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In 1609, the Shimazu requested permission from the shogunate to invade the Ryûkyû Kingdom which lay to its south. After a brief invasion which met little resistance, Satsuma seized a number of the northern [[Ryukyu Islands|Ryûkyû Islands]],<ref>including [[Amami Oshima|Amami Ôshima]], [[Tokunoshima]], [[Okinoerabujima]], [[Yoronjima]], and [[Kikaigashima]].</ref> annexing them to the ''han'', and claimed the Ryûkyû Kingdom as a vassal state. For the remainder of the Edo period, Satsuma exacted tribute from Ryûkyû, influenced its politics, and dominated its trading policies. As strict [[kaikin|maritime prohibitions]] were imposed upon much of Japan beginning in the 1630s, Satsuma's ability to enjoy a trade in Chinese goods, and information, via Ryûkyû, provided it a distinct and important, if not entirely unique, role in the overall economy and politics of the Tokugawa state. The degree of economic benefits enjoyed by Satsuma, and the degree of their oppression of Ryûkyû, are subjects debated by scholars, but the political prestige and influence gained through this relationship is not questioned. The Shimazu continually made efforts to emphasize their unique position as the only feudal domain to claim an entire foreign kingdom as its vassal, and engineered repeated increases to their own official [[Court rank]], in the name of maintaining their power and prestige in the eyes of Ryûkyû. Satsuma also maintained contacts with Chinese merchants, in violation of the shogunate's policies, allowing Chinese merchants to visit their shores and engage in trade; the domain hired Chinese language interpreters to speak with these merchants, who arrived sporadically, in order to attempt to glean information from them regarding events in China, and allowed a Chinese community to remain active at the port town of [[Bonotsu|Bônotsu]] up until the early 18th century.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 46-47.</ref>
 
In 1609, the Shimazu requested permission from the shogunate to invade the Ryûkyû Kingdom which lay to its south. After a brief invasion which met little resistance, Satsuma seized a number of the northern [[Ryukyu Islands|Ryûkyû Islands]],<ref>including [[Amami Oshima|Amami Ôshima]], [[Tokunoshima]], [[Okinoerabujima]], [[Yoronjima]], and [[Kikaigashima]].</ref> annexing them to the ''han'', and claimed the Ryûkyû Kingdom as a vassal state. For the remainder of the Edo period, Satsuma exacted tribute from Ryûkyû, influenced its politics, and dominated its trading policies. As strict [[kaikin|maritime prohibitions]] were imposed upon much of Japan beginning in the 1630s, Satsuma's ability to enjoy a trade in Chinese goods, and information, via Ryûkyû, provided it a distinct and important, if not entirely unique, role in the overall economy and politics of the Tokugawa state. The degree of economic benefits enjoyed by Satsuma, and the degree of their oppression of Ryûkyû, are subjects debated by scholars, but the political prestige and influence gained through this relationship is not questioned. The Shimazu continually made efforts to emphasize their unique position as the only feudal domain to claim an entire foreign kingdom as its vassal, and engineered repeated increases to their own official [[Court rank]], in the name of maintaining their power and prestige in the eyes of Ryûkyû. Satsuma also maintained contacts with Chinese merchants, in violation of the shogunate's policies, allowing Chinese merchants to visit their shores and engage in trade; the domain hired Chinese language interpreters to speak with these merchants, who arrived sporadically, in order to attempt to glean information from them regarding events in China, and allowed a Chinese community to remain active at the port town of [[Bonotsu|Bônotsu]] up until the early 18th century.<ref>Robert Hellyer, ''Defining Engagement'', Harvard University Press (2009), 46-47.</ref>
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Satsuma remained the second wealthiest domain (in terms of official ''kokudaka'' rating) and among the most powerful throughout the Edo period. This derived not only from their connection to Ryûkyû, but also from the size and productive wealth of Satsuma province itself, and from their extreme distance from [[Edo]], and thus from the [[Shogun]]'s armies. The Shimazu exercised their influence to exact from the shogunate a number of special exceptions. Satsuma was granted an exception to the shogunate's limit of one castle per domain, a policy which was meant to restrict the military strength of the domains. Satsuma had the highest proportion of samurai in its population of any domain, roughly 25%,<ref>Norman, E.H. ''Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription''. New York: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1945. p44.</ref> as compared to 6% in most parts of the archipelago.<ref>Hellyer, 25.</ref> Contrary to the policy of removing the samurai from the countryside and consolidating them in the domainal capital, as was standard in most domains, the Shimazu were able to form sub-fiefs within their domain, and to dole out castles to their retainers, administering the domain in a manner not entirely unlike a microcosm of the Tokugawa state(s) itself. Most of these rural samurai lived in separate samurai villages, watching over neighboring peasant villages and effecting tax collection; this was in contrast to the system in place in most domains, in which village heads were responsible, within a hierarchy of peasant and samurai officials, for the collection of taxes.<ref>Hellyer, 28.</ref> The Shimazu also received special exceptions from the shogunate in regard to the policy of ''[[sankin kotai|sankin kôtai]]'', another policy meant to restrict the wealth and power of the ''daimyô''. Under this policy, every feudal lord was mandated to travel to Edo at least once a year, and to spend some portion of the year there, away from his domain and his power base. The Shimazu were granted permission to make this journey only once every two years. These exceptions thus allowed Satsuma to gain even more power and wealth relative to the majority of other domains. Even so, ''sankin kôtai'' was expensive, and like most domains, by the 19th century, Satsuma found itself in heavy debt, having borrowed time and again from [[Osaka]] merchants to finance their trips to Edo. In fact, despite its high rank and ''kokudaka'', in terms of debts, Satsuma was the poorest domain in the realm in [[1827]], with roughly 320,000 ''[[currency|kan]]'' (a measure of [[silver]]) in debt. A number of agricultural policies put in place in the 1820s-1830s by domain official [[Zusho Shozaemon|Zusho Shôzaemon]] helped alleviate the domain's financial difficulties, but only somewhat.<ref>Hellyer, 126.</ref>
      
Though arguably opposed to the shogunate, Satsuma was perhaps one of the strictest domains in enforcing particular policies. Christian missionaries were seen as a serious threat to the power of the daimyô, and the peace and order of the domain; the shogunal ban on Christianity was enforced more strictly and brutally in Satsuma, perhaps, than anywhere else in the archipelago. The ban on smuggling, perhaps unsurprisingly, was not so strictly enforced, as the domain gained significantly from trade performed along its shores, some ways away from [[Nagasaki]], where the shogunate monopolized commerce.
 
Though arguably opposed to the shogunate, Satsuma was perhaps one of the strictest domains in enforcing particular policies. Christian missionaries were seen as a serious threat to the power of the daimyô, and the peace and order of the domain; the shogunal ban on Christianity was enforced more strictly and brutally in Satsuma, perhaps, than anywhere else in the archipelago. The ban on smuggling, perhaps unsurprisingly, was not so strictly enforced, as the domain gained significantly from trade performed along its shores, some ways away from [[Nagasaki]], where the shogunate monopolized commerce.
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These policies were considerably relaxed, however, for a brief period under ''daimyô'' [[Shimazu Shigehide]] (r. [[1755]]-[[1787]]). It is said that Shigehide desired to bring more commerce and trade into the domain, and believed that greater merchant activity was essential for a prosperous castle town; Satsuma residents were even allowed during this period to make the pilgrimage to [[Ise]]. It was during this time, as well, that [[Furukawa Koshoken|Furukawa Koshôken]] and [[Tachibana Nankei]], among other prominent scholar-travelers, were able to enter the domain and travel within it, Koshôken explicitly noting that it was then easier to enter Satsuma than it had been previously. Various precautions and procedures more strict than in most other domains were still in place, however, as he relates that the guards at the border searched all his possessions, and required him to prove he had enough coin to prevent himself from becoming any kind of burden for the domain.<ref name=barriers/>
 
These policies were considerably relaxed, however, for a brief period under ''daimyô'' [[Shimazu Shigehide]] (r. [[1755]]-[[1787]]). It is said that Shigehide desired to bring more commerce and trade into the domain, and believed that greater merchant activity was essential for a prosperous castle town; Satsuma residents were even allowed during this period to make the pilgrimage to [[Ise]]. It was during this time, as well, that [[Furukawa Koshoken|Furukawa Koshôken]] and [[Tachibana Nankei]], among other prominent scholar-travelers, were able to enter the domain and travel within it, Koshôken explicitly noting that it was then easier to enter Satsuma than it had been previously. Various precautions and procedures more strict than in most other domains were still in place, however, as he relates that the guards at the border searched all his possessions, and required him to prove he had enough coin to prevent himself from becoming any kind of burden for the domain.<ref name=barriers/>
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Satsuma remained the second wealthiest domain (in terms of official ''kokudaka'' rating) and among the most powerful throughout the Edo period. This derived not only from their connection to Ryûkyû, but also from the size and productive wealth of Satsuma province itself, and from their extreme distance from [[Edo]], and thus from the [[Shogun]]'s armies. The Shimazu exercised their influence to exact from the shogunate a number of special exceptions. Satsuma was granted an exception to the shogunate's limit of one castle per domain, a policy which was meant to restrict the military strength of the domains. Satsuma had the highest proportion of samurai in its population of any domain, roughly 25%,<ref>Norman, E.H. ''Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription''. New York: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1945. p44.</ref> as compared to 6% in most parts of the archipelago.<ref>Hellyer, 25.</ref> Contrary to the policy of removing the samurai from the countryside and consolidating them in the domainal capital, as was standard in most domains, the Shimazu were able to form sub-fiefs within their domain, and to dole out castles to their retainers, administering the domain in a manner not entirely unlike a microcosm of the Tokugawa state(s) itself. Most of these rural samurai lived in separate samurai villages, watching over neighboring peasant villages and effecting tax collection; this was in contrast to the system in place in most domains, in which village heads were responsible, within a hierarchy of peasant and samurai officials, for the collection of taxes.<ref>Hellyer, 28.</ref> The Shimazu also received special exceptions from the shogunate in regard to the policy of ''[[sankin kotai|sankin kôtai]]'', another policy meant to restrict the wealth and power of the ''daimyô''. Under this policy, every feudal lord was mandated to travel to Edo at least once a year, and to spend some portion of the year there, away from his domain and his power base. The Shimazu were granted permission to make this journey only once every two years. These exceptions thus allowed Satsuma to gain even more power and wealth relative to the majority of other domains. Even so, ''sankin kôtai'' was expensive, and like most domains, by the 19th century, Satsuma found itself in heavy debt, having borrowed time and again from [[Osaka]] merchants to finance their trips to Edo. In fact, despite its high rank and ''kokudaka'', in terms of debts, Satsuma was the poorest domain in the realm in [[1827]], with roughly 320,000 ''[[currency|kan]]'' (a measure of [[silver]]) in debt. A number of agricultural policies put in place in the 1820s-1830s by domain official [[Zusho Shozaemon|Zusho Shôzaemon]] helped alleviate the domain's financial difficulties, but only somewhat.<ref>Hellyer, 126.</ref>
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Zusho also oversaw the creation of a system of smugglers, sanctioned and sometimes even supported financially by the domain. The most prominent of these, the [[Hamazaki family]], boasted agents in all the major port and market cities, and was involved in everything from Ryukyuan [[sugar]] to marine products from [[Ezo]], cutting into the trade volume or market share of the [[kitamaebune|Western]] and [[Eastern Sea Circuit]] trade routes. Satsuma had been condoning Chinese smuggling within its territory to varying extents throughout the period as well, receiving Chinese ships in violation of Tokugawa policy, instead of sending them on to Nagasaki. When the volume of trade at Nagasaki began to seriously decline in the 1830s, shogunate officials pointed the finger at Satsuma's smuggling; in fact, there were a variety of other causes for the decline in trade, including wars being fought by the Dutch Republic which severely weakened the [[Dutch East India Company]], and the growth of domestic products, including sugar from the [[Amami Islands]], which competed with imported goods. Nevertheless, in [[1837]], [[Mizuno Tadakuni]] declared a ban on the sale of Ryûkyû goods at Nagasaki for a ten-year period, from [[1839]]-[[1848]], and further that in the intervening time before the ban came into effect, the shogunate-run [[Nagasaki kaisho|Nagasaki customs house]] would take over the warehousing, sale, and transportation of Satsuma's goods. Satsuma complained almost immediately, citing once again the financial difficulties of the Ryûkyû Kingdom, but in the end, the ban was upheld, with the shogunate issuing a grant of 5,000 ''ryô'' annually for three years, directed specifically at benefiting the kingdom.<ref>Hellyer, 134-138.</ref>
    
==Relations with Ryûkyû==
 
==Relations with Ryûkyû==
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Satsuma boasted it was the only domain to claim a foreign kingdom as a vassal, and encouraged regular [[Ryukyuan embassies to Edo]] as a display of that fact, leveraging this at times to demand greater [[court rank]] and other privileges and concessions. After the shogunate rejected Satsuma's requests in [[1704]] and [[1709]] to send Ryukyuan missions, the dismissal (''muyô'', "no need") coming perhaps chiefly from financial concerns, Satsuma emphasized the importance of these missions for Ryûkyû in demonstrating its loyalty and fealty to the shogunate, and the powerful implications for the shogunate's own prestige and impressions of legitimacy. The shogunate, spurred by [[Arai Hakuseki]], who was of a particular mind for the political importance of ritual display, relented, and allowed a mission to come in [[1710]]. [[Shimazu Yoshitaka]] also pressed the shogunate at that time for an elevation in court rank, suggesting that a higher court rank was essential for demanding the respect of the Ryûkyû Kingdom, but likely truly thinking about his rank relative to other ''daimyô'', such as the [[Maeda clan]], lords of [[Kaga han]]. He got what he wanted, and from that year forward, the lord of Satsuma was elevated in court rank every time he escorted a Ryukyuan embassy to Edo.
 
Satsuma boasted it was the only domain to claim a foreign kingdom as a vassal, and encouraged regular [[Ryukyuan embassies to Edo]] as a display of that fact, leveraging this at times to demand greater [[court rank]] and other privileges and concessions. After the shogunate rejected Satsuma's requests in [[1704]] and [[1709]] to send Ryukyuan missions, the dismissal (''muyô'', "no need") coming perhaps chiefly from financial concerns, Satsuma emphasized the importance of these missions for Ryûkyû in demonstrating its loyalty and fealty to the shogunate, and the powerful implications for the shogunate's own prestige and impressions of legitimacy. The shogunate, spurred by [[Arai Hakuseki]], who was of a particular mind for the political importance of ritual display, relented, and allowed a mission to come in [[1710]]. [[Shimazu Yoshitaka]] also pressed the shogunate at that time for an elevation in court rank, suggesting that a higher court rank was essential for demanding the respect of the Ryûkyû Kingdom, but likely truly thinking about his rank relative to other ''daimyô'', such as the [[Maeda clan]], lords of [[Kaga han]]. He got what he wanted, and from that year forward, the lord of Satsuma was elevated in court rank every time he escorted a Ryukyuan embassy to Edo.
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After Tsushima argued that its diplomatic and trade interactions with Korea constituted an important service to the shogunate in terms of intelligence and national defense, in [[1748]] both Tsushima and Satsuma were exempted from military or corvée obligations related to the defense of the port of [[Nagasaki]], an obligation otherwise shared by all other Kyushu ''daimyô''.<ref>Hellyer, 68.</ref>
    
The economic benefits for Satsuma of the arrangement came chiefly in the ability to import Chinese silks, medicinal products, and other luxury goods, obtained by Ryukyuan envoys in China (or as gifts from [[Chinese investiture envoys]] who came to Ryûkyû), and to sell those goods at market in Japan. Right around the same time that Satsuma was experiencing difficulties with the shogunate permitting them to send Ryukyuan embassy missions to Edo, the shogunate's monetary policies were creating other very severe problems for the domain. In [[1711]], the shogunate debased the currency to an all-time low, producing silver ingots that were only 20% [[silver]]. Satsuma complained that as 80% ingots had been the standard, sending Ryukyuan envoys to China with 20% ingots would not only make it much more expensive (in number of ingots) to purchase goods, but would also risk Ryûkyû losing face with China, and Satsuma losing face with Ryûkyû. [[Tsushima han]], which had an exclusive privilege to engaging in trade with [[Joseon|Korea]], and which was by far the chief source in Japan of the highly-demanded product [[ginseng]], similarly complained, and was granted permission to use 80% ingots; Satsuma was not so successful, being granted permission to use 64% ingots. The shogunate returned to producing 80% silver ingots only a few years later, in [[1715]], but seeking to find a way of stemming the flow of silver out of the country, restricted further the amount of silver Satsuma could send out of the country. Whereas they had previously been permitted to provide 800 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' of silver to Ryûkyû for [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]] and 400 ''kan'' for gifts given to [[Chinese investiture envoys]] visiting Ryûkyû, these amounts were now limited to 600 and 300 ''kan'' respectively.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref>
 
The economic benefits for Satsuma of the arrangement came chiefly in the ability to import Chinese silks, medicinal products, and other luxury goods, obtained by Ryukyuan envoys in China (or as gifts from [[Chinese investiture envoys]] who came to Ryûkyû), and to sell those goods at market in Japan. Right around the same time that Satsuma was experiencing difficulties with the shogunate permitting them to send Ryukyuan embassy missions to Edo, the shogunate's monetary policies were creating other very severe problems for the domain. In [[1711]], the shogunate debased the currency to an all-time low, producing silver ingots that were only 20% [[silver]]. Satsuma complained that as 80% ingots had been the standard, sending Ryukyuan envoys to China with 20% ingots would not only make it much more expensive (in number of ingots) to purchase goods, but would also risk Ryûkyû losing face with China, and Satsuma losing face with Ryûkyû. [[Tsushima han]], which had an exclusive privilege to engaging in trade with [[Joseon|Korea]], and which was by far the chief source in Japan of the highly-demanded product [[ginseng]], similarly complained, and was granted permission to use 80% ingots; Satsuma was not so successful, being granted permission to use 64% ingots. The shogunate returned to producing 80% silver ingots only a few years later, in [[1715]], but seeking to find a way of stemming the flow of silver out of the country, restricted further the amount of silver Satsuma could send out of the country. Whereas they had previously been permitted to provide 800 ''[[Japanese Measurements|kan]]'' of silver to Ryûkyû for [[Ryukyuan tribute missions to China]] and 400 ''kan'' for gifts given to [[Chinese investiture envoys]] visiting Ryûkyû, these amounts were now limited to 600 and 300 ''kan'' respectively.<ref>Hellyer, 67.</ref>
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After Tsushima argued that its diplomatic and trade interactions with Korea constituted an important service to the shogunate in terms of intelligence and national defense, in [[1748]] both Tsushima and Satsuma were exempted from military or corvée obligations related to the defense of the port of [[Nagasaki]], an obligation otherwise shared by all other Kyushu ''daimyô''.<ref>Hellyer, 68.</ref>  
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Satsuma experienced further economic/commercial difficulties beginning in the late 1780s to early 1790s, when [[Matsudaira Sadanobu]], as part of broader efforts to limit Japan's foreign trade activities, restricted Satsuma to selling only silk and silk [[damask]] - two particularly less profitable products - at [[Kyoto]], obliging them to consume all other Chinese and Ryukyuan goods they imported within the domain. This struck a severe blow, nearly defeating entirely the economic purpose of Satsuma's links with Ryûkyû. Satsuma petitions to the shogunate in [[1801]] to reverse the imposition, or to expand the variety of permitted goods, were rejected. However, over the course of the 1810s-1820s, a series of famines and other problems in Ryûkyû offered Satsuma the opportunity to press its claims, asserting that the Nagasaki trade was essential to Ryûkyû's financial well-being. In [[1825]], the shogunate finally relented, not only allowing Satsuma to sell a variety of different goods on the market, but also making official limits on the total volume of sale significantly more lenient, increasing the amount from 900 ''kan'', stipulated in [[1716]], to 1,720 ''kan''.<ref>Hellyer, 132.</ref>
    
==Bakumatsu==
 
==Bakumatsu==
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