| Among its many functions, the agency charged various fees, tariffs, and markups, earning revenues which contributed to maintaining its own operations and expanding shogunate coffers, though much of the money was also used to support the Nagasaki community. As Nagasaki was controlled directly by the shogunate, the merchants of Nagasaki were essentially direct subjects of the shogun, and thus entitled to a certain degree of protection and assurance of well-being from their lord. Thus, from [[1663]] onward, the ''[[Nagasaki bugyo|Nagasaki bugyô]]'' (and, later, the ''Nagasaki kaisho'') divided the profits from trade and tariffs among the districts of the city, after paying their own staffs. The amount paid out also derived from rents charged to [[Chinese in Nagasaki|Chinese merchants]] living in the [[Tojin yashiki|Chinese compound]], among other sources of official revenues. In years of particular difficulty for the merchant community, such as in [[1713]]-[[1714]], when epidemics killed an estimated 5,000 people in the city in the aftermath of a serious but temporary decline in trade in [[1711]], the ''bugyô-sho'' and ''kaisho'' did what they could to help out the merchant community even further. Of the roughly 161,000 ''[[currency|ryô]]'' in profits the agency made in 1714, for example, roughly 70,000 was spent or paid out within Nagasaki, and roughly 76,000 was sent to the shogunate's [[Osaka]] treasuries; this in comparison to the closely similar figure, 171,000 ''ryô'', spent by the lord of [[Kaga han]] in 1747 on domain expenditures.<ref name=hellyer56>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 56-59.</ref> These revenues were not distributed equally, however, but rather in different proportions to landowners and renters; further, the size of the frontage of one's property determined the degree to which one was obliged to contribute to public works projects, such as the construction of [[Dejima]] at the beginning of the 17th century, and of the Chinese compound some decades later, as well as for the construction of booms, bridges, and the like to help defend the port in times of crisis.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 11-12.</ref> | | Among its many functions, the agency charged various fees, tariffs, and markups, earning revenues which contributed to maintaining its own operations and expanding shogunate coffers, though much of the money was also used to support the Nagasaki community. As Nagasaki was controlled directly by the shogunate, the merchants of Nagasaki were essentially direct subjects of the shogun, and thus entitled to a certain degree of protection and assurance of well-being from their lord. Thus, from [[1663]] onward, the ''[[Nagasaki bugyo|Nagasaki bugyô]]'' (and, later, the ''Nagasaki kaisho'') divided the profits from trade and tariffs among the districts of the city, after paying their own staffs. The amount paid out also derived from rents charged to [[Chinese in Nagasaki|Chinese merchants]] living in the [[Tojin yashiki|Chinese compound]], among other sources of official revenues. In years of particular difficulty for the merchant community, such as in [[1713]]-[[1714]], when epidemics killed an estimated 5,000 people in the city in the aftermath of a serious but temporary decline in trade in [[1711]], the ''bugyô-sho'' and ''kaisho'' did what they could to help out the merchant community even further. Of the roughly 161,000 ''[[currency|ryô]]'' in profits the agency made in 1714, for example, roughly 70,000 was spent or paid out within Nagasaki, and roughly 76,000 was sent to the shogunate's [[Osaka]] treasuries; this in comparison to the closely similar figure, 171,000 ''ryô'', spent by the lord of [[Kaga han]] in 1747 on domain expenditures.<ref name=hellyer56>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 56-59.</ref> These revenues were not distributed equally, however, but rather in different proportions to landowners and renters; further, the size of the frontage of one's property determined the degree to which one was obliged to contribute to public works projects, such as the construction of [[Dejima]] at the beginning of the 17th century, and of the Chinese compound some decades later, as well as for the construction of booms, bridges, and the like to help defend the port in times of crisis.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 11-12.</ref> |
− | The agency also handled the transference of imported copper and [[silver]] to agents of the shogunal mints, and the sale of certain Southeast Asian goods such as [[sappanwood]], [[alum]], and [[buffalo horn]], to agents of [[Tsushima han]], who could then present those luxury commodities as [[tribute]] goods to the [[Joseon Court]].<ref name=hellyer56/> | + | The agency also handled the transference of imported copper and [[silver]] to agents of the shogunal mints, and the sale of certain Southeast Asian goods such as [[sappanwood]], [[alum]], and [[buffalo horn]], to agents of [[Tsushima han]], who could then present those luxury commodities as [[tribute]] goods to the [[Joseon]] Court.<ref name=hellyer56/> |
| Once Japan started ''importing'' [[gold]] and silver from the 1760s onward, the ''kaisho'' levied taxes on these imports, 35% on gold and 7-9% on silver; the revenues from these levies went a long way to supporting the agency, and the people of Nagasaki, while the remainder of the gold and silver was sent to the shogunate's treasuries.<ref>Hellyer, 84-85.</ref> | | Once Japan started ''importing'' [[gold]] and silver from the 1760s onward, the ''kaisho'' levied taxes on these imports, 35% on gold and 7-9% on silver; the revenues from these levies went a long way to supporting the agency, and the people of Nagasaki, while the remainder of the gold and silver was sent to the shogunate's treasuries.<ref>Hellyer, 84-85.</ref> |