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| While the defense of other "gateways" to Japan at this time was entrusted entirely to individual domains (namely, the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of [[Tsushima han]] and the [[Shimazu clan]] of [[Satsuma han]], respectively, in guarding against foreign incursions in/via Tsushima and the Ryukyus), an arrangement much like that at Nagasaki was employed in [[Ezo]] in the 19th century, where the [[Tsugaru clan]] and [[Nanbu clan]] shared responsibility, and in [[Edo]]. | | While the defense of other "gateways" to Japan at this time was entrusted entirely to individual domains (namely, the [[So clan|Sô clan]] of [[Tsushima han]] and the [[Shimazu clan]] of [[Satsuma han]], respectively, in guarding against foreign incursions in/via Tsushima and the Ryukyus), an arrangement much like that at Nagasaki was employed in [[Ezo]] in the 19th century, where the [[Tsugaru clan]] and [[Nanbu clan]] shared responsibility, and in [[Edo]]. |
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− | White sails were spotted on 8/15, and assumed to be Dutch, even though the Dutch, who normally arrived in the 6th or 7th month, almost never came to Nagasaki this late in the season. It was for that same reason - the fact that no European ships were expected so late in the season - that only 50-60 samurai from Saga han were on duty, even though policy demanded 1,000 be present throughout the summer trading season (6th-9th months). The Dutch had already come for the season, and so most of the troops had returned to Saga already. | + | White sails were spotted on 8/15, and assumed to be Dutch, even though the Dutch, who normally arrived in the 6th or 7th month, almost never came to Nagasaki this late in the season. It was for that same reason - the fact that no European ships were expected so late in the season - that only 50-60 samurai from Saga han were on duty, even though policy demanded 1,000 be present throughout the summer trading season (6th-9th months). The Dutch had not come for the season, and were not expected to at this point, and so most of the troops had returned to Saga already. Typical numbers for the off-season were closer to 200-400, but even if this were to be considered the off-season, on account of the absence of Dutch trading ships that summer, the 50-60 present were a mere fraction of what was standard. |
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| The [[Dutch East India Company]] at this time used a wide variety of ships - including those from other countries - so, when the British warship ''Phaeton'' raised a Dutch flag, nothing was perceived as being unusual at first. The ship was permitted to approach, and to enter the harbor. It anchored at a spot called Kôsaki, and Japanese inspectors went to greet the captain and to inspect the ship. They found that it was much more heavily armed than a typical merchant vessel, with 38 eighteen-pound cannon, eight 32-pound carronades (a type of cannon), and two more carronades of unknown caliber. By contrast, the largest cannon the Japanese had nearby was only a 12-pounder. If a battle were to break out, the Japanese would be not only severely out-gunned, but outnumbered, even here in their own home port, the 250 British crew outnumbering the Saga samurai roughly five-to-one. | | The [[Dutch East India Company]] at this time used a wide variety of ships - including those from other countries - so, when the British warship ''Phaeton'' raised a Dutch flag, nothing was perceived as being unusual at first. The ship was permitted to approach, and to enter the harbor. It anchored at a spot called Kôsaki, and Japanese inspectors went to greet the captain and to inspect the ship. They found that it was much more heavily armed than a typical merchant vessel, with 38 eighteen-pound cannon, eight 32-pound carronades (a type of cannon), and two more carronades of unknown caliber. By contrast, the largest cannon the Japanese had nearby was only a 12-pounder. If a battle were to break out, the Japanese would be not only severely out-gunned, but outnumbered, even here in their own home port, the 250 British crew outnumbering the Saga samurai roughly five-to-one. |
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| In the end, the ''bugyô'' provided the British water, two cows, four sheep, and other food & provisions. The British released their captives and left the following morning. Matsudaira committed suicide that night, and a few hours later 8,000 troops arrived from Fukuoka han to serve as reinforcements and to attack the ''Phaeton'', which was now gone. | | In the end, the ''bugyô'' provided the British water, two cows, four sheep, and other food & provisions. The British released their captives and left the following morning. Matsudaira committed suicide that night, and a few hours later 8,000 troops arrived from Fukuoka han to serve as reinforcements and to attack the ''Phaeton'', which was now gone. |
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| + | ==Aftermath & Analysis== |
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| + | Before committing ''[[seppuku]]'', Matsudaira left behind a written account of his interpretation of the events which unfolded, and of where blame should be placed. Noell Wilson argues that among the chief motives behind his suicide were an acknowledgement of his failure to obey shogunate policy, which demanded that Nagasaki harbor be denied to foreigners other than the Dutch and Chinese, and that the British ship should have been destroyed. In killing himself, he pre-empted any formal trial and sentence, and thus saved his own family from harm or death, as was standard in such cases of ''seppuku'' committed in order to preserve or protect family honor. |
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| + | In his account, Matsudaira chastises his own men for failing to protect the Dutch agents, who were officially under the protection of the shogunate, from their abduction at the hands of the British. He then also rebukes Saga han for its failure to have enough men actively stationed in the harbor. It would seem, however, that even at the time it was unclear whether policy or precedent called for Saga troops to require permission from the Nagasaki ''bugyô'' to withdraw from their posts. Rather, it was standard for troops to withdraw - without explicit permission from the ''bugyô'' - after the Dutch ships left for the season; no Dutch ship had arrived nor was expected that summer. |
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| + | Matsudaira also argues that those in the position of Nagasaki ''bugyô'' should not be ''[[hatamoto]]'', as he was, with no forces of his own to call upon, but should instead be ''daimyô'', with their own armies, however small, upon which they could rely. It was the disparity between his rank or position and that of the ''daimyô'' of Saga and Fukuoka that exacerbated ambiguities in the command hierarchy of the defense of Nagasaki harbor. Nagasaki ''bugyô'' had initially been ''daimyô'', but this practice had come to an end quite early in the Edo period, as the result of misconduct on the part of [[Takenaka Shigeyoshi]], Nagasaki ''bugyô'' from 1629-1633, and ''daimyô'' of [[Funai han]]. |
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| + | Some sources argue that fiscal difficulties on the part of Saga han were to blame for an inability to muster sufficient forces; yet, while Saga may have indeed been experiencing financial difficulties, other sources argue that complacency borne out of the extreme rarity of incidents in which martial defense was called for, was truly to blame for chronic shortfalls in manpower. |
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| ==References== | | ==References== |