Changes

==Nobunaga the Ruler==

==Nobunaga the Ruler==

In early 1574, Nobunaga was promoted to the junior third rank (ju sanmi) and made a court advisor (sangi); court appointments would continue to be lavished on a near-yearly basis, perhaps in the hopes of placating him. By February [[1578]] the court had made him Daijo daijin, or Grand Minister of State - the highest post that could be given. Yet if the court had hoped that exalted titles would woo Nobunaga, they were to be mistaken. In May of 1574 Nobunaga resigned his titles, pleading unfinished work in the provinces, and stepped up a campaign to force [[Emperor Ogimachi]] into retirement. That Nobunaga did not succeed in having Ogimachi removed goes some way towards demonstrating that there was a limit to his power - although what exactly acted as a check on his ambitions is a matter of scholarly debate. Suffice it to say that Nobunaga was in every other way tantamount to a shogun in the lands he controlled. That he did not actually take the title of shogun is generally explained by his not being of Minamoto blood, which is misleading and possibly quite off the mark. A worthwhile discussion of this issue would likely require a careful examination of the rank of Shogun taken in its greater historical context - beyond the scope of this writing. Let it be said that in all probability Nobunaga could well have taken the title, at least after [[1582]], but died without saying much on the business himself.  

Prior to Ashikaga Yoshiaki’s fall in 1573, Nobunaga had not accepted any court titles.  Now he accepted the prestigious rank of ''Kugyo''.  As a ''kugyo'', Nobunaga was officially part of the ruling hierarchy and could act in state affairs.  Court appointments would continue to be lavished on a near-yearly basis.  He was named ''Gondainagon'' and ''Ukon’etaishou'' in 1574 and two years later was elevated to ''Udaijin''.  He showed his regard for the Court by assuring the property of the ''kuge'' (nobles) and ordered that all land in Kyoto that had belonged to the ''kuge'' in the previous one hundred years be restored to them.  Normally, statutes of limitations were considered to come into effect after a period of 20 years. On the same token, he assumed the right to settle disputes involving members of the nobility, a right he excersied by placing under temporary arrest the nobleman who had opposed his selection of the head abbot of the Kofuku-ji. During this time he handed over the official leadership of the Oda to his son Nobutada and clearly intended to carve out a political structure for his hegemony of the country. In 1577 he resigned from his ranks of ''Udaijin'' and ''Ukon’etaishou'', pleading unfinished work in the provinces.  Actually, since the policy of the court was to honor an individual based on the highest post he had achieved, Nobunaga lost no influence by so doing.  According to some historians, such as Fujiki Hisashi, Nobunaga maneuvered to try to force [[Emperor Ogimachi]] into retirement. Osamu Wakita has refuted this theory.  Nobunaga adopted a son of Ogimachi’s in 1579 and in the construction of Azuchi Castle had a room set aside to receive future visits from the future emperor. As Nobunaga would be the father-in-law to the emperor, he would enjoy a status along the lines of a Retired Emperor. Far from disdaining the court, Nobunaga had worked to link it directly to his vision of a united country under his rule.

Nobunaga's entry into Kyoto presented him with a situation very different from that which he had come. While Kyôto had come a long way since the dark days of the Onin War, it was still in relative disrepair, with it's population subject to myriad tollbooths along the roadways and hills infested with bandits. Nobunaga's responsibilities increased exponentially, both militarily and politically after [[1568]]. His first order of business, and that arguably most important to him, was to establish an economic power base and maximize the potential wealth of the Kinai. Among his many measures were included the abolition of tollbooths (perhaps partially as a PR move on his part, as the action was quite popular with the common people) and a series of cadastral surveys in Yamato, [[Yamashiro province|Yamashiro]], Omi, and Ise. Nobunaga moved to control the minting and exchange of coins, and brought the merchant city of Sakai under his influence, which in time proved to be worth it's weight in gold. He used his gathering wealth to compensate for the generally poor quality of his common soldiery by buying as many rifles as he could get his hands on-and building his own when the arms factory at Kunimoto (Omi) fell into his hands after [[1573]].  

Nobunaga accepted no other titles before his death, including that of shogun. Traditionally, the rank of shogun was withheld for men of Minamoto stock and Nobunaga had openly associated himself with the Taira.  This is not to say that the court would not have made this appointment; in fact, such was suggested in 1582.  As it was, before Nobunaga, shoguns had been the only warriors to attain the title of ''Kugyo''. Nobunaga died before he could give an answer to the court's offer to elevate him to whatever lofty title he wanted. Yet it seems that Nobunaga was willing to honor the existing political framework of the country, at least ''vis-à-vis'' the court. What his ultimate plans were as for how he would excersise his rule over the entire country are a matter for mere speculation.

Westerners fascinated Nobunaga and he showed a high degree of tolerance for their activities, to the extent that he is sometimes referred to mistakenly as a Christian. The chances that Nobunaga planned to convert are probably nonexistent - rather, the Jesuits fulfilled two uses for Nobunaga: 1) they provided him with some of the novelties and artifacts he habitually collected and probably added to his sense of power (the Jesuits tended to see Nobunaga as the real ruler of Japan - a distinction he could not have but enjoyed) and, 2), they acted as a foil to his Buddhist enemies, if only to increase their frustration. Much has always been made in western works of Nobunaga's relationship with the Jesuits - it is possible, however, that he saw them as merely useful and somewhat amusing diversions. Far more important to Nobunaga were his own retainers, and yet he does not come across as a particularly trustworthy leader. Few if any samurai entered his inner circle of top retainers after 1568. Even those top men he did employ were moved about from place to place, and often treated with at least some modicum of coldness. In [[1580]], after the fall of the Ishiyama Honganji, Nobunaga summarily dismissed and allowed to die in exile one of his oldest retainers – [[Sakuma Nobumori]], for alleged incompetence of command. He is recorded as teasing Hideyoshi with the nickname 'Saru', or Monkey, and deriding Akechi Mitsuhide for his poetic ability (actually considered rather good) and his hairline. There are other, more outrageous recordings, but, as always in Sengoku tales, it is sometimes difficult to discern where truth ends and hyperbole begins. For all that, it is likely that Nobunaga would not have been nearly as successful as he was had he been afraid to delegate. [[Shibata Katsuie]], for instance, was dispatched to subdue the [[Hokuriku]] and with a few notable exceptions, Nobunaga left him to it for the better part of a decade. When Nobunaga decided to launch a campaign into the Chugoku region, he sent Hideyoshi and Akechi to lead the armies, never once commanding troops there himself.  

 

 

Westerners fascinated Nobunaga and he showed a high degree of tolerance for their activities, to the extent that he is sometimes referred to mistakenly as a Christian. The chances that Nobunaga had any intention of converting are probably nonexistent.  However, Nobunaga was indeed very hospitable towards his European callers.  They provided him with some of the novelties and artifacts he habitually collected and almost certainly added to his sense of power-the Jesuits tended to see Nobunaga as the real ruler of Japan, a distinction he could not have but enjoyed.  Additionally, they acted as a foil to his Buddhist enemies, if only to increase their frustration. Much has always been made in western works of Nobunaga's relationship with the Jesuits.  it is possible, however, that he saw them as merely useful and somewhat amusing diversions. Yet it seems unlikely that Nobunaga would have trivialized the connection they afforded him with the outside world, especially as an alternative to China.  Far more important to Nobunaga were his own retainers, and yet he does not come across as a particularly trustworthy leader. Few if any samurai entered his inner circle of top retainers after 1568. Even those top men he did employ were moved about from place to place, and often treated with at least some modicum of coldness. In 1580, after the fall of the [[Ishiyama Honganji]], Nobunaga summarily dismissed and allowed the death in exile one of his oldest retainers, [[Sakuma Nobumori]], for alleged incompetence of command. He is recorded as teasing Hideyoshi with the nickname 'Saru', or Monkey, and deriding Akechi Mitsuhide for his poetic ability (actually considered rather good) and his hairline. There are other, more outrageous recordings, but, as always in Sengoku tales, it is sometimes difficult to discern where truth ends and hyperbole begins. For all that, it is likely that Nobunaga would not have been nearly as successful as he was had he been afraid to delegate. Shibata Katsuie, for instance, was dispatched to subdue the Hokuriku and with a few notable exceptions, Nobunaga left him to it for the better part of a decade. When Nobunaga decided to launch a campaign into the Chugoku region, he sent Hideyoshi and Akechi to lead the armies, never once commanding troops there himself.  

In [[1578]] [[Azuchi castle]] was completed in Omi province and stood as the most impressive castle ever built in Japan. Lavishly decorated and immensely expensive, Azuchi was meant not so much for defense but as a way of clearly illustrating his power to the nation. He went to great lengths to draw merchants and citizens to Azuchi's accompanying town, and probably saw it becoming the long-term capital of the Oda hegemony - in whatever form it took.  

In [[1578]] [[Azuchi castle]] was completed in Omi province and stood as the most impressive castle ever built in Japan. Lavishly decorated and immensely expensive, Azuchi was meant not so much for defense but as a way of clearly illustrating his power to the nation. He went to great lengths to draw merchants and citizens to Azuchi's accompanying town, and probably saw it becoming the long-term capital of the Oda hegemony - in whatever form it took.  

In May 1575 Katsuyori hatched a plot whereby one of Ieyasu's retainers would betray his lord and open the gates of Hamamatsu Castle to the approaching Takeda army. Katsuyori was halfway to Hamamatsu before he learned that the plot had been uncovered and Ieyasu alerted. Perhaps as a consolation prize, Katsuyori turned his attentions to [[Nagashino castle]], a fort held by a certain [[Okudaira Sadamasa]]. When direct attack failed to reduce the garrison, Katsuyori settled in for a siege and attempted to mine the walls. Nagashino may well have fallen had it not been for a brave member of the garrison, [[Torii Sune'emon]], who slipped through the Takeda lines and delivered a message to Ieyasu explaining the castle's predicament. Ieyasu sent Torii back to let Nagashino know that he had no intention of abandoning him, but he was captured and crucified by the Takeda in the attempt.

In May 1575 Katsuyori hatched a plot whereby one of Ieyasu's retainers would betray his lord and open the gates of Hamamatsu Castle to the approaching Takeda army. Katsuyori was halfway to Hamamatsu before he learned that the plot had been uncovered and Ieyasu alerted. Perhaps as a consolation prize, Katsuyori turned his attentions to [[Nagashino castle]], a fort held by a certain [[Okudaira Sadamasa]]. When direct attack failed to reduce the garrison, Katsuyori settled in for a siege and attempted to mine the walls. Nagashino may well have fallen had it not been for a brave member of the garrison, [[Torii Sune'emon]], who slipped through the Takeda lines and delivered a message to Ieyasu explaining the castle's predicament. Ieyasu sent Torii back to let Nagashino know that he had no intention of abandoning him, but he was captured and crucified by the Takeda in the attempt.

Tokugawa was determined to rescue Nagashino, but lacked the manpower to do so alone. Nobunaga, on the other hand, was hesitant, perhaps reluctant to take so many of his men and leaders so far from the Kyôto area. In frustration, Ieyasu once again played his trump card - he threatened to join the Takeda and attack Oda as part of their vanguard! Faced with this rather unpleasant prospect, Nobunaga changed his mind and agreed to throw his full weight into the effort. Moving quickly, he gathered an army of some 30,000 men, to be commanded by some of his best commanders, including [[Shibata Katsuie]], [[Hashiba Hideyoshi]], and [[Takigawa Kazumasu]]. Tokugawa brought about 8,000 men of his own, tough Mikawa men whose skill would once again more than make up for their relative lack in numbers. Perhaps most importantly, Nobunaga arranged to deal with the vaunted Takeda cavalry by bringing along a sizable contingent of riflemen (around 3,000) and logs to throw up a palisade for protection.  

Tokugawa was determined to rescue Nagashino, but lacked the manpower to do so alone. Nobunaga, on the other hand, was hesitant, perhaps reluctant to take so many of his men and leaders so far from the Kyôto area. In frustration, Ieyasu once again played his trump card - he threatened to join the Takeda and attack Oda as part of their vanguard! Faced with this rather unpleasant prospect, Nobunaga changed his mind and agreed to throw his full weight into the effort. Moving quickly, he gathered an army of some 30,000 men, to be commanded by some of his best commanders, including [[Shibata Katsuie]], [[Hashiba Hideyoshi]], and [[Takigawa Kazumasu]]. Tokugawa brought about 8,000 men of his own, tough Mikawa men whose skill would once again more than make up for their relative lack in numbers. Perhaps most importantly, Nobunaga arranged to deal with the vaunted Takeda cavalry by bringing along a sizable contingent of riflemen (around 3,000) and logs to throw up a palisade for protection. The popular version of the battle was set down by the General Staff of the Japanese Army in 1910 in its History of Warfare in Japan.  Their source for the battle of Nagashino was Oze Hoan’s ''Shincho-ki'', a later derivitive of the ''Shinchoko-ki'', which was, as Professor Paul Varley comments, romanticized and often fictional.  There are numerous problems with it, ignored by many authors to this present time.  Some of these will be touched on below.  Nonetheless, Oze’s version will be described.

 

 

In late June, the Oda and Tokugawa forces converged on Nagashino, putting Katsuyori in a difficult spot. Nagashino Castle, bolstered by Torii's brave sacrifice, was holding firm, leaving the weary Takeda army outnumbered and without a base from which to conduct operations from. The older - and wiser - Takeda retainers urged Katsuyori to either retreat or make one last push to take the castle. Unfortunately for them and the Takeda army, Katsuyori chose to do neither - he ordered preparations for an all-out attack on the Oda and Tokugawa army massed just to their west. The attack, in retrospect, was almost bound to fail - even had Nobunaga left most of his guns at home and dispensed with his palisade building. The Takeda were tired from weeks in the field in poor weather, outnumbered almost three to one, and faced with attacking over ground broken by foliage, dips, and a stream. It has been said that Katsuyori planned to attack in the hopes that rain would render Nobunaga's guns useless, but this apologetic excuse seems unlikely. In truth, Nagashino seems to have simply been a tremendous mistake on the part of an impetuous commander. These judgments aside, the battle progressed poorly for the Takeda from the first. On the night of 27 June, the day before the actual battle, Sakai Tadatsugu led a raid into the Takeda camp and killed one of Shingen's surviving brothers, Takeda Nobuzane. When day broke, any possible Takeda hopes for rain were dashed by the rays of a bright morning sun. Nonetheless, Katsuyori gave the order to attack, sending nearly 10,000 of his troops across the Shidarahara against 38,000 troops established on superior ground and entrenched with wooden palisades.  Matchlock fire, supposedly in volley fire, produced the first casualties and likely served to further disrupt formations already strained by the difficult terrain.  The popular view of the battle holds that the majority of the Takeda attackers were mounted but there is little evidence for this one way or the other.  The Shinchoko-ki, the basis for Oze’s popularized work, mentions that the Takeda had cavalry at the battle but does not indicate their number.  Finally, after hours of bitter struggle, Katsuyori was convinced to retreat by Baba Nobuharu, who covered his master's flight until he and his men were themselves killed. Katsuyori left as many as 10,000 of his men dead at Nagashino. The battle is often considered Nobunaga's greatest military achievement, a victory as tactically decisive as Okehazama and ultimately of great strategic significance. The victory at Nagashino all but secured his eastern flank and allowed him to throw his weight into the siege of the Honganji and consolidate his recent gains. Takeda Katsuyori was beaten but not vanquished, and would continue to harass Tokugawa.  Yet the Takeda were much weakened as a regional power.

Nobunaga returned to Kyoto and prepared for new battles and new enemies.

This is the common view of the battle.  However, the scholar Paul Varley, working from primary materials such as the ''Shinchoko-ki'', has recently challenged the widely-accepted facts of the battle.  He points out that the ''Shinchoko-ki'', the most reliable document we have relating to Nobunaga’s campaigns, states that there were 1,000 guns in the Oda-Tokugawa force, not the 3,000 later sources, drawing on Oze Hoan’s ''Shincho-ki'', recorded.  According to the ''Shinchoko-ki'', the Takeda attacked in a total of five waves and suffered heavily from musket fire.  However, there is no mention at all of volley-fire.  Professor Varley also draws attention to the estimates of the Japanese scholar Owada Tetsuo, who believes that the figures for men engaged were half that seen in the traditional version of the battle.  This would consequently lower the Takeda casualties to a less crushing figure of around 5,000.  The ability of the Takeda to sustain offensive activities in the following years while also holding Tokugawa Ieyasu at bay becomes more explicable if such is the case.

 

==1576-1580==

==1576-1580==

==References==

==References==

* Initial text from [http://www.samurai-archives.com Samurai-Archives.com] FWSeal & CEWest, 2005

* Initial text from [http://www.samurai-archives.com Samurai-Archives.com] FWSeal & CEWest, 2005

[[Category:Samurai]]

[[Category:Samurai]]

[[Category:Sengoku Period]]

[[Category:Sengoku Period]]