Changes

*''Japanese'': 倭寇 ''(wakou; C: wōkòu; K: waegu)''

*''Japanese'': 倭寇 ''(wakou; C: wōkòu; K: waegu)''

The ''wakô'' were raiders, pirates, or brigands active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref>  

The ''wakô'' were raiders, pirates, or brigands active in East Asian waters in the [[Kamakura period|Kamakura]] to early [[Edo period]]s, the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century (the late [[Muromachi period|Muromachi]] or [[Sengoku period]]). The term might be literally translated as "Japanese pirates," the ''wa'' (倭) denoting Japan, but many ''wakô'' were in fact Chinese.<ref name=arano186>Arano. p186.</ref>

 

 

==Early Wakô==

==Early Wakô==

The shogunate officially acknowledged Ming China as its [[suzerain]] in the 1390s, and entered into [[tribute|tributary relations]] which would continue through the 15th century. However, ''wakô'' raids occurred during this time as well. On occasion, the Japanese authorities would capture Japanese pirates and present them to the Ming authorities as proof that they were taking action, but the shogunate did not always demonstrate willingness to take action against the pirates. More to the point, despite the fact that the shogunate did not always have the ability to enforce order on the seas, to apprehend pirates, and to otherwise deal with the situation, the Ming Court seems to have been convinced that the shogunate had full power to control the raids.<ref>So. p4.</ref> This insistence on the part of the Chinese authorities would continue through the 16th century, and would prove a major obstacle to friendly relations between China and Japan.

The shogunate officially acknowledged Ming China as its [[suzerain]] in the 1390s, and entered into [[tribute|tributary relations]] which would continue through the 15th century. However, ''wakô'' raids occurred during this time as well. On occasion, the Japanese authorities would capture Japanese pirates and present them to the Ming authorities as proof that they were taking action, but the shogunate did not always demonstrate willingness to take action against the pirates. More to the point, despite the fact that the shogunate did not always have the ability to enforce order on the seas, to apprehend pirates, and to otherwise deal with the situation, the Ming Court seems to have been convinced that the shogunate had full power to control the raids.<ref>So. p4.</ref> This insistence on the part of the Chinese authorities would continue through the 16th century, and would prove a major obstacle to friendly relations between China and Japan.

==Wakô in the 16th Century==

==Early 16th Century==

Though relations between Ming [[China]] and the Ashikaga shogunate were quite good for a time, with merchants from both countries engaging in official trade, by the early 16th century, tensions arose between the two powers. The increasingly weak shogunate did not wield strong control throughout Japan, let alone overseas, and was unable to curb or halt the attacks by Japanese pirates, acting independently, upon the Chinese coast.<ref name=so204>So. p204.</ref> By the 1530s, Sengoku (i.e. civil war in many parts of Japan) was in full swing, the shogunate held little power, and relations with China had fully soured.

Though relations between Ming [[China]] and the Ashikaga shogunate were quite good for a time, with merchants from both countries engaging in official trade, by the early 16th century, tensions arose between the two powers. The increasingly weak shogunate did not wield strong control throughout Japan, let alone overseas, and was unable to curb or halt the attacks by Japanese pirates, acting independently, upon the Chinese coast.<ref name=so204>So. p204.</ref> By the 1530s, Sengoku (i.e. civil war in many parts of Japan) was in full swing, the shogunate held little power, and relations with China had fully soured.

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>

After 1555, the ''wakô'' threat to the central Jiangnan region diminished, as the pirates turned their attentions to Fujian to the south, and Anhui to the north. Raids became fewer. Yet, altogether, eleven cities had been captured by the raiders, and countless coastal unwalled market towns attacked. After 1561, ''wakô'' attacks diminished even further, except in and around Fujian,<ref>So. pp6-7.</ref> and in [[1563]], Chinese military forces expelled a number of ''wakô'' from that region as well.<ref name=so204/>

While there were certainly many Japanese who did engage in violent acts of piracy and raiding, however, one of the chief factors contributing to the growth of the phenomenon was the Chinese ''[[hai jin]]'' ban on overseas travel and trade, imposed in [[1557]]. Formal trade with foreign countries (including Japan) was only allowed to occur within the framework of [[tribute|tributary relations]], and only at certain designated ports. Strict restrictions were placed on Chinese contact or trade with foreigners. In theory, this was intended to prevent Chinese merchants or seamen from becoming involved with the ''wakô'' or other foreign forces, but in practice, such policies were ineffective in preventing contact and trade - a great many Chinese settled abroad and conducted trade and other interactions as "overseas Chinese" no longer subject to Ming law.<ref name=arano186/> Furthermore, in the eyes of the Chinese Court, Japanese seamen who sought to trade with Chinese, or to make port in China, as well as many Chinese seeking to trade with Japanese, were considered in violation of the bans, and were labeled criminals, and ''wakô''. In this way, the numbers of the ''wakô'', and their perceived presence, grew dramatically.

While there were certainly many Japanese who did engage in violent acts of piracy and raiding, however, one of the chief factors contributing to the growth of the phenomenon was the Chinese ''[[hai jin]]'' ban on overseas travel and trade, imposed in [[1557]]. Formal trade with foreign countries (including Japan) was only allowed to occur within the framework of [[tribute|tributary relations]], and only at certain designated ports. Strict restrictions were placed on Chinese contact or trade with foreigners. In theory, this was intended to prevent Chinese merchants or seamen from becoming involved with the ''wakô'' or other foreign forces, but in practice, such policies were ineffective in preventing contact and trade - a great many Chinese settled abroad and conducted trade and other interactions as "overseas Chinese" no longer subject to Ming law.<ref name=arano186/> Furthermore, in the eyes of the Chinese Court, Japanese seamen who sought to trade with Chinese, or to make port in China, as well as many Chinese seeking to trade with Japanese, were considered in violation of the bans, and were labeled criminals, and ''wakô''. In this way, the numbers of the ''wakô'', and their perceived presence, grew dramatically.

The issue of terminology is thus quite central to discussion of the ''wakô''. The question arises as to why Chinese and Korean authorities, and the official records they produced, employed the term when, arguably, in many cases, that being described was either not Japanese, or not a band of pirates. Yet, as with many historical terms, the issue is complicated by the fact that officials, historically, had no intention, and made no conscious effort, to employ the term in a consistent manner. Rather, the term was often used, or avoided, for explicit political purposes - such as to attack or protect certain parties or interests; its usage also varied from individual to individual, from case to case, and from time to time.<ref name=so209>So. p209.</ref>

The issue of terminology is thus quite central to discussion of the ''wakô''. The question arises as to why Chinese and Korean authorities, and the official records they produced, employed the term when, arguably, in many cases, that being described was either not Japanese, or not a band of pirates. Yet, as with many historical terms, the issue is complicated by the fact that officials, historically, had no intention, and made no conscious effort, to employ the term in a consistent manner. Rather, the term was often used, or avoided, for explicit political purposes - such as to attack or protect certain parties or interests; its usage also varied from individual to individual, from case to case, and from time to time.<ref name=so209>So. p209.</ref>

Nevertheless, in aggregate, an image emerges of Chinese and Korean use of the term ''wakô'', or "Japanese pirates," to refer not only to Japanese raiders, brigands and the like, but also to raiders and brigands of a number of other ethnicities (mainly Chinese), to smugglers and traders less involved in violent or predatory activity, and to the formal samurai invasion forces of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]]. The 17th century Official History of the Ming (''[[Ming shi]]''), among other primary sources, links the ''wakô'' to Japanese foreign relations policy, implying if not stating outright that the ''wakô'' were agents of the central Japanese authorities, and conflating pirate raids and the like with Hideyoshi's formal invasion forces. These sources also make little or no distinction between those who committed violent acts of piracy and coastal raids, and those who simply engaged in maritime trade in violation of Ming law. These conflations and distortions are reflected in much later scholarship, and in modern-day textbooks as well.

Nevertheless, in aggregate, an image emerges of Chinese and Korean use of the term ''wakô'', or "Japanese pirates," to refer not only to Japanese raiders, brigands and the like, but also to raiders and brigands of a number of other ethnicities (mainly Chinese), to smugglers and traders less involved in violent or predatory activity, and to the formal samurai invasion forces of [[Toyotomi Hideyoshi]]. The 17th century Official History of the Ming (''Ming shi''), among other primary sources, links the ''wakô'' closely to Japanese foreign relations policy, implying if not stating outright that the ''wakô'' were agents of the central Japanese authorities, and conflating pirate raids and the like with Hideyoshi's formal invasion forces. These sources also make little or no distinction between those who committed violent acts of piracy and coastal raids, and those who simply engaged in maritime trade in violation of Ming law. Though other prominent sources such as the ''[[Ming shi-lu]]'' (''The Veritable Records of the Ming'') do not misrepresent the subject in this way, the conflations and distortions seen in the ''Ming shi'' and elsewhere are reflected widely in modern scholarship, and in modern-day textbooks as well.

Some contemporary sources, however, were much more clear on the actual identities and activities of the so-called "Japanese pirates." A 1596 text by Vice Commissioner for Military Defense Cai Fengshi describes the "Wo" as not being all barbarians, i.e. Japanese, but as actually being led by spurious barbarians, i.e. Chinese, and goes on to recommend that the concern should be not with the "barbarians," but with the "spurious barbarians."<ref>Ts'ai Feng-shih. ''An Illustrated Discourse on the Maritime Defenses of Wen-chou and Ch'u-chou'' (''Wen-Ch'u hai-fang t'u-lüeh''). Cited in translation in So. p212.</ref> Similarly, Xie Jie (d. 1604), wrote that "the pirates and the traders were the same people. When trade flourished, the pirates became traders; when trade was banned, the traders became pirates."<ref>So. p214.</ref> He goes on to cite Chinese bans on trade and other restrictions and policies as the chief causes of ''wakô'' activity, suggesting that if trade were allowed to take place legally, illegal activity would diminish.<ref>So. pp215-216.</ref>

Some contemporary sources, however, were much more clear on the actual identities and activities of the so-called "Japanese pirates." A 1596 text by Vice Commissioner for Military Defense Cai Fengshi describes the "Wo" as not being all barbarians, i.e. Japanese, but as actually being led by spurious barbarians, i.e. Chinese, and goes on to recommend that the concern should be not with the "barbarians," but with the "spurious barbarians."<ref>Ts'ai Feng-shih. ''An Illustrated Discourse on the Maritime Defenses of Wen-chou and Ch'u-chou'' (''Wen-Ch'u hai-fang t'u-lüeh''). Cited in translation in So. p212.</ref> Similarly, Xie Jie (d. 1604), wrote that "the pirates and the traders were the same people. When trade flourished, the pirates became traders; when trade was banned, the traders became pirates."<ref>So. p214.</ref> He goes on to cite Chinese bans on trade and other restrictions and policies as the chief causes of ''wakô'' activity, suggesting that if trade were allowed to take place legally, illegal activity would diminish.<ref>So. pp215-216.</ref>