Changes

These economic developments among the rice merchants were intricately connected to parallel developments in other trades, and the formation of a number of networks of different types of guilds including ''[[kabunakama]]'', ''[[rakuichi]]'' and ''[[rakuza]]'', which developed out of the older guild types known as ''[[tonya]]'' and ''[[za]]''.

These economic developments among the rice merchants were intricately connected to parallel developments in other trades, and the formation of a number of networks of different types of guilds including ''[[kabunakama]]'', ''[[rakuichi]]'' and ''[[rakuza]]'', which developed out of the older guild types known as ''[[tonya]]'' and ''[[za]]''.

In the first years of the 1730s, as the result of poor harvests and trade issues, the price of rice plummeted. Though this looked good for buyers on the face of it, it wreaked havoc with an economy which was still based largely on rice as a medium of exchange. Samurai, whose income was in rice, panicked over the exchange rate into coin, and meanwhile speculators and various conspiracies within the brokers' community played games with the system, keeping vast stores of rice in the warehouses, which ensured low prices. A series of riots against the speculators, and against the conspiratorial, manipulative system as whole, erupted in [[1733]]; starvation was widespread, and meanwhile, speculators were acting to "corner" the market and to control prices. This was the first of a number of riots, called ''uchikowashi'' (打壊し), which would grow in frequency and size over the next century or so. The shogunate set a price floor in [[1735]], forcing merchants in Edo to sell for no less than one ''[[ryo|ryô]]'' per 1.4 ''[[koku]]'', and in Osaka no less than 42 ''[[momme]]'' per ''koku''. A 10 ''momme'' fine was charged of anyone found to have paid less. Over the fifteen years or so, until roughly 1750, the shogunate stepped in on a number of occasions to attempt to stabilize or control the economy. Though in 1730 the government budget as a whole was in balance (expenditures=revenue), interventions by the shogun over the ensuing years inadvertently led to economic collapse. [[Tokugawa Yoshimune]] made so many attempts at reforms and controls that he came to be known as ''Kome Kubô'' or ''Kome Shôgun'' (the Rice Shogun). At the same time, attempts were made at monetary policy, which largely resulted in solving the problems of the rice economy, while bringing debasement of the currency.

In the first years of the 1730s, as the result of poor harvests and trade issues, the price of rice plummeted. Though this looked good for buyers on the face of it, it wreaked havoc with an economy which was still based largely on rice as a medium of exchange. Samurai, whose income was in rice, panicked over the exchange rate into coin, and meanwhile speculators and various conspiracies within the brokers' community played games with the system, keeping vast stores of rice in the warehouses, which ensured low prices. A series of riots against the speculators, and against the conspiratorial, manipulative system as whole, erupted in [[1733]]; starvation was widespread, and meanwhile, speculators were acting to "corner" the market and to control prices. This was the first of a number of riots, called ''uchikowashi'' (打壊し), which would grow in frequency and size over the next century or so. The shogunate set a price floor in [[1735]], forcing merchants in Edo to sell for no less than one ''[[currency|ryô]]'' of gold per 1.4 ''[[koku]]'', and in Osaka no less than 42 ''[[currency|momme]]'' of silver per ''koku''. A 10 ''momme'' fine was charged of anyone found to have paid less. Over the fifteen years or so, until roughly 1750, the shogunate stepped in on a number of occasions to attempt to stabilize or control the economy. Though in 1730 the government budget as a whole was in balance (expenditures=revenue), interventions by the shogun over the ensuing years inadvertently led to economic collapse. [[Tokugawa Yoshimune]] made so many attempts at reforms and controls that he came to be known as ''Kome Kubô'' or ''Kome Shôgun'' (the Rice Shogun). At the same time, attempts were made at monetary policy, which largely resulted in solving the problems of the rice economy, while bringing debasement of the currency.

The shogunate re-established the Rice Exchange in [[1773]], under governmental sponsorship, regulation, and organization; the shogunate also established its own rice storehouse at this time. The direct impetus for this was a series of riots, as a result of famines, earlier that year. In general, however, by this point, the government realized the extreme economic power of the Rice Exchange in supporting the entire national economy, determining exchange rates, and even creating paper money. An incredible proportion of the nation's monetary transactions were handled through the private, independent, merchants of Dōjima, who stored rice for most of the daimyo, exchanging it for paper money. Dôjima held what were in essence "bank accounts" for a great number of samurai and daimyo, managing deposits, withdrawals, loans, and tax payments. Though the shogunate ultimately had little sense of modern economic theory, and thus would make some serious errors in their monetary and financial policy over the course of the following century or so, they nevertheless recognized the need for governmental control of such policies; exchange rates, monetary standards and the like had to be set by the government, and not left in the hands of an increasingly wealthy and powerful merchant class which was intended to be at the bottom of the [[neo-Confucianism|neo-Confucian]] ''[[mibunsei]]'' class system.

The shogunate re-established the Rice Exchange in [[1773]], under governmental sponsorship, regulation, and organization; the shogunate also established its own rice storehouse at this time. The direct impetus for this was a series of riots, as a result of famines, earlier that year. In general, however, by this point, the government realized the extreme economic power of the Rice Exchange in supporting the entire national economy, determining exchange rates, and even creating paper money. An incredible proportion of the nation's monetary transactions were handled through the private, independent, merchants of Dōjima, who stored rice for most of the daimyo, exchanging it for paper money. Dôjima held what were in essence "bank accounts" for a great number of samurai and daimyo, managing deposits, withdrawals, loans, and tax payments. Though the shogunate ultimately had little sense of modern economic theory, and thus would make some serious errors in their monetary and financial policy over the course of the following century or so, they nevertheless recognized the need for governmental control of such policies; exchange rates, monetary standards and the like had to be set by the government, and not left in the hands of an increasingly wealthy and powerful merchant class which was intended to be at the bottom of the [[neo-Confucianism|neo-Confucian]] ''[[mibunsei]]'' class system.