Asia in the early decades of the 17th century, factions emerged within the Joseon Court for and against submission to the Qing. [[Prince Gwanghae]], who reigned as king from [[1608]], sought to accommodate the Manchus, and was supported by the Puk'in faction; however, the rival Sŏin faction saw this as submission to barbarians, as a violation of the recognition of Ming China as the source of great civilization, and as a betrayal to the Ming, who had so aided Korea in defeating Hideyoshi's forces. In [[1623]], the Sŏin faction staged a coup, and placed [[King Injo]] on the throne, marking the beginning of an even deeper adherence to Confucian orthodoxy, and Ming loyalty. This came to be known as the Injo Revolt. Manchu attacks on Korea in [[1636]] only strengthened anti-Manchu attitudes within the Korean court, and though the court did eventually capitulate to paying tribute to the Qing, they maintained their loyalty to the Ming as one of the central ideals of their state.<ref>Seo-Hyun Park, "Small States and the Search for Sovereignty in Sinocentric Asia: Japan and Korea in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Anthony Reid & Zheng Yangwen (eds.), Negotiating Asymmetry: China's Place in Asia (NUS Press, 2009), 36-37.</ref>
 
As the [[Manchus]] gained strength in Northeast Asia in the early decades of the 17th century, factions emerged within the Joseon Court for and against submission to the Qing. [[Prince Gwanghae]], who reigned as king from [[1608]], sought to accommodate the Manchus, and was supported by the Puk'in faction; however, the rival Sŏin faction saw this as submission to barbarians, as a violation of the recognition of Ming China as the source of great civilization, and as a betrayal to the Ming, who had so aided Korea in defeating Hideyoshi's forces. In [[1623]], the Sŏin faction staged a coup, and placed [[King Injo]] on the throne, marking the beginning of an even deeper adherence to Confucian orthodoxy, and Ming loyalty. This came to be known as the Injo Revolt. Manchu attacks on Korea in [[1636]] only strengthened anti-Manchu attitudes within the Korean court, and though the court did eventually capitulate to paying tribute to the Qing, they maintained their loyalty to the Ming as one of the central ideals of their state.<ref>Seo-Hyun Park, "Small States and the Search for Sovereignty in Sinocentric Asia: Japan and Korea in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Anthony Reid & Zheng Yangwen (eds.), Negotiating Asymmetry: China's Place in Asia (NUS Press, 2009), 36-37.</ref>
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