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==Seventeenth Century==
 
==Seventeenth Century==
 
In the 17th century, the Tokugawa shogunate tested out a variety of policies in efforts to stem the tide of silver exports. The [[1655]] abolition of the ''[[itowappu]]'' silk monopoly, established in [[1604]], was one such effort, but it backfired; the free competition that emerged after the dissolution of the monopoly caused silk prices to rise, which only served to increase the amount of silver leaving the country for the same amount of imported silk.
 
In the 17th century, the Tokugawa shogunate tested out a variety of policies in efforts to stem the tide of silver exports. The [[1655]] abolition of the ''[[itowappu]]'' silk monopoly, established in [[1604]], was one such effort, but it backfired; the free competition that emerged after the dissolution of the monopoly caused silk prices to rise, which only served to increase the amount of silver leaving the country for the same amount of imported silk.
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The export of pure silver ingots from Nagasaki was banned in [[1609]], and in [[1616]] a Nagasaki ''ginza'' was established to oversee controls over the export of silver. A series of regulations gradually limited and eventually banned the export of specific items made from silver, and in [[1668]], the shogunate banned the export of silver entirely.<ref name=jansen28>Jansen, 28.</ref>
    
In [[1671]], a system was put into place in which Japanese officials set the prices for imports. This worked to some extent, and was manageable largely because [[Qing Dynasty]] bans on maritime activity along the South China coast reduced the number of ships calling at Nagasaki. Once those bans were lifted in [[1684]], the number of ships more than tripled, leading the shogunate to impose a series of quotas the following year. Chinese merchants were not to engage in more than 6000 ''kan'' (a unit of silver) worth of trade, and Dutch merchants not more than 3000. After those numbers were reached for the year, additional ships were turned away. Satsuma and Tsushima han were requested to implement similar restrictions in their trade with Ryûkyû and Korea, respectively. Despite these restrictions, however, a certain rather significant amount of silver was required to be provided to Ryûkyû and Korea, to pay in [[tribute]], in turn, to China. Ryûkyû often borrowed considerably from Satsuma to afford this, and both Satsuma and Tsushima often borrowed in turn from the merchant class.
 
In [[1671]], a system was put into place in which Japanese officials set the prices for imports. This worked to some extent, and was manageable largely because [[Qing Dynasty]] bans on maritime activity along the South China coast reduced the number of ships calling at Nagasaki. Once those bans were lifted in [[1684]], the number of ships more than tripled, leading the shogunate to impose a series of quotas the following year. Chinese merchants were not to engage in more than 6000 ''kan'' (a unit of silver) worth of trade, and Dutch merchants not more than 3000. After those numbers were reached for the year, additional ships were turned away. Satsuma and Tsushima han were requested to implement similar restrictions in their trade with Ryûkyû and Korea, respectively. Despite these restrictions, however, a certain rather significant amount of silver was required to be provided to Ryûkyû and Korea, to pay in [[tribute]], in turn, to China. Ryûkyû often borrowed considerably from Satsuma to afford this, and both Satsuma and Tsushima often borrowed in turn from the merchant class.
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The dearth of silver in the country led to numerous remintings and depreciations of the [[currency]], with the Yotsuhô currency issued in [[1711]] the most depreciated in the period, at only 20% pure silver.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref> One of the first major instances of this took place in [[1695]], when the government moved from 80% silver Keichô coins to 64% silver [[Genroku]] coins. Gold coins were reduced to 57% gold at that same time.<ref>Hellyer, 59.</ref> These debasements brought much-needed savings, or profits, for the shogunate's finances, typically worth millions of ''ryô''. They created problems at times, however, for foreign trade, as the 80% silver Keichô ingots used throughout the 17th century were highly trusted and widely able to be circulated throughout the region, second only to the 90% silver [[Mexican silver dollar]], the standard means of exchange for both East Asian and European traders at the time. Following the Genroku debasement, Korean merchants trading with agents from [[Tsushima han]] feared that the newly debased Japanese ingots might not be easily accepted by Chinese merchants, and so were hesitant to accept them; prices rose, and Tsushima's revenues for the year were severely negatively impacted.<ref>Hellyer, 60.</ref> They were permitted soon afterwards to return to using 80% ingots, specially minted just for trade with Korea; [[Satsuma han]] complained about the impact upon its trade with [[Ryukyu Kingdom|Ryûkyû]] as well, but received only lesser concessions. Regardless, only four years later, in [[1715]], [[Arai Hakuseki]] engineered a return to 80% ingots more broadly.<ref>Hellyer, 65.</ref>
 
The dearth of silver in the country led to numerous remintings and depreciations of the [[currency]], with the Yotsuhô currency issued in [[1711]] the most depreciated in the period, at only 20% pure silver.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref> One of the first major instances of this took place in [[1695]], when the government moved from 80% silver Keichô coins to 64% silver [[Genroku]] coins. Gold coins were reduced to 57% gold at that same time.<ref>Hellyer, 59.</ref> These debasements brought much-needed savings, or profits, for the shogunate's finances, typically worth millions of ''ryô''. They created problems at times, however, for foreign trade, as the 80% silver Keichô ingots used throughout the 17th century were highly trusted and widely able to be circulated throughout the region, second only to the 90% silver [[Mexican silver dollar]], the standard means of exchange for both East Asian and European traders at the time. Following the Genroku debasement, Korean merchants trading with agents from [[Tsushima han]] feared that the newly debased Japanese ingots might not be easily accepted by Chinese merchants, and so were hesitant to accept them; prices rose, and Tsushima's revenues for the year were severely negatively impacted.<ref>Hellyer, 60.</ref> They were permitted soon afterwards to return to using 80% ingots, specially minted just for trade with Korea; [[Satsuma han]] complained about the impact upon its trade with [[Ryukyu Kingdom|Ryûkyû]] as well, but received only lesser concessions. Regardless, only four years later, in [[1715]], [[Arai Hakuseki]] engineered a return to 80% ingots more broadly.<ref>Hellyer, 65.</ref>
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In [[1736]], the shogunate debased the coinage again, producing 46% silver ingots known as Genbun coins or Genbun ingots. As domestic production of [[ginseng]] and [[silk]] had grown considerably by this point, the shogunate decided it no longer needed to provide silver to Tsushima to support its trade in these goods, and so put an end to the domain's supply of 80% silver ingots. From that time forward, the domain gradually ceased exporting silver, switching to copper and other means of payment. Though later reporting that they had not exported any silver since 1736, [[uchi and omote|in truth]] they likely continued to export diminishing amounts up into the 1750s or 1760s.<ref>Hellyer, 77.</ref>
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In [[1736]], the shogunate debased the coinage again, producing 46% silver ingots known as Genbun coins or Genbun ingots. As domestic production of [[ginseng]] and [[silk]] had grown considerably by this point, the shogunate decided it no longer needed to provide silver to Tsushima to support its trade in these goods, and so put an end to the domain's supply of 80% silver ingots. From that time forward, the domain gradually ceased exporting silver, switching to [[copper]] and other means of payment. Though later reporting that they had not exported any silver since 1736, [[uchi and omote|in truth]] they likely continued to export diminishing amounts up into the 1750s or 1760s.<ref>Hellyer, 77.</ref>
    
Silver exports via Nagasaki came to an end around [[1763]], though no specific ban was put into place. Domestic production of ginseng, sugar, and silk had grown to such an extent by this point that the Japanese could now afford to actually export those goods, along with a variety of marine products, and begin ''importing'' gold and silver. The export of copper was significantly reduced at this time as well.<ref>Hellyer, 78.</ref> Over the course of the period from 1763 to 1803, the shogunate implemented six new exemptions to the Chinese trading quotas aimed at increasing the amount of silver Chinese merchants brought into the country, along with 29 such exemptions aimed at doing the same for gold. Beginning in [[1769]], the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'' (customs house) also began obtaining silver from the Dutch. The supplemental trade conducted through these and other exemptions amounted to as much as 31% of the total trade in the second half of the 18th century.<ref>Hellyer, 84.</ref>
 
Silver exports via Nagasaki came to an end around [[1763]], though no specific ban was put into place. Domestic production of ginseng, sugar, and silk had grown to such an extent by this point that the Japanese could now afford to actually export those goods, along with a variety of marine products, and begin ''importing'' gold and silver. The export of copper was significantly reduced at this time as well.<ref>Hellyer, 78.</ref> Over the course of the period from 1763 to 1803, the shogunate implemented six new exemptions to the Chinese trading quotas aimed at increasing the amount of silver Chinese merchants brought into the country, along with 29 such exemptions aimed at doing the same for gold. Beginning in [[1769]], the ''[[Nagasaki kaisho]]'' (customs house) also began obtaining silver from the Dutch. The supplemental trade conducted through these and other exemptions amounted to as much as 31% of the total trade in the second half of the 18th century.<ref>Hellyer, 84.</ref>
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