Changes

Under the [[kaikin|maritime restrictions]] imposed by the [[Tokugawa shogunate]] in the 1630s, which would remain in force until the [[Bakumatsu Period]] (1850s), the only foreigners permitted to trade at the port of [[Nagasaki]] were the [[Dutch East India Company|Dutch]] and the Chinese.<ref>These were not particularly strict definitions; other Europeans did come to [[Dejima]] with the Dutch, and a small number of people from other parts of Asia were included alongside the Chinese in the umbrella category of ''[[Tojin|Tôjin]]''.</ref> The volume of trade handled by the Chinese far exceeded that of the Dutch, however. [[Oba Osamu|Ôba Osamu]] has written that "Nagasaki trade was China trade," arguing for the importance of recognizing Nagasaki's place as the northernmost and easternmost point within larger, complex networks of Chinese trade, rather than (or in addition to) the Japanese perspective, in which Nagasaki is a lone exception to an archipelago of ports closed to foreign trade.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 23.</ref>

Under the [[kaikin|maritime restrictions]] imposed by the [[Tokugawa shogunate]] in the 1630s, which would remain in force until the [[Bakumatsu Period]] (1850s), the only foreigners permitted to trade at the port of [[Nagasaki]] were the [[Dutch East India Company|Dutch]] and the Chinese.<ref>These were not particularly strict definitions; other Europeans did come to [[Dejima]] with the Dutch, and a small number of people from other parts of Asia were included alongside the Chinese in the umbrella category of ''[[Tojin|Tôjin]]''.</ref> The volume of trade handled by the Chinese far exceeded that of the Dutch, however, as did the size of the two communities. While only about 15-20 Dutchmen lived on Dejima at a time, Chinese residents of Nagasaki numbered in the thousands, and by the late Tokugawa period may have comprised as much as one-fifth of the city's total population.<ref>Gary Leupp, ''Interracial Intimacy in Japan: Western Men and Japanese Women, 1543-1900'', A&C Black (2003), 259n63.</ref> [[Oba Osamu|Ôba Osamu]] has written that "Nagasaki trade was China trade," arguing for the importance of recognizing Nagasaki's place as the northernmost and easternmost point within larger, complex networks of Chinese trade, rather than (or in addition to) the Japanese perspective, in which Nagasaki is a lone exception to an archipelago of ports closed to foreign trade.<ref>[[Marius Jansen]], ''China in the Tokugawa World'', Harvard University Press (1992), 23.</ref>

There were essentially two categories of Chinese resident in Nagasaki in the [[Edo Period]]. Those who were seen as being aligned with China, chiefly including merchants who were based in China and came to Nagasaki primarily, or solely, to engage in trade, were restricted to a district known as the ''[[Tojin yashiki|Tôjin yashiki]]'', or "Chinese mansions," but were, like the Dutch, who were similarly confined to Dejima, allowed to leave Japan and to come back. Though initially permitted to travel more freely and to live in the regular Japanese sections of the town, these Chinese merchants were restricted to the ''Tôjin yashiki'' beginning in [[1689]] as a response to rises in smuggling.<ref>Mizuno Norihito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu’s Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China,” ''Sino-Japanese Studies'' 15 (2003), 140n181.</ref>

 

 

There were essentially two categories of Chinese resident in Nagasaki in the [[Edo Period]]. Those who were seen as being aligned with China, chiefly including merchants who were based in China and came to Nagasaki primarily, or solely, to engage in trade, were restricted to a district known as the ''[[Tojin yashiki|Tôjin yashiki]]'', or "Chinese mansions," but were, like the Dutch, who were similarly confined to Dejima, allowed to leave Japan and to come back. Though initially permitted to travel more freely and to live in the regular Japanese sections of the town, these Chinese merchants were restricted to the ''Tôjin yashiki'' beginning in [[1689]] as a response to rises in smuggling.<ref>Mizuno Norihito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu’s Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China,” ''Sino-Japanese Studies'' 15 (2003), 140n181.</ref> Most of those who lived in the district lived there only temporarily, or seasonally, as they were merchants or crewmen otherwise who came and went with the trading vessels. However, the community also included some number of physicians, veterinarians, scholars and the like. Roughly 130 members of the community were influential in Japan as painters.<ref>Jansen, 60.</ref> The community had its own leaders, and liaisons or representatives for interaction with Japanese authorities. A man named Ma Liu (溤六) was the first to serve as official Chinese interpreter, beginning in [[1603]].<ref>Arano, 195.</ref>

Meanwhile, those seen as "resident Chinese," who were not traveling merchants but were more permanently resident in Japan, were permitted more freedom to inter-mingle with Japanese society, and to travel more freely across Japan; however, like the Japanese themselves, these "resident Chinese" were forbidden from leaving the country.<ref>Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. ''Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation''. M.E. Sharpe, 1998. p83. </ref>

Meanwhile, those seen as "resident Chinese," who were not traveling merchants but were more permanently resident in Japan, were permitted more freedom to inter-mingle with Japanese society, and to travel more freely across Japan; however, like the Japanese themselves, these "resident Chinese" were forbidden from leaving the country.<ref>Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. ''Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation''. M.E. Sharpe, 1998. p83. </ref>

In [[1684]], 24 Chinese ships called at Nagasaki; that same year, following the [[1683]] defeat by the Qing of the last of the Ming loyalists on [[Taiwan]], the Qing lifted bans on maritime activity on the south coast of China. The following year, 85 Chinese ships attempted to trade at Nagasaki, spurring the shogunate in [[1685]] to restrict Chinese and Dutch trade to 6000 and 3000 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' (a measure of [[silver]]), respectively, worth of trade. Once the requisite amount of trade had been completed, additional ships were turned away. As the number of Chinese ships soared, to as many as 193 in [[1688]], these restrictions led to a considerable number of cases of ships unloading offshore, or pulling into other ports, all of which was declared "smuggling" and decried as illegal by the shogunal authorities.<ref>Jansen, 28-29.</ref>

In [[1684]], 24 Chinese ships called at Nagasaki; that same year, following the [[1683]] defeat by the Qing of the last of the Ming loyalists on [[Taiwan]], the Qing lifted bans on maritime activity on the south coast of China. The following year, 85 Chinese ships attempted to trade at Nagasaki, spurring the shogunate in [[1685]] to restrict Chinese and Dutch trade to 6000 and 3000 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' (a measure of [[silver]]), respectively, worth of trade. Once the requisite amount of trade had been completed, additional ships were turned away. As the number of Chinese ships soared, to as many as 193 in [[1688]], these restrictions led to a considerable number of cases of ships unloading offshore, or pulling into other ports, all of which was declared "smuggling" and decried as illegal by the shogunal authorities.<ref>Jansen, 28-29.</ref>

In [[1715]], shogunal advisor [[Arai Hakuseki]] oversaw the implementation of a new set of policies which limited Chinese ships to thirty, and Dutch to two, each year; his regulations also drew upon the Chinese [[kango boeki|tally trade]] system, giving each Chinese ship that left Nagasaki half of a seal which, when matched with the half retained by Nagasaki officials, would constitute a license to trade. This, combined with the efforts of the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'', or customs-house, established in [[1698]], it was hoped, would severely cut down on smuggling.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 52-53.</ref>

In [[1715]], shogunal advisor [[Arai Hakuseki]] oversaw the implementation of a new set of policies which limited Chinese ships to thirty, and Dutch to two, each year; his regulations also drew upon the Chinese [[kango boeki|tally trade]] system, giving each Chinese ship that left Nagasaki half of a seal which, when matched with the half retained by Nagasaki officials, would constitute a license to trade. These licenses were known as ''shinpai''. This, combined with the efforts of the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'', or customs-house, established in [[1698]], it was hoped, would severely cut down on smuggling.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 52-53.</ref>

In the 18th century, the shogunate encouraged the expansion of the domestic production of [[sugar]], [[ginseng]], and [[silk]], in an effort to use import substitution measures to stem the dangerous flow of silver out of the country. As a result, fewer (though sometimes larger) Chinese ships came to trade. In the latter portion of this century, from [[1764]] onwards, on average eleven Chinese ships called at Nagasaki each year. While they continued to bring in sugar, ginseng, and silk for sale, they also continued to bring in other luxury goods, such as tortoiseshell, sandalwood, ivory, and a wide variety of [[kanpo|medicinal]] products such as herbs and roots. [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]] expressed desires to more severely limit, or even eliminate entirely, Chinese trade at the port, emphasizing the value instead of encouraging the people of Nagasaki to pursue agriculture or industry, but knew it was not possible, as demand for medicinal goods was just too powerful. In [[1790]], he imposed restrictions, limiting the Chinese to only ten ships a year. Profits continued, however, unabated, and indeed soared, with the ''Nagasaki kaisho'' earning an unprecedented 2,742 ''kan'' in bullion imports via the supplemental trade in [[1801]].<ref>Hellyer, 109.</ref>

In the 18th century, the shogunate encouraged the expansion of the domestic production of [[sugar]], [[ginseng]], and [[silk]], in an effort to use import substitution measures to stem the dangerous flow of silver out of the country. As a result, fewer (though sometimes larger) Chinese ships came to trade. In the latter portion of this century, from [[1764]] onwards, on average eleven Chinese ships called at Nagasaki each year. While they continued to bring in sugar, ginseng, and silk for sale, they also continued to bring in other luxury goods, such as [[tortoiseshell]], [[sandalwood]], [[ivory]], and a wide variety of [[kanpo|medicinal]] products such as herbs and roots. Japan regularly imported as many as one thousand Chinese books a year.<ref>Kang, David C. “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia.” ''Security Studies'' 19, no. 4 (2010): 607.</ref> [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]] expressed desires to more severely limit, or even eliminate entirely, Chinese trade at the port, emphasizing the value instead of encouraging the people of Nagasaki to pursue agriculture or industry, but knew it was not possible, as demand for medicinal goods was just too powerful. In [[1790]], he imposed restrictions, limiting the Chinese to only ten ships a year. Profits continued, however, unabated, and indeed soared, with the ''Nagasaki kaisho'' earning an unprecedented 2,742 ''kan'' in bullion imports via the supplemental trade in [[1801]].<ref>Hellyer, 109.</ref>

Chinese trade at Nagasaki, at least within the "traditional" Edo period patterns, fell dramatically into decline in the late 1850s, in large part due to competition against Western traders and turmoil at home (especially related to the [[Taiping Rebellion]]). A set of three ships which sold goods at Nagasaki in [[1859]] but were then unable to return to China for a time were likely the last ones to deal directly with the shogunate's clearinghouse. After a few months of sitting in harbor, they resold at a loss the cargoes they had acquired in their initial exchanges. A group of Chinese merchants resident in the city formed a guild in [[1861]] in the hopes of working their way to dominance in the China-Japan trade in the port, but before long, most Chinese merchants simply took up working for, or working with, Western firms.<ref>Hellyer, 184.</ref>

Chinese trade at Nagasaki, at least within the "traditional" Edo period patterns, fell dramatically into decline in the late 1850s, in large part due to competition against Western traders and turmoil at home (especially related to the [[Taiping Rebellion]]). A set of three ships which sold goods at Nagasaki in [[1859]] but were then unable to return to China for a time were likely the last ones to deal directly with the shogunate's clearinghouse. After a few months of sitting in harbor, they resold at a loss the cargoes they had acquired in their initial exchanges. A group of Chinese merchants resident in the city formed a guild in [[1861]] in the hopes of working their way to dominance in the China-Japan trade in the port, but before long, most Chinese merchants simply took up working for, or working with, Western firms.<ref>Hellyer, 184.</ref>