Changes

The [[provinces of China|provinces]] of the empire were divided into roughly 1,100 counties, each of which was administered by a magistrate appointed by the center. Even in the most populous counties, a magistrate was aided by no more than six assistants with [[Chinese imperial examinations|civil service credentials]], and a staff of maybe a dozen clerks. Due to the law of avoidance, which sought to prevent officials from gaining too much local connections or local power-bases, magistrates were rotated to a new post every three years. This meant that most magistrates did not speak the local dialect, did not understand certain local customs, and had to rely on the local gentry - retired scholars, exam certificate holders who never rose to official posts, and some who simply bought status - to get things done. The gentry were the ones with local influence, and they helped the magistrates enforce policy and ensure tax collection. This short time span in each post also meant that a magistrate generally could not implement great policy programs, but could at best hope to simply keep things running as smoothly as possible.<ref name=huang50>Huang, 50.</ref>

The [[provinces of China|provinces]] of the empire were divided into roughly 1,100 counties, each of which was administered by a magistrate appointed by the center. Even in the most populous counties, a magistrate was aided by no more than six assistants with [[Chinese imperial examinations|civil service credentials]], and a staff of maybe a dozen clerks. Due to the law of avoidance, which sought to prevent officials from gaining too much local connections or local power-bases, magistrates were rotated to a new post every three years. This meant that most magistrates did not speak the local dialect, did not understand certain local customs, and had to rely on the local gentry - retired scholars, exam certificate holders who never rose to official posts, and some who simply bought status - to get things done. The gentry were the ones with local influence, and they helped the magistrates enforce policy and ensure tax collection. This short time span in each post also meant that a magistrate generally could not implement great policy programs, but could at best hope to simply keep things running as smoothly as possible.<ref name=huang50>Huang, 50.</ref>

Since the Imperial Court lacked the power to effectively manage affairs on the ground throughout the empire, the business of the court consisted largely of personnel matters - carefully selecting the best men for each post, and reviewing them from time to time, such that those appointed to these posts could be trusted to make the right decisions and administer their jurisdiction competently. Official reports from the most distant provinces could take up to a month to arrive in the capital, and due to the great distances involved and the sparse number of officials, among other reasons, local and regional records held in the capital were often grossly out of date. For example, a given county might go as long as one hundred years between thorough-going demographic and land surveys conducted by the Court. Unable to effectively remain informed about goings-on throughout the empire, or to render decisions on every local matter (or even very many at all), the Court thus left much local administration completely up to local officials, able to do little more than simply commending them for good work from time to time, and punishing them (often quite harshly) for failures and mistakes. And, since the Court lacked the time and manpower to be informed of, or to properly consider, more complex considerations in any given situation of local matters, it was standard practice to blame and punish local officials for anything that might go wrong. For example, when a local official was struggling with a bandit uprising, the Court typically blamed the official for either failing to suppress the bandits, or for suppressing them too harshly, and thus inspiring further resistance. As a local official, the best one could hope to do was to simply keep one's affairs in order, such that no news of any difficulties or problems reached the capital.<ref>Huang, 50, 57-58.</ref>

Since the Imperial Court lacked the power to effectively manage affairs on the ground throughout the empire, the business of the court consisted largely of personnel matters - carefully selecting the best men for each post, and reviewing them from time to time, such that those appointed to these posts could be trusted to make the right decisions and administer their jurisdiction competently. Official reports from the most distant provinces could take up to a month to arrive in the capital, and due to the great distances involved and the sparse number of officials, among other reasons, local and regional records held in the capital were often grossly out of date. For example, a given county might go as long as one hundred years between thorough-going demographic and land surveys conducted by the Court; not dissimilar with [[Edo period|Tokugawa Japan]], tax quotas were set at the beginning of the dynasty, and were extremely rarely, if ever, reassessed. In many districts with historically absurdly low tax rates, the local economy had grown so dependent on low tax rates that any effort to re-assess and raise the tax rate would bankrupt significant swaths of the population. Conversely, in areas where taxes were exceptionally high on paper, collection was strongly resisted by entrenched interests, and was rarely successful; in many areas, as many as 60% of the people managed to avoid paying any tax at all. When Grand Secretary [[Zhang Juzheng]] worked in the 1570s to see all taxes properly collected, this brought much-needed increases in government revenues, but at the cost of arresting and harshly punishing a great many peasants, which severely damaged the regime's reputation of legitimacy as a benevolent government supported by the [[Mandate of Heaven]].<ref>Huang, 62-63.</ref>

 

Unable to effectively remain informed about goings-on throughout the empire, or to render decisions on every local matter (or even very many at all), the Court thus left much local administration completely up to local officials, able to do little more than simply commending them for good work from time to time, and punishing them (often quite harshly) for failures and mistakes. And, since the Court lacked the time and manpower to be informed of, or to properly consider, more complex considerations in any given situation of local matters, it was standard practice to blame and punish local officials for anything that might go wrong. For example, when a local official was struggling with a bandit uprising, the Court typically blamed the official for either failing to suppress the bandits, or for suppressing them too harshly, and thus inspiring further resistance. As a local official, the best one could hope to do was to simply keep one's affairs in order, such that no news of any difficulties or problems reached the capital.<ref>Huang, 50, 57-58.</ref>

Reviews were conducted once every three years for local officials, and once every six years for those serving in the capital. Members of the censorate and of the Ministry of Personnel carefully examined each official's record, and either reassigned him to a new post (with or without a promotion or demotion), or in cases of the official being judged "cruel," "unstable," "indiscreet," or the like, he might be dismissed from service, thus making room in officialdom for other degree-holders vying for official posts. Many junior officials, as a result, fearing losing their position within officialdom, garnered connections with more senior officials, who might look out for them, or exercise influence on their behalf.<ref>Huang, 58.</ref>

Reviews were conducted once every three years for local officials, and once every six years for those serving in the capital. Members of the censorate and of the Ministry of Personnel carefully examined each official's record, and either reassigned him to a new post (with or without a promotion or demotion), or in cases of the official being judged "cruel," "unstable," "indiscreet," or the like, he might be dismissed from service, thus making room in officialdom for other degree-holders vying for official posts. Many junior officials, as a result, fearing losing their position within officialdom, garnered connections with more senior officials, who might look out for them, or exercise influence on their behalf.<ref>Huang, 58.</ref>