Difference between revisions of "Wako"
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The question of the extent to which regional ''[[daimyo|daimyô]]'', particularly in Kyushu, supported and enabled ''wakô'' activity is a contentious one, and one of the chief issues involved in the subject of ''wakô''. Arano asserts that the regional ''daimyô'' must have provided tacit consent, if not outright invitations, for these Chinese merchants to engage in such activities within their domains; the Chinese smugglers had similar relationships with local officials in China.<ref name=arano188/> | The question of the extent to which regional ''[[daimyo|daimyô]]'', particularly in Kyushu, supported and enabled ''wakô'' activity is a contentious one, and one of the chief issues involved in the subject of ''wakô''. Arano asserts that the regional ''daimyô'' must have provided tacit consent, if not outright invitations, for these Chinese merchants to engage in such activities within their domains; the Chinese smugglers had similar relationships with local officials in China.<ref name=arano188/> | ||
| − | The later years of the reign of the [[Jiajing Emperor]] | + | The later years of the reign of the Ming [[Jiajing Emperor]] (1521-1567) saw a peak in ''wakô'' activity, which subsided when, in 1567, the Ming Court lifted the bans on Chinese trade and interaction in Southeast Asia<ref name=arano189>Arano. p189.</ref>, thus allowing many so-called "''wakô''" to become legitimate traders and seafarers in the eyes of the Chinese authorities. Many smugglers still engaging in activities deemed illicit, such as trade with Japan, moved their bases at this time to Taiwan or the Philippines.<ref name=arano189/> |
| + | |||
| + | [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]] helped further weaken the ''wakô'' with a [[1588]] edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial ''daimyô'' to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the ''wakô''.<ref name=arano190>Arano. p190.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | The imposition of [[kaikin|maritime restrictions]] in the 1630s dealt a major blow to the ''wakô''. All but three ports<ref>Plus the more land-based "port" of access in [[Matsumae]] for interactions and trade with [[Ainu]].</ref> were closed to foreign trade, and Japanese were forbidden from leaving the country or returning. ''Wakô'' activity still continued among Japanese, and others, based overseas, who traded (or raided) in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, as well as among, presumably, some small number of smugglers who continued to engage in illegal operations along the Kyushu coast. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty in [[1644]], Ming loyalists continued to fight against the [[Manchus|Manchu]] conquest for forty years; these loyalists, and others associated with them, may have been at times referred to as ''wakô'' in Qing documents. | ||
| + | |||
| + | It was only with the turn of the 18th century that the ''wakô'' phenomenon really petered out and came to an end. The Tokugawa shogunate solidified its control over Japan - including, to the extent it ever would, over the Kyushu ''daimyô'' who allowed or encouraged ''wakô'' activities in earlier times. Meanwhile, greater European presence and activity in the region (though not in Japan itself) brought a degree of stability.<ref name=arano190/> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
*Arano Yasunori. "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order." ''International Journal of Asian Studies'' 2:2 (2005). pp185-216. | *Arano Yasunori. "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order." ''International Journal of Asian Studies'' 2:2 (2005). pp185-216. | ||
| − | </ | + | <references/> |
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:Muromachi Period]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Criminals, Bandits, and Pirates]] | ||
Revision as of 04:47, 18 May 2010
- Japanese: 倭寇 (wakou)
The wakô were raiders, pirates, or brigands active in East Asian waters in the Muromachi to early Edo periods. The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the wa (倭) denoting Japan, but many wakô were in fact Chinese.[1]
While there were certainly many Japanese who did engage in violent acts of piracy and raiding, one of the chief factors contributing to the growth of the phenomenon was the Chinese hai jin ban on overseas travel and trade. Formal trade with foreign countries (including Japan) was only allowed to occur within the framework of tributary relations, and only at certain designated ports. Strict restrictions were placed on Chinese contact or trade with foreigners. In theory, this was intended to prevent Chinese merchants or seamen from becoming involved with the wakô or other foreign forces, but in practice, such policies were ineffective in preventing contact and trade - a great many Chinese settled abroad and conducted trade and other interactions as "overseas Chinese" no longer subject to Ming law.[1] Furthermore, in the eyes of the Chinese Court, Japanese seamen who sought to trade with Chinese, or to make port in China, as well as many Chinese seeking to trade with Japanese, were considered in violation of the bans, and were labeled criminals, and wakô. In this way, the numbers of the wakô, and their perceived presence, grew dramatically.
As Chinese demand for, and Japanese supply of, silver rose in the 1530s-40s, a number of Chinese merchants established themselves at bases in Kyushu, selling expensive Chinese silks for Japanese silver, in violation of the Chinese bans. These merchants, including Wang Zhi (d. 1559), Chan Hai (d. 1556), Chen Dong (d. 1556), and Ye Ming (d. 1556), along with their mixed Chinese and Japanese crews, were considered 'wakô by the Chinese authorities as well, despite not being Japanese, and not being involved in any true piratical or raiding activities.[2]
The question of the extent to which regional daimyô, particularly in Kyushu, supported and enabled wakô activity is a contentious one, and one of the chief issues involved in the subject of wakô. Arano asserts that the regional daimyô must have provided tacit consent, if not outright invitations, for these Chinese merchants to engage in such activities within their domains; the Chinese smugglers had similar relationships with local officials in China.[2]
The later years of the reign of the Ming Jiajing Emperor (1521-1567) saw a peak in wakô activity, which subsided when, in 1567, the Ming Court lifted the bans on Chinese trade and interaction in Southeast Asia[3], thus allowing many so-called "wakô" to become legitimate traders and seafarers in the eyes of the Chinese authorities. Many smugglers still engaging in activities deemed illicit, such as trade with Japan, moved their bases at this time to Taiwan or the Philippines.[3]
Toyotomi Hideyoshi helped further weaken the wakô with a 1588 edict banning piracy. Hideyoshi established a definition of "Japanese waters," and declared that force could not be used to settle disputes within those boundaries; further, this edict severely weakened the ability of provincial daimyô to support, benefit from, or otherwise directly associate with pirates, i.e. the wakô.[4]
The imposition of maritime restrictions in the 1630s dealt a major blow to the wakô. All but three ports[5] were closed to foreign trade, and Japanese were forbidden from leaving the country or returning. Wakô activity still continued among Japanese, and others, based overseas, who traded (or raided) in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, as well as among, presumably, some small number of smugglers who continued to engage in illegal operations along the Kyushu coast. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, Ming loyalists continued to fight against the Manchu conquest for forty years; these loyalists, and others associated with them, may have been at times referred to as wakô in Qing documents.
It was only with the turn of the 18th century that the wakô phenomenon really petered out and came to an end. The Tokugawa shogunate solidified its control over Japan - including, to the extent it ever would, over the Kyushu daimyô who allowed or encouraged wakô activities in earlier times. Meanwhile, greater European presence and activity in the region (though not in Japan itself) brought a degree of stability.[4]
References
- Arano Yasunori. "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order." International Journal of Asian Studies 2:2 (2005). pp185-216.
